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The  problem of  the  nature  of  ideality  is  decisive  for  the  whole  phenomenological
philosophy. Not only because it was the proper sense of this ideality, and its role in the
definition  of  phenomenology,  in  question at  the beginning of  the phenomenological
schism  and  the  following  accusation  of  alleged  “idealism”  around  1908,  but  also
because, even though it  represents the task which defines phenomenology the most,
remains an issue under many aspects still not completely settled1. Ideality  assumes in
fact different characteristics and features in the development of Husserl's thought. By
presenting a distinct nature at the edge of the genetic analysis with the introduction of
history and intersubjectivity in the analysis of experience and cognition2, in comparison
with the approach to mathematical and logical objects in the early years of his work,
Husserl's  understanding  of  ideality  even  seems  to  show  features,  prima  facie,
irreconcilable. 
In fact, while the problem of the nature of ideality and more specifically of the ideal
1 Looking  briefly  into  this  complex  issue,  by  example,  if  Husserl  defines  in  his  1921  Formale  und
transzendentale Logik his philosophy as «phenomenological idealismus», in 1913 he also notably states in
Ideas I that phenomenology should not be intended as a idealismus in the traditional sense of the word. E.
Husserl,  Formale und transzendentale Logik, in Husserliana XVII, ed. P. Jannsen (Martinus Nijhoff, Den
Haag,  1974),  p.  178  sgg.  See  also,  K.  Schuhmann,  Die  Dialektik  der  Phänomenologie  II:  reine
Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, in Phaenomenologica, 57 (Martinus Nijhoff, Den
Haag,  1973), p.  191.  More  recently,  V.  De  Palma,  “Ist  Husserl  Phänomenologie  ein  transzendentaler
Idealismus“, in Husserl Studies, 21, 2005, pp. 183 – 206, and also D. Zahavi, “Husserl and the 'absolute'”,
in  Philosophy,  Phenomenology,  Sciences,  Pahenomenologica,  200,  ed.  C.  Ierna,  H.  Jacobs,  F.  Mattens
(Springer, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New York, 2010), pp. 71 – 92. On the question of a possible
refutation of idealism in Husserl  writings were presented many hypothesis:  S.  Bachelard identifies  for
example  a Husserlian “refutation of idealism” in  Formal and Transcendental Logic -  S. Bachelard,  La
Logique de Husserl, (épiméthée, Paris, 1957), while L. Alweiss and N. De Warren (2009) locate it in the
Cartesian  Meditations;  see L. Alweiss,  The World Unclaimed: A Challange to Heidegger's Critique of
Husserl  (Ohio  University  Press,  Ohio,  2003)  and  N.  De  Warren,  Husserl  and  the  promise  of  time:
subjectivity in transcendental phenomenology (Modern European philosophy, Cambridge University Press,
New York, 2009). 
2 See the classical, L. Landgrebe,  Phänomenologie und Geschichte (Mohn, Gütersloh, 1967), A. Pazanin,
Wissenschaft  und Geschichte  in  der  Phänomenologie E.  Husserls,  in  Phaenomenologica,  46 (Martinus
Nijhoff,  Den Haag,  1972)  and  Lebenswelt  und  Wissenschaften  in  der  Philosophie  E.  Husserls,  ed.  E.
Ströker (Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M., 1979).
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objects  is  «not  a  problem  among  others  in  phenomenology, by determining  the
possibility itself of a phenomenological philosophy», it appears still not a easy task to
define and emphasize the nature of Husserl's account of ideality in a coherent way, even
considering the key role just recalled1. If he has offered and very convincingly argued in
favor of the necessity to recognize something like “essences”, and even indicated in the
entire extent of his work lots of different expressions for ideality (Wesen, Essenz, Eidos,
Idealität,  etc.)  and  the  “grasping”  of  essences  or  «universal  objects»,  their explicit
determination is more often negative than positive. For example, essences are said not to
be spatiotemporal realities, nor reducible to mere psychological data or to the mental
status of the subject of knowing. They are also not involved, at least directly, with a
metaphysical statement about their ontological status, like in the case of some sort of
Platonic  hypostatizations2.  Husserl  even  stressed  the  distinction  of  his  «universal
concept of (either formal or material) essence» from other philosophical or scientific
tradition, as for example in the case of the still «supremely important Kantian concept of
idea»3,  but  the negative features are  still  much easier to  discern than the traits  of a
positive solution.
In his early years Husserl tried in many ways to argue about the existence and status of
an ideal dimension irreducible to factuality.  In his  Prolegomena zur reinen Logik in
1900 he constructs, for example, an argument for the existence of this ideal dimension
around the concept of truth: as long as there is something like truth, there must be an
ideal dimension irreducible to facts. This argument bases its cogency on the fact that
every possible  judgment  needs  to  refer  to  something  which  preserves  its  unity  and
identity in order to obtain «general contents», on the basis of which we can formulate
and share verifiable judgments and knowledge. 
Husserl was at this time pushed to claim on the existence of this ideal dimension due to
his purpose to avoid any kind of psychological or anthropological skepticism, as it is
already well know. The conditions for such judgment and truth could in fact be mere
psychological facts of a particular species or, even worst, an individual, but this would
1 S. Rinofner-Kreidl, Edmund Husserl.Zeitlichkeit und Intentionalität (Karl Alber, Freiburg, München, 2000),
p. 682.
2 E. Husserl,  Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie.  Erstes Buch:
Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, in Husserliana III/1, ed. W. Biemel (Martinus Nijhoff,
Den Haag, 1950), p. 40. For a recent discussion on this topic, see also, A. Zohk, “The Ontological Status of
Essences in Husserl’s Thought”, in New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy,
XI, 2012, pp. 99 – 130.
3 E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch, cit.,
p. 6.
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reduce general contents to facts belonging to the psychological and factual state of a
particular being1. Judgments claiming to be truthful become mere couplings of facts,
which belong to two different dimensions respectively, but since facts are individual
determinations  also  their  coupling  would  represent  therefore  just  an  individual
determination. The reduction of truth to an individual determination does destroy the
truth claim to lead to stable and valid knowledge:
«The constitution of a species is a fact: from fact it is only possible to derive other
facts.  To base facts  relativistically on the  constitution of  the  species  therefore
means to give it a factual character. This is absurd. Every fact is individually and
therefore  temporally  determinate.  In  the  case  of  truth,  talk  of  temporal
determination only makes sense in regard to a fact posited by a truth (provided,
that is, that it is a truth about facts): it make no sense in regard to the truth itself.
(…) If  someone wished to  argue from the fact  that a true judgment,  like any
judgment, must spring from the constitution of the judging subject in virtue of
appropriate natural laws, we should warn him not to confuse the “judgment”, qua
content  of  judgment,  i.  e.  as  a  ideal  unity,  with  the  individual,  real  act  of
judgment. It is the former that we mean when we speak of the judgment 2 x 2 = 4,
which is the same whoever passes it. (…) My act of judging that 2 x 2 = 4 is no
doubt causally determined, but this not true of the truth 2 x 2 = 4»2.  
Truth  as  knowledge  of  reality  requires  a  stable  grasp  of  something  endowed  with
universal validity, otherwise, conceived as just an individual fact among other individual
facts, truths and ideas as facts implies the assertion that it does not exist any proper
truth, which is, of course, radical skepticism and even contradictory. We are therefore
forced to grant the existence of ideas, or essences, not reducible to factuality3.
This assert leads hereafter also to account the issue of the nature  of the relationship
between truth and reality. The fact that, if there must be truth there must be entities
which are more than individual, does not explain for itself the relation between essence
1 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. 118f.
2 Ibid., p. 126.
3 See, B.C Hopkins, “Phenomenological Cognition of the A Priori: Husserl's method of “Seeing Essences”
(Wesenserschauung)”, in  Husserl in Contemporary Context. Prospects and Projects for Phenomenology,
Contributions to Phenomenology, 26, ed B.C. Hopkins (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston,
London, 1997), p. 151. 
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and  reality.  Essences  are  in  fact  primarily  accounted  by  opposition  to  the  factual.
Essence is not individual and immutable,  and that  enables factuality to be grasped,
which is individual and mutable, temporal and empirical, where again ideal must be by
result  non-temporal1 and  metempirical2.  All  this  features  can  be  only understood  if
related  properly  to  each  other,  their  non-individuality  to  their  non-temporal  and
metempirical nature. Essences must be non-temporal in the sense that they must not be
labile and changeable, in fact only on their ground is allowed the stable identification
across the volatile flow of facts. However, this argument does not lead to the assertion
regarding their existence in a dimension of “eternity” parallel and foreign to the worldly
existence, so that this eternity only means  «that every judgment is bound by the pure
laws of logic without regard to time and circumstances, or to individual and species»,
where this being bound is mean «in the ideal sense of a norm and not psychologically as
a thought-compulsion»3. 
If essences and ideal objects are in fact metempirical because of the impossibility of
their  been  understood  as  something  fully  dependent  on  the  peculiarities  and
individuality  of  factual  experiencing,  this  doesn't  mean  that  they  are  dimension
completely  separated  and  foreign  to  the  dimension  of  experience.  Obviously,  the
relation  of  the  two  spheres  have  been  interpreted  by  Husserl's  in  many  ways  and
explained by taking different explicative strategies which has also led to interpretative
misunderstandings4. 
If to each science corresponds an object-province as domain of its investigations, and if
to all its correct statements correspond, as ground of legitimacy, intuitions in which their
objects become themselves given as existing and «given originally», we can distinguish,
on the one side, natural cognition and all the sciences belonging to this sphere, to which
is proper  presentive intuition articulated as natural experience and perception and, on
the other  side,  the science of pure essences,  to which is  proper a  radical  change in
1 See E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. , p. 85, 136.
2 See, for example, Ibid., p. 76, 108, 134.
3 Ibid., p. 147.
4 Husserl sums very concisely in his 1921 preface to the second edition of the VI Logical Investigation the
history  of  one  major  misunderstanding:  «I  remain  of  the  opinion  that  the  chapter  on  “Sensuous  and
Categorial Intuition”, together with the preparatory arguments of the preceding chapters, has opened the
way for  a  phenomenological  clarification  of  logical  self-evidence  (and  eo  ipso  of  its  parallels  in  the
axiological and practical sphere). Many misunderstandings of my Ideas towards a Pure Phenomenology
would not have been possible had these chapters been attended to», E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen,
zweiter Band, zweiter Teil, in Husserliana XIX/2, ed. U. Panzer (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague,
Boston,  Lancaster,  1984),  p.  534.  See  also,  S.  Rinofner-Kreidl,  Edmund  Husserl.  Zeitlichkeit  und
Intentionalität, cit., p. 627 – 30. 
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methodology and objects of investigation. «Experiential sciences are science of “matter
of facts”», where their cognitional act as experience posits something real individually,
factually and existing spatiotemporally, as something with its duration, position in space
and time, and that, with respect to its essence, could just as well have been at any other
spatiotemporal locus, with any other shape and changeable nature1. This defines in fact
the contingent nature of every sort of individual existence: it is thus, but in respect of its
essence it could be otherwise. The ideal dimension could therefore on the contrary be
indicated as counterpart of this contingency. As Husserl points out:
«The sense of this contingency, which is called factualness, is limited in that it is
correlative to a necessity which does not signify the mere de facto existence of an
obtaining rule of coordination among spatiotemporal matters of fact but rather has
the character of  eidetic necessity and with this a relation to  eidetic universality.
When we said that any matter of fact, “in respect of its own essence,” could be
otherwise,  we  were  already  saying  that  it  belongs  to  the  sense  of  anything
contingent to have an essence and therefore an Eidos which can be apprehended
purely; and this Eidos comes under eidetic truths belonging to different levels of
universality»2.
That defines therefore also the status of the natural laws and hereafter part of natural
knowledge and of the scientific thought grounding on it. Even if they express definite
laws of nature, i.e. the fact that for example, something in real circumstances must exist
as  consequence  of  another  fact,  these  laws  «express  only  de  facto  rules  which
themselves could read quite otherwise»; they even presuppose in fact, that the object of
experience which is governed by such rules is, considered for itself, contingent. 
It poses a very complex issue the relation between science and its respective objects and
rules, considering the differences within the definition of both. Here, it must suffice only
a brief statement on the essential connection of phenomenology as «rigorous eidetic
science» and the ideal  dimension to  which it  refers,  a statement  that  seems to take
shapes by opposition with science and its definition as dependent from the factual status
1 E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch, cit.,
p. 8.
2 Ibid., p. 9.
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of its  objects1. Phenomenology,  then,  will  be satisfied  only  with a  cognition  that  is
absolutely certain,  and in this sense it will  be concerned only with an object that is
absolutely necessary, in no way contingent, which is but another way of saying that it is
the  object  of  an  absolutely certain  and ultimately “rational”  cognition.  This  sort  of
philosophy will refuse therefore  any conclusion that has not been absolutely valid; thus
it wants to be a science in direct contact with absolute being, which can only be for
Husserl, however, “essential being”, and the whole orientation of his phenomenology
therefore will be to achieve a knowledge of the essential. He will not deny the existence
of a world and as well not all the others kind of existence, he will yet simply deny that
such an existence  can  have  much of  significance  for  philosophy,  since this  kind  of
existence can only be contingent.
But already the very few words above show the importance for phenomenology of the
problem concerning the complex articulation of the ideal dimension of knowledge, and,
from the very beginning, the peculiar position of phenomenology with respect to science
and to the epistemological explication of how objective knowledge must be possible. All
of  those  questions  involve  radically  in  phenomenology  the  question  of  its  proper
methodology as a guarantee for its claim to be scientific and, by aiming to build up a
rigorous theory of knowledge, a  Wissenschaftslehre in its own sense. Husserl wrote in
fact in the introduction to Ideas I that
«pure or transcendental phenomenology will become established, not as a science
of matters  of fact,  but  as a science  of essences (as an “eidetic” science),  (…)
which exclusively seeks to ascertain “cognitions of essences” and no “matter of
fact” whatever. The relevant reduction which leads over from the psychological
phenomena to the pure “essence” or,  in the case of judgmental thinking, from
matter-of-fact  (“empirical”)  universality  to  “eidetic” universality,  is  the  eidetic
reduction».2
An  important  aspect  of  the  question  concerning  Husserl's  approach  to  the  ideal
dimension  of  experience  refers  to  the  peculiar  methodological  claim  of  the
1 See E. Husserl, “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft”, in Logos, I,  pp. 289 – 341. Now in E. Husserl,
Aufsätze und Vorträge (1911 – 1921), in Husserliana XXV, ed. T. Nenon and H. R. Sepp (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster, 1987), pp. 3 – 62.
2 E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch, cit.,
p. 4.
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phenomenological investigation, which, having been labeled as “eidetic”, defines the
very nature of phenomenology itself as intended by Husserl in the form of «a science of
essence  –  as  an  “a  priori”  or  (…)  as  an  eidetic  science»1,  and  hereafter, specifies
phenomenology in its relation to philosophy and science in general. The question on the
nature of ideality isn't in fact only fundamental for the definition of phenomenology as
philosophy,  but  also  for  its  relation  to  other  philosophical  and  scientific  thoughts.
Considering for example the fact that logic and mathematics are both forms of cognition
that relate to ideal and universal objects, it seems that it must have been the stated goal
of phenomenology, at least clear in the Prolegomena and the Logical Investigations, but
already  present  at  the  time  of  the  Philosophie  der  Arithmetik,  to  provide  an
epistemological foundation for the apprehension of ideal objects and, consequently, also
a foundation for the possibility of science. 
It is also well-known, that by the insistence on the ideal and irreducible meaning of
logical  objects,  Husserl  tried  to  move from,  and to  argue  against,  various  forms  of
psychologism,  especially,  logical  psychologism2.  But  his  struggle  moves  also in  the
same direction of other approaches in the field of philosophy of mathematics and logic.
If the way in which phenomenology and the earlier Husserlian approach describes the
apprehension of ideal objects does have therefore an impact on the definition of these
objects for itself and in their relations, that puts at the same time the phenomenological
description  in relation  with  other  perspectives  which  are  dealing  with  the  same
philosophical problem: a coherent explanation of the conditions and possibility of valid
knowledge originated in cognition and experience.    
For Husserl, any account of how knowledge is possible and how knowledge in general
can be possible, must provide a solid description of how consciousness can apprehend
objects of higher-order and ideal objects, that are the kind of objects that do “transcend”
1 Ibid., p. 5.
2 According to Husserl, psychologism and logical psychologism are not to be identified. If the first indicates
a research concerning the psychical acts of cognition in their full dimension, an inquiry with seems to be to
some  extent  legitimate,  even  representing  phenomenology  itself  a  philosophical  refined  and
methodological-grounded version, logical psychologism represents an illicit extension of such a research by
reducing the validity of logical objects and laws to factual events occurrences of human psyche. He writes
in fact in the Formal and Transcendental Logic: «It is noteworthy that readers regarded the “Prolegoma zur
reinen Logik” as an unqualified overcoming of psychologism and failed to take notice that nowhere in that
volume was psychologism pure and simple (as a universal epistemological aberration) the theme. Rather
the discussion concerned a psychologism with a quite particular sense, namely the psychologizing of the
irreal significational  formations that  are the theme of logic».  E. Husserl,  Formale und transzendentale
Logik, in Husserliana XVII, cit., p. 160.   
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the  immanent  content  and  acts  of  intentional  consciousness1.  It  could  be  hereafter
stressed that, beyond the fact that the first Husserlian works are primarily interested in a
philosophical inquiry into the abstract functions which leads to the formation of the
logical-  and  mathematical-grounding  concepts,  while  in  the  late  works  he  appeared
more  focused  on  the  question  of  the  proper  epistemological  relevance  of  human
experience and praxis, one of the central theme always present from the Philosophy of
Arithmetic up to the  Crisis is the description of the kind of experience within which
concepts, judgments, till up to even higher forms of cognition are deployed. 
Under  this  point  of  view,  phenomenology  distinguishes  itself  as  philosophy  from
science tout court, and that is already before the late meditations of the Krisis. In fact, in
1896, and that is before the  phenomenological turn of its philosophy, by stating the
efficacy  of  scientific  knowledge,  Husserl  already  outlines  this  very  aspect  of  his
understanding of philosophy. He writes in his lecture on Logic held in Halle a few years
before the Prolegomena zur reinen Logic:
«The mathematicians, the physicist and the astronomer, do not need any proper
insight into the very last principles of their scientific doing in order to operate
scientific processes. And even if the results obtained by the latter possess for him
the strength of rational certainty, he can not claim to demonstrate in general the
last principles on which the cogency of his method is grounded, and therefore, to
have guaranteed for his science the higher theoretical status»2.
The  question of  the validity of  objective knowledge and the  claim connected  to  its
foundation is, as well-known, retaken also in the very late  Krisis, which is in fact, a
“critic” of scientific knowledge in the sense of an “analysis” of its reasons, birth and
history. Even if this analysis comes after a deep methodological development and self-
understanding of Husserl's principles of investigation, still here, scientific knowledge is
intended as a “transformation” in the sense of a «idealization» of what is already present
previously  to  science,  in  the  Lebenswelt,  which  must  be  investigated  in  order  to
understand the «functioning activity» of the transcendental ego as the source of sense,
1 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 389.
2 E. Husserl, Logic. Vorlesung 1896, in Husserliana, Materialienbände, I, ed E. Schuhmann (Springer Science
and Business, Dordrecht, 2001), p. 3.
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and thereby accomplishing the scope of phenomenology as philosophy1.      
However,  it  must  be  already  stressed  out  that  the  proper  understanding  of
phenomenology should not reduce its entire enterprise and scope to the mere critic of
scientific knowledge, a view that will be far from a proper understanding of Husserl's
entire project. Husserl's enterprise and especially in its full range of interest, does raise
many  questions,  which  can  even  be  understood  as  problems  belonging  to  some
traditional  areas  of  philosophical  inquiry  into  the  relation  between  experience  and
abstract  knowledge.  There  could  be  first  a  straightforward  metaphysical  question,
namely the question as to whether there are abstract or ideal entities, a question that has
occupied philosophy since its  birth  and has  assumed different  shapes  and definition
throughout its entire history. Especially with the development after the first half of the
19th century of  logical  and mathematical  studies  with a strong formal  and symbolic
orientation, the problem concerning ideal objects and their role in scientific thought had
risen,  secondly,  a  semantical  question,  which  concerns  whether  there  are  utterances
whose truth commits or not commits one to the existence of abstract objects. There are
therefore epistemological issues, namely the questions as to whether there is knowledge
about abstract objects and how this knowledge has to be properly described, say for
example, in terms of direct grasp or intuition, as a form of abstraction, or if there is only
an inductive way leading to the ideal contents. 
Phenomenology in  its  questioning  ideal  objects  seems to  take  part  and to  show its
peculiarity with respect to all the questions mentioned above; but its major contribution
is to be found in its attempt to clarify the problem of access to ideal and valid content of
knowledge without reducing the investigation to only one aspect of the general inquiry,
like the semantical one, for example, nor to a specific field (mathematics, logic etc.),
and  moreover,  the  peculiarity  of  the  investigation  seems  to  be  define  by  the
methodology itself applied and its own development.    
The method undergoes in fact during the long journey of the Husserlian phenomenology
under many adjustments and changes, from the  Logical Investigations throughout the
1925  lecture  Phenomenological  Psychology and  the  very  later  stages.  And  even  if
phenomenology  has  been  yet  differently  defined,  the  transition  from  its  more
“descriptive” nature to the “transcendental”, in no way constitutes a break in Husserl's
1 E.  Husserl,  Die  Krisis  der  europäischen  Wissenschaftem und die  transzendentale  Phänomenologie,  in
Husserliana, VI, ed. W. Biemel (artinus Nijhoff, Haag, 1976), p. XIX.
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thought. It is in fact but the logical explicitation of what was implicit or already present
in the earlier period. 
Besides  the  confrontation  with  the  scientific  thought  in  general  and  with  its  own
method, the aim posed by Husserl to his phenomenology leads also to a confrontation
with the history of philosophy, logic and mathematics in his attempt to clarify the nature
of the ideal dimension. It is well-known the major interest in the early years for the
mathematical  and  logical  thought,  interest  which  led  Husserl  to  confront  the  main
theories in logic and the more straightforward mathematics of logic of its time. This
ground interest is easy to show as one of the more consistent in Husserl's thought, by
referring to the methodological evolution that the statements in the fourth and sixth of
the  Logical Investigation on the theory of forms and validity in the logical field will
undergo in the late  Formal and Transcendental Logic  and with the delineation in this
work of the “formal logic”1. The latter precedes yet the analysis of constitution which
with its «subjective inquiries» aims to discover the origin of validity for the objective
formations and poses the early investigations into the frame of a transcendental logic
and the genetic methodology, continuing to claim for this logic the role of a theory of
science2. 
Also the confrontation with the philosophical tradition has surely represented a starting
point for Husserl in his inquiry into ideal. For exaple, Husserl seems to adopt Plato's
terminology for his own theory of essences, like in the case of idea, eidos and methexis,
conducting  therefore  with  such  a  terminological  choose  even  to  misleading
interpretations.  Moreover,  Plato becomes  in  the  early years  of  Husserl's  teaching in
Freiburg even more present. He recognized for example the Athenian philosopher as
«the founder of philosophy as rigorous science»3 and, in his lecture  Einleitung in die
Philosophie from 1919 – 20, the «discoverer of the idea» and even «of the Apriori» 4.
Under this point of view, Husserl saw in Plato the proper germ of logic, and even more
1 E. Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik, cit. p. 53f.
2 Ibid., cit. p. 256f. This structure comes in clear presentation in a letter to Ingarden dated 23 th of December
1928, during the preliminary works for Formal and Transcendental Logic. So Husserl: «I'm working hard
on a writing – the development of the idea of logic as theory of science. First in connection with the
Logical Investigation. 1. Formal logic and formal ontology, all withing a deep phenomenological analysis;
therefore, the transition to the psychological and transcendental, and also the extension to the idea of a real
and universal ontology and phenomenology». 
3 E. Husserl, Natur und Geist. Vorlesung Sommersemester 1919, p. 4.  and  E. Husserl,  Erste Philosophie
(1923/24), Erster Teil: Kritische Ideengeschichte, in Husserliana VII, ed. R. Boehm (Martinus Nijhoff, Den
Haag, 1956), p. 327.
4 E. Husserl, Einleitung in die Philosophie, Vorlesungen 1916 – 1920, in Husserliana, Materialien, IX, ed. H.
Jacobs, (Springer, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London, 2012), p. 36, 44.
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in the direction of his own interpretation, of the «universal logic»: «We must therefore
state in general, within his dialectic Plato has already foreseen with clarity a universal
theory of science, and that, by inquiring into all correlations proper to the essence of
knowledge»1.  It will come therefore as no surprise to see Husserl a few years later, in
his famous Kaizo-Artikel from 1924, accounting his «inquiry into essence» as «the pure
and resulting application of the method of “seeing ideas” already introduced in science
by Socrates and Plato»2. 
Notoriously,  it  was  Husserl's  encounter  with Hermann Lotze's  Logik3 and especially
with his interpretation of the platonic theory of ideas in the sense of a “logic of validity”
in the third book of his 1874 work, that pushed Husserl to acquire his “Platonismus”,
which  is  however  to  be  correctly  evaluated,  considering  the  fact  that  «the
epistemological  and  metaphysical  traits»  of  such  a  Platonismus  have  been  always
rejected by Husserl4. Lotze's theory of knowledge has been even taken by Husserl as the
«origin» of a Platonic way in the epistemology of his time, and therefore considered
worthy of attention and of critic in his Prolegomena5. 
Husserl seems therefore to have delineated his theory of essence or Eidetics through a
long meditation which comprehend nearly his entire production. What we have seen are
in fact only the main directions of development followed by Husserl in his continuous
meditation on ideality. The aim of our work is instead trying to trace back the origin of
the question governing Husserl's eidetics.  
Aim and Structure of The Work
Justify the title of a work means in many cases already justify at the same time the aim
of the work itself and in certain sense also part of its contents. Nevertheless, by putting
two concepts such as “origin” and “ideality” may surely cause some confusion and even
generate  misinterpretations.  In  order  to  avoid  errors  and introduce  the  work,  a  few
1 Ibid., p. 86.
2 E. Husserl, “Die Methode der Wesensforschung”,  in  Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922 – 1937),  Husserliana
XXVII, ed. T. Nenon, H. R. Sepp (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1989), p. 13. 
3 H.  Lotze,  Logik.  Drei  Bücher vom Denken,  vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen,  2nd edition (Hirzel,
Leipzig, 1880), in particular, §313–321, p. 31–49.
4 From a 1933 letter to Parl Welch. E. Husserl, Briefwechsel. Philosophenbriefe, in Husserliana Dokumente
III, VI, ed E. Schuhmann and K. Schuhmann (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London,
1994), p. 460. 
5 K.  Schuhmann,  Husserl-Chronik.  Denk-  und Lebensweg Husserls,  Husserliana  Dokumente  I,  (Martinu
Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1981), p. 26.
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clarifying words are mandatory. The early term “Origin” [Urspung], introduced around
the  time  of  his  first  important  philosophical  work,  i.e.,  Husserl's  1887
Habilitationsschrift “Über den Begriff der Zahl. Psychologische Analysen“, has in fact a
specific  Husserlian  connotation,  which,  on  the  one side,  does  characterize  Husserl's
approach to concept analysis in its early development, on the other side, reveals some
common traits  with other investigations.  The sense of “Origin” must not be directly
understood in a  simply psychological  or  historical  way,  but  in  our  interpretation  as
exposed in Section 1, will be clearly traced back to its development within descriptive
psychology.  This  leading  back  to  the  scientific  kind  of  approach  within  which  it
originally developed, shares some light on the two fundamental aspects belonging to a
descriptive analysis  of the origin of concepts.  On the one side, the need to indicate
which are the very basic act components and their corresponding structure, involved by
the deploying of a concept. On the other side, the peculiar strategy of concept analysis
performed  by  “bringing  directly”  to  experience  the  acts  involved  in  possessing  or
deplying a concept, making therefore analysis possible. 
This  connotation  is  also  to  be  distinguished  within  Husserl's  work  from “Genesis”
[Genesis],  which  better  integrate  into  the  later  genetic  approach to  the  inquiry into
fundamental aspects of cognition.    But speaking of an inquiry into the “origin” of
ideality  means  in  our  understanding  and  within  the  framework  of  the  work  also:
searching  for  the  historical  origin  and  for  the  fundamental  étapes in  Husserl's
investigation into the ideal aspects of knowledge. In this sense, the work concentrates on
the early works and production of Edmund Husserl,  and especially,  on the time we
consider fundamental for the development of Husserl's later phenomenology. That will
also cover a period normally less taken into consideration by the critic. This will not
prevent us to refer, when necessary or illustrative, also to the late production of the '20s.
Ideality, on the other hand, is in our understanding linked as label-term to the Husserlian
«eidetics», which is for its part explicitly derived in the first Book of Ideas from eidos, a
term introduced in reality years earlier by Husserl, in connection with essence [Wesen].
It  is  in  fact  only  around  the  time  of  the  works  belonging  to  this  fundamental
introduction to phenomenology that the concept of eidos is assumed as an equivalent for
«pure essence» and phenomenology is established for its part as “eidetics” or “eidetic
science”.  Around  the  time  of  the  Logical  Investigations  indeed,  the  term  essence
comprehends a large variety of concepts less distinguished in comparison with to later
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Husserlian  works,  for  example,  for  what  concern  the  concept  of  eidos.  Among  the
different definitions and functions showed by essence and idea in the 1900 work and in
the course on logic and epistemology before the Ideas, we will try to stress one peculiar
aspect of such overly complex thematic, which is the partial definition of essence in
terms of conceptual universality. With respect to this characterization, we will therefore
try to indicate the kind of definition given to it by Husserl, which partially recalls the
traditional interpretation of the Universal in the sense of an ideal terms, or a common
element, over against the multiplicity. This latter is therefore interpreted in the sense of a
universal object. Our aim will be consequently, to analyze a series of manuscripts on the
period prior to the Logical Investigations, where, according to our interpretation, all the
features  assigned to  the  same concept  are  present.  That  will  be basically,  show the
“origin” of one important aspect of the future doctrine of essence, even besides the later
interpretation via Lotze and Bolzano of Ideality.  
Consequently,  one  of  the  main  point  this  work  aim to,  at  least,  stress  the  fact  that
according to  the author  view,  Husserl's  inquiry into ideality,  starting from the early
inquiries into concepts (mainly mathematical) and abstract and ideal object up to the
first investigations into essences, can be understood in its birth also from the point of
view of the early works on mathematics  and logic.  Obviously,  the fact that Husserl
manifestly connects the inquiry into the logical, and even mathematical fields with a
theory of experience and perception on the one side, and a theory of intentional act, with
a deep insight and constant investigations into the structure and articulation of the lived-
experiences and, especially, the acts of knowledge, force the investigations to take into
account Husserl's descriptive strategy for such a sphere.  
The work is articulated into three main sections. In the first one, we will give the very
fundamental traits of Husserl descriptive strategy into concept analysis. That will give
us the opportunity to stress on the one side, the structure of acts involved in the actual
deploying of such logical entities concepts are; on the other, to trace back to the field of
descriptive  psychology the  individuation  of  the  elements  involved  in  the  “complex
presentation” that partially defines concepts as properly given in acts of cognition. In
this  sense,  we  will  see,  the  role  of  Brentano  but  especially  Stumpf.  Also  a
characterization of the validity of such an inquiry, with respect to Husserl's early field of
influences, will be given. Besides some well established insights on the Husserl-Frege
debate, we will try to share some light into a specific aspect of this certainly already
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well  know period  of  Husserl's  development,  that  is  the  issue  into  the  definition  of
concept, and especially, the concept of number with respect of the sense of a descriptive
approach, and the consequence of such a position in Husserl's general understand of
logic. We will then try to trace back to Stumpf and its debate with the Kritizismus one of
the fundamental principle which lays as the basis for the descriptive concept analysis,
and  which  may  have  influenced  also  Husserl's  approach  before  the  proper
phenomenological  turn.  Referring  to  material  recently  published,  we  will  finally
approach two aspects of Husserl's confrontation with Brentano in the middle '90s, which
may have influenced the first analysis on concepts conducted within the  Philosophie
der Arithmetik and whose later clarification may have helped Husserl in overcoming his
early position.
The second section takes therefore directly the analysis of concepts offered by Husserl
in  the  works  before  1896,  especially  focusing  on  the  formal  concepts,  also  called
categories. In this sense, we will systematically follow Husserl's exposition in the first
part of the 1891 work on arithmetic and other works correlated. This will give us the
opportunity to indicate the structure of the cognitive act, the three-tier act structure, to
which Husserl traces back the origin of concept as properly given in lived-experiences.
We will therefore concentrate on the specif question of the relations and the kind of
relations on which the intuition of concepts bases, the process of abstraction involved,
and finally  the  role  of  reflection  in  the  “process”.  Our  aim will  be  here  to  offer  a
possible alternative interpretation of the direction of reflection as exposed by Husserl
for  the  proper  arising  of  concepts,  trying  to  comment  a  specific  point  in  Husserl
exposition. That, under the perspective of: its relevance for Husserl's later theory of the
content of reflection, and the consequences the still unclear position may have for the
definition of concepts; the historical encounter with theories explicitly commented by
Husserl.  Abstraction will  be object  of attention among the two main chapter  of  the
section. It will be analyzed in its function and it will be stressed the limit of its early
formulation. Abstraction will be also directly compared with the more proper “formal
abstraction” which will make its appearance, in our interpretation, before the  Logical
Investigations, that is, in the 1896 Lecture on  Logik, where it also already shows its
relevance for the position assigned to the logical content of acts and its reference. The
proper  concept  of  number  will  be  briefly  analyzed  and  the  basic  characteristics  of
Husserl's “definition” stressed, where the result of the chapter may be resumed in the
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unstable ontological  definition of number as ideal object.  This  will  be linked to  the
specific framework of Husserl's investigation and interpreted as a consequence of the
characteristics of the analysis emerged in the chapter. Also two different approaches
(Frege and Cantor) will be taken into consideration in order to evaluate on the one side,
the reasons of Husserl's veiled definition, on the other, a recent meditation on Cantor's
number concept which, by starting from an approach close to Husserl's one, actually
reached  an  explicit  definition  of  the  concept  of  number  in  the  sense  of  ideality.  A
definition this latter which will be also assumed, under a different perspective, also by
Husserl, but which seems to be still absent, at least in a clear formulation, in the works
taken into account.
In the third section, we will finally follow Husserl's 1896 investigation into conceptual
universality, from which, even if in a still non-explicit definition, he will develop its
conception on the one side, of universal objects, later on interpreted as proper ideal
objects, on the other side, one of the main trait of his theory of essence as developed
starting  from the  Logical  Investigations.  In  this  sense,  a  short  introduction  on  the
problem of conceptual universality will be offered at the beginning of the section. This
actually  has  the  only  aim to  offer  some  theoretical  insights  in  order  to  access  the
problematic  which  may  have  originated  Husserl's  endorsement  of  the  “traditional”
definition of the Universal as common element among different entities. This definition,
we hope to be able to show, will find its Husserlian formulation at the end of a long
aporetic  analysis,  where  Husserl  will  establish,  on  the  one  side,  the  identity  of  the
Universal, and on the other the existence of universal objects. The universal is in fact
defined as the identical element in the multiplicity of connection; an identity which also
posses unity. The exposition of this long analysis will follow after a prior and essential
overview of the function assigned by Husserl to the conceptual universality, which is the
formulation of the concept of essence that most will follow from this early statements.
We  will  also  expose,  prior  to  look  directly  to  the  Husserlian  meditations,  Lotze's
analysis of the conceptual universal, defined by him in his Logik as the “first universal”,
a  work  this  latter  which  was  well  know  by  Husserl  and  even  deeply  influential
according to his later statement in 1903 and the works related to the new edition of the
Logical Investigations. We will try in this sense, to stress some common element within
the two interpretations. The thesis of a possible influence is anyway to be ruled out;
Husserl first investigations develop in fact taking theoretical elements from its earlier
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works  actually,  especially  from  the  his  works  on  the  Elements  of  Logic. We  will
therefore try to briefly offer some insights, without any claim of completeness, on some
early yet important developments which follow the 1896 works. 
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Section 1) 
The Role of Description in Husserl's Analysis of Concepts and the Definition of
Descriptive Psychology on The Long Road to Phenomenology. The early years
1891 – 1900.
1.0) Introduction 
Description and phenomenology are essential counterparts, the latter supposes the first
and the first  assumes its  own sense within phenomenology:  «to say phenomenology
implicates  description,  and  who  describes,  proceed  therefore  phenomenologically»1.
Phenomenology can be taken as the description referred to a particular field or set of
objects, which entails a theory for its descriptive proceeding that sets such a description
in a peculiar framework. Even if historically starts from the field of psychology, it soon
assumes in fact its own shape and its peculiar role in the phenomenological method, in
its  aiming  to  become «the  true  method for  the  critic  of  knowledge»2.  Furthermore,
against the easy association of ideas arising from the term, description is not simply an
“image-theory”  which  only  doubles  the  reality  without  analyzing  anything.  On  the
contrary,  it  performs an analysis  in  a  peculiar sense.  Moreover,  as a science with a
descriptive character does not simply «want to gain by cognition anything more than a
mere “image” of the objects»,  risking,  this way of undergoing Rickert's criticism of
representing  nothing  more  than  «mere  constructions»  with  «radically  empirical
tendencies»3,  but  rather  to  establish  itself  even  against  descriptive  psychology with
empirical ancestry.
The attitude proper to the phenomenological description is in fact first of all essentially
different from the ones belonging to psychology and to science of facts in general. Even
1 E. W. Orth, “Beschreibung in der Phänomenologie“, in  Phänomenologische Forschungen, 24/25, (Felix
Meiner Verlag,  1991),  p.  8. Orth even proposes  the possibility to translate  “phenomenologically” with
“descriptively”.
2 Husserl's 1905 letter to H. Gomperz, in E. Husser, Briefwechsel, VI, cit., p. 148.
3 H. Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft  und Naturwissenschaft,  (J.C.B. Mohr,  Tübingen,  1926),  p.  30. The same
above cited E. W. Orth, stressed in a earlier article on reduction that, in reality, «the Husserlian concept of
description turns against construction which conceals the elementary views of a theme», See, Philosophy
and  Science  in  Phenomenological  Perspective,  in  Phaenomenologica  95,  ed.  R.  Chisholm,  K.K.  Cho
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1984), p. 156.
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if the concept of description has its source in Husserl's philosophy from the traditional
distinction  between  genetic  and  descriptive  psychology,  a  distinction  introduced  by
Brentano1, Husserl tried in the years after but even prior to the Logical Investigations to
distinguish  phenomenology  tout  court from  descriptive  psychology,  perceiving  the
unclear distinction between the two methods, and later on, to underline the fundamental
difference which characterizes the phenomenological approach from the other forms of
psychological investigation2. 
But  nevertheless,  the  fact  that  Husserl  approached at  first  «descriptive  psychology»
positively, is recognized by Husserl himself by remembering its first encounter with the
«fundamental  parts  of  a  descriptive  psychology  of  the  intellect»,  and  with  the
«descriptive and fundamental analysis on the essence of phantasy representations» and
«continua» during the Brentano's lectures in 1868 – 703.  In a sense related to the ones
applied by Husserl also in his later works, the methodological framework characterizing
the first attempts to indicate how the origin of such initially undefined class of logical
entities, which are concepts, was meant to be grasped, is in fact indicated by Husserl as
“descriptive-psychological”. 
This  general  kind of  approach,  however,  and even with respect  to  the first  specific
concept chosen by Husserl for such a psychological account, i.e., the concept of number,
was not an unusual topic in the field of researchers from which he took his first lectures
in the late '70s of the 19th Century. The mathematician Weierstrass himself, for example,
in one of his lecture attended by Husserl, observes in a certain programmatic way:
«We  best  attain  the  concept  of  number  by  proceeding  with  the  operation  of
counting. We consider a given aggregate of objects; among these we look for the
ones that have a certain feature apprehended in the presentation by going through
them sequentially; we comprehend the single objects with the feature together in
an encompassing presentation, and thus a multiplicity of unities is made, and this
is the number»4.
1 Franz  Brentano,  for  example,  introduced  with  nearly  the  same  sense  nuance  “phenomenology”  and
“descriptive psychology” in his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte. See, F. Brentano, Psychologie
vom empirischen Standpunkte, Erster Band (Duncker & Humblot Verlag, Leipzig, 1874), p. 27, 124. 
2 E. Husserl,  Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesung Sommersemester 1925, in Husserliana IX,  cit., p.
46f.
3 E.  Husserl,  “Erinnerungen  an  Franz  Brentano”  (1919),  in   Aufsätze  und  Vorträge  (1911  –  1921),  in
Husserliana XXV, cit., p. 304f. 
4 K. Weierstrass, Einleitung in die Theorie der analytischen Funktionen, 1878. From the translation by Carlo
Ierna,  in  C.  Ierna,  “The  beginnings  of  Husserl’s  philosophy,  Part  2:  Philosophical  and  mathematical
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But the task to indicate the proper descriptive character of Husserl approach in the early
works,  its  later  reshaping  and  relation  to  phenomenology,  also  indicated  in  fact  as
«descriptive theory»1, seems to represent a complex problem, which has led to different
interpretations2, considering the changes under which the methodological but even the
theoretical framework has undergone before and after the Logical Investigations. 
Anyway,  it  seems  useful  for  our  intent,  first  to  expose  the  descriptive  character  of
Husserl's inquiry essentially with respect to the task assigned to early phenomenology,
i.e.,  the relation to the ideal content of experience. If it easy to understand the early
critical confrontation and the lacking of endorsement of the genetic character of the
psychological investigation due to Husserl's aim to avoid any kind of psychologism, the
descriptive ones represents a more comprehensive character which does even influence
the very first Husserlian work and even the definition of phenomenology3. But first of
all, we must start with accounting the descriptive character of Husserl's investigations
before the point «we are forced to definitively abandon the ground of psychology, even
the ones belonging to descriptive psychology», as he states with conviction in 19074. 
Therefore, the question may be generally formulated as such:  What does it mean to
perform a descriptive analysis of the origin of concept, i.e.,  what are the descriptive
background”,  in  The new yearbook for phenomenology and phenomenological  philosophy,  VI.  (Noesis
Press,  Seattle,  2006),  p.  36. Weierstrass  in  the  following  pages  of  the  lecture  does  not  follows  any
“psychological” investigation anyway, but what is for some interest here, is that such a theme was not a
completely rejected one even among mathematicians. One of the main theme, or at least one of the main
key for interpreting the evolution and the history of the mathematical and logical thought around the time
of the first Husserlian works,  is in fact the role and possibility among the different perspective on the
foundation of mathematics (constructivist, intuitionist, “platonic” etc.) of a previous investigation into «the
epistemological and cognitive requirement assumed in such kind of foundations». If, in other words, «the
exclusion of these issue does represent a  manco in a theory even if, at the end of the day, its foundation
results consistent». On the base of such a thematic limitation may in fact the foundation not pretend to be
«foundation from last principle», by lying «the last basis of the science outside science itself, yet in a theory
of knowledge». See, R. Schmit, Husserls Philosophie der Mathematik (H. Grundmann Verlag, Bonn, 1981),
p. 20.
1 E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch, cit.,
p. 156f.
2 See,  for example, F. Fisette, “Descriptive Psychology and Natural Sciences: Husserl's early Criticism of
Brentano”, in Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences, in Phaenomenologica, 200, ed. C. Ierna, H. Jacons, F.
Mattens (Springer, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New York, 2010), p. 221f. P. Hofmann, Phänomen und
Beschreibung:  zu  Edmund  Husserls  Logischen  Untersuchungen,  (Fink,  München,  2004),  p.  207f.  R.J.
Walton,  Intencionalidad y Horinzonticidad, (Aula, Cali, 2015), esp. p.  25f.  See also, under many of the
themes taken here in account, T. De Boer, The development of Husserl's Thought, in Pahenomenologica 76
(Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Boston, London, 1978). 
3 In the First Edition of the Logical Investigations, “Phenomenology” is still explicitly linked to descriptive
psychology, See, E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Theil, First Edition (Max Niemeyer, Halle,
1901), p. 18. And here, 1.2.  
4 E. Husserl, Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen, in Husserliana II, ed. W. Biemel (Martinus
Nijhoff, Haag, 1973), p. 7. 
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elements in such a descriptive inquiry? 
The descriptive characteristic in Husserl psychological investigations on the origin of
concepts is to be found, in our interpretation, in two elements. First, in the structure of
the inquiry conducted into the psychical phenomena, which conducts to a description of
the psychological complex in which concepts are to be found. Psychical phenomena are
in  fact  described in  order  to  obtain a  “psychological  analysis”  of  such a  nature  for
concepts.  These  are  posed  in  relation  to  founding  presentations,  where  a  theory of
abstraction seems to be in charge in order to explain the relation between both: 
«(…) The concrete phenomena, to which we refer certain numerical utterances,
are  concrete  multiplicities,  i.e.,  multitude  of  certainly given  things,  which  are
exactly  the  same phenomena,  which  fall  even  under  the  universal  concept  of
multiplicity. Exactly for that reason it is necessarily to start from such phenomena,
and observe how the less determined and more general concept, which grounds
the  group  of  names  such  multiplicity,  plurality,  set,  etc.  but  even  the  precise
concepts of number, are abstracted from them»1.    
The sense of this analysis takes therefore its peculiar role and shape within descriptive
psychology and it represents the aspect of Husserl's psychological-descriptive inquiry
into concepts on which we have first to concentrate in order to start the exposition of his
account of the concept. The latter will be in fact partially linked and developed from
elements  as  well  as  from  issues  related  to  such  analysis.  (1.1)  If  the  descriptive-
psychological  framework for  investigating  concepts  was  at  the  time  not  completely
unusual,  both  in  logical  and  mathematical  field,  its  peculiar  claim  and  right  was
challenged but  at  the  same time influenced by other  insights2.  Obviously,  the  main
challenge was to avoid logical psychologism and therefore, to asset a proper sense to the
psychological trait of the inquiry. (1.2) 
Second,  the main work for the preparation of the  Philosophie der Arithmetik,  if  we
1 E. Husserl, “Über den Begriff der Zahl. Psychologische Analysen“, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 298.
2 See, for  example,  Sigwart's  1878  Logik,  remembered by Husserl  in the  Philosophie der Arithmetik (in
Husserliana XII, cit., p. 33, 61f). In the 2nd Volume of his Logic dedicated to the theory of method, writes in
the shape of a program: «The general problem of methodology is to show how we may apply our natural
mental activities in such a way that, starting from a given state of thought and knowledge, we may attain
the object  of  human thought by an ideally perfect  process;  a  process,  that  is,  in which none but fully
determined concepts and adequately grounded judgments are employed». C. Sigwart, Logik, zweiter Band,
(H. Laupp, Tübingen, 1878), p. 3.  
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believe in Husserl's own words, started  «essentially around the years 1886 – 87», and
therefore in  the middle of  his  reflections  on Brentano's  interpretation  of  descriptive
psychology and under the influence of Stumpf's Theorie der psychologischen Theile and
the famous  Tonpsychologie1. His interest in descriptive psychology, as he writes in a
later personal note from 1906, pushed him to a deeper study of psychological works,
among which Jame's Psychology2, and even to give a lecture in Halle on psychology3.
This occurrence is of course to be interpreted as the origin of Husserl's first endorsement
of  its  investigation under  the label  of  descriptive psychology,  but  also source of an
intense confrontation with the definition of the proper sphere of investigation belonging
to  psychology,  differently  understood.  Husserl's  interest  in  this  sense  is  not  to  be
reduced only to a mere classification of phenomena, but to gain a deeper insight into
relations, a task which requires, according to Husserl, a look into «this very dark chapter
of descriptive psychology»4.(1.3).  
1.1)  Description  and  analysis.  Some  remarks  on  Husserl's  early  approach  to  the
investigations into concepts.
The main trait of the descriptive psychology elaborated in the intellectual and scientific
environment in the early years of Husserl's works, at least till the first edition of the
Logical Investigations, can be indicated in the «psychological analysis»5, whose aim is
to be sketched in the proper indication of the conditions under which it could be said a
concept is possessed6, and which, along with the more strictly «logical», compose the
1 The  Tonpsychologie is  cited  in  many  occasions  in  the  Philosophie  der  Arithmetik,  see  E.  Husserl,
Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 42, 63, 71. See also, for a reconstruction of the
historical background of the first period of Husserl's phenomenology, H. Spiegelber,  E. Ave-Lallemant,
Pfänder-Studien, in Phaenomenologica, 84 (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Boston, London, 1982). 
2 W. James, Principles of Psychology, (Holt, New York, 1890). Another fundamental work «against which»
Husserl will be forced to react and come to clarity with respect of the nature of presentation, as he stated in
a letter to Meinong in 1902, is Twardowsky Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Eine
psychologische  Untersuchung, (Alfred  Höleder,  Wien,  1894).  See,  for  the  letter,  A.  Meinong,
Philosophenbriefe.  Aus  der  wissenschaftlichen  Korrespondenz  von  Alexius  Meinong,  ed.  R.  Kindinger,
(Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, Graz, 1965), p. 107. 
3 So Husserl in the personal note: «Later on was the time of my 1891/92 lecture on psychology, which leaded
me to look deeper into descriptive psychology». E. Husserl, “Beilage IX: Persönliche Aufzeichnungen vom
25.9.1906  und  6.3.1908“,  in  Einleitung  in  die  Logik  und  Erkenntnistheorie.  Vorlesungem 1906/07,  in
Husserliana XXIV, cit., p. 443.
4 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 66.
5 E. Husserl, “Über den Begriff der Zahl. Psychologische Analysen“, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 289.
6 This definition, generally endorsed by many commentators, is close to Willard's one. As he puts it, «to give
the genesis of a concept (...) is to describe the essential course of experiences through which one comes to
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«sequence of investigation» conducted in the complex of his early works1. Under this
point of view, such an analysis differs radically from a mere inquiry into the conditions
under which it is recognized only the competence in using a concept in a judgmental
act;  but  also differs from stating the nature of concepts  as abstract  objects  acquired
trough only «sense intuition» on the basis of object perception. The first attempt could
in fact only conduct to establish the psychological-subjective condition involved in the
mere use of the concept, i.e., the description of a mere praxis; the second one, would for
its  part  represent  only  a  refined  version  of  a  psychological-empirical  investigation,
which  would  undergo  the  same  criticism  Husserl  notoriously  exposed  in  the
Prolegomena.   
Husserl poses in fact rather the question about how is to understand the relationship
between acts of thinking and the kind of abstract (i.e. non particular) or logical objects,
even  complex  one2,  as  for  example  in  the  case  of  the  “categorical  objects”  of
mathematics,  which  present  their  self  in  those  acts  but  are  given in  a  substantially
different manner than objects of perception3. When objects of thought are to be found,
that we represent as being in itself, i.e., recognizable as independent from our actual
cognitive grasp and which remains in over-temporal identity,  «all the even trivial or
remarkable sense-moment of such a presentation must be exhibited in its possibility and
legitimacy  in the  effecting  of  our  consciousness  [Bewusstseinsleistung]».  It  must  be
showed, in other words, «how and that we can legitimately think about such objects»4. A
psychological  analysis  of  such  a  kind  would  therefore  try  to  exhibit  the  necessary
articulation  of  acts  of  the  “effecting  consciousness”  by describing  what  we,  nearly
literally, found in possessing a concept.    
In  the  lecture Phänomenologische  Psychologie,  even  25  years  after  the  Logical
Investigations, Husserl looks back to his early works to recognize indeed how basically
posses  the  concept».  See,  D.  Willard,  “Concerning  Husserl's  view of  number”, Southwest  Journal  of
Philosophy, V, 1974, p. 106.
1 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 5. On the importance of underlying the
logical component of this investigations among the psychological, see, B.C. Hopkins,  The Origin of the
Logic of Symbolic Mathematics. Edmund Husserl and Jacob Klein (Indiana University Press, Bloomington,
Indianapolis, 2011), p. 107.
2 Like in the case of state of affairs.
3 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. 7. E. Husserl, Philosophie
der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 64f.
4 D.  Lohmar,  Phänomenologie  der  Mathematik,  Phaenomenologica,  114  (Kluwer  Academic  Publishers,
Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1989), p. 42.
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«the  main  theme  of  the  Logical  Investigations was  the  psychical  element,
correlative to each objectivities intended, (especially the logical ideal ones), i.e.,
the variety of the psychical modes, in which concepts, judgments, theories as ideal
and identical unity of meaning do take shape, purely in the immanence of the
psychical life (…)»1.  
After  having  emphasized  the  insufficiency  of  simply  recognizing  the  «manner»  of
experienced self-evidence of what he calls here «ideas» and «pure laws of logic» and
the  necessity  of  a  «epistemological»  clarification  of  such  logical  objects,  Husserl
defines  in  fact  in  the  Logical  Investigations the  function  and  aim  of  the
«phenomenological analysis»:
«The phenomenology of the logical experiences aims at giving us a sufficiently
wide  descriptive  (thought  not  empirically-psychological)  understanding  of  the
psychical lived-experiences and their indwelling sense, as will enable us to give
fixed meanings to all the fundamental concepts of logic. Such meanings will be
clarified  both  by going back to  the  analytically explored  connections  between
meanings-intentions and meanings-fulfilments, and also by making their possible
function in cognition intelligible and certain»2.  
In the same quote, Husserl offers us also a general yet rich definition of logical concepts
and of the articulated way by which we come to posses them:
«Logical concepts, as valid thought-unities, must have their origin in intuition;
they must arise out of an ideational intuition founded on certain experiences, and
must admit of infinite reconfirmation, and of recognition of their self-identity, on
the performance of such abstraction».
Therefore,  what  it  is  here at  issue is  basically the initial  securing of access to non-
particular yet unitary meaning formations, such as concepts, and essentially connected
with this, access to a experiential domain that transcends atomistic sensations. Husserl's
1 E. Husserl,  Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesung Sommersemester 1925, in Husserliana IX,  cit., p.
37.
2 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 9 – 11.
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meditations, even if critical with respect to the solution of most of their versions, start
therefore  from  the  same  epistemological  problem  which  historically  found  its
formulation in the different theories of abstraction1, i.e., how we come to posses the
terms that function in thinking to represent more than one particular and how we can
make reason of its function in such a way in higher-order lived-experiences, such as
meanings-intentions. Concepts on their side, are logically relevant entities. With respect
to a concept in fact, we can investigate its extension [Umfang], its content [Inhalt], and,
indeed,  its  origin,  where  preliminary  speaking,  what  he  means  with  “extension”  is
basically the class of objects that fall under the concept, while by “content” he means
mainly the intentional correlate of the concept, or the essential properties of the objects
that fall under that concept. 
Now, the strategy to indicate the psychological origin of concepts, and especially the
peculiar concepts which are the formal ones in the Philosophie der Arithmetik, is based
on showing the essential course of experiences through which one comes to posses the
concept. In this sense, to put someone in front of the necessary path of experience which
leads to concepts means to show at the same time how the concepts generate in the
structuring of acts, and therefore, to literally «falling back on the spontaneous activities
of», in the case of the formal concepts of mathematics,   «collecting and counting in
which collections (“aggregates”, “sets”) and numbers are given»2. Even if with essential
changes, especially for what concern the function of abstraction and ideation, as well as
for the introduction of a different interpretation of intuition,  Husserl's strategy to go
back  to  the  sequence  of  “process”  involved  in  the  arising  of  a  concept  and  to  the
structure  of  the  cognitive  act  (in  the  Logical  Investigations:  meaning-
intention/fulfillment), will remain the fundamental emerging framework.      
To analyze a certain concept requires that we discern what is of necessity thought of or
meant  whenever that concept is deployed. In order to obtain such an analysis, assuming
the complex nature of concepts, we must resolve the composed consciousness which
posses the concept into the composing element. In this sense, the analysis should give
answer  to  the  question  about  the  origin.  But  that  is  only possible  by means of  the
“leading back” already seen. With analysis Husserl indicates here therefore also a «non-
natural direction of thought», within which we are not «lost in the performance of acts
1 Ibid., p. 172.
2 E. Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik, in Husserliana XVII, cit., p. 76.
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built intricately on one another», rather we «practice “reflection”, we make this acts
themselves, and their immanent meaning-content, our object»1.
Such  an  analysis  is  yet  conducted  in  the  early  works  within  the  methodological
framework of the descriptive psychology, whose very basic and common assumptions
can be indicated as laying on these three principal items: 1) descriptive psychology
methodologically involves a form of cognition obtained by “internal experience”; 2)
concepts  are  based  on presentations  [Vorstellungen]  or  intuitions  [Anschauungen];  a
certain  process  of  abstraction  is  here  involved;  and  finally,  3)  concepts  are
psychologically  complex,  i.e.,  they  are  founded  upon  complexions  of  presentations.
Psychological analysis shows its clarifying [aufklären] function especially with respect
to the third item, which is even the most related to the task assigned by Husserl to the
inquiry. By historically lying in such a descriptive framework, some of Husserl very
early positions are therefore shared by others thinkers belonging to the common, even
slightly misleading label “descriptive psychology”.
1.1.1) Three features of the descriptive analysis of concept.
For what concerns the first item (1), even if we do not accept two of the main characters
indicated by Brentano as reasons to prefer internal experience as explanatory field for
cognition2 (i. e., its certainty and the possible bestowing to other subjects due to analogy
with  the  proper),  internal  experience  results  immediate  and  infallible  self-evidence,
considering  the  easy  access  to  reflection  on  ones  own  experience  and  the  not
adumbration in the mode of givenness of internal experience, as explained even some
twenty years later in Ideen I and even after a radical methodological change: 
«(…) it is evident and drawn from the essence of spatial physical things (even in
the widest sense, which includes “sight things”) that, necessarily a being of that
kind can be given in perception only through an adumbration; and in like manner
it  is  evident  from  the  essence  of  cogitationes,  from  the  essence  of  lived-
1 Ibid., p. 14.
2 Regarding  the  epistemic  function  of  internal  perception,  Brentano  speaks  in  his  Psychologie  vom
empirischen Standpunkte about «its immediate, infallible self-evidence. Of all the types of knowledge of
the objects of experience, inner perception alone possesses this characteristic. Consequently, when we say
that mental phenomena are those which are apprehended by means of inner perception, we say that their
perception is immediately evident». F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte, cit., p. 119.
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experiences of any kind, that they exclude anything like that»1.
This would offer and guarantee an accessible field of evidence within which intentional
lived-experiences, along with their objects, may result stable object of description. 
The  second  item indicated  above  (2)  is  well  showed  in  the  1891  Philosophie  der
Arithmetik, where Husserl clearly indicates the inner connection between concepts and
founding intuitions: 
«No concept can be thought without the foundation within a concrete intuition.
Therefore, we have always the intuition of an concrete multiplicity whatever in
consciousness, when we represent the general concept of multiplicity; an intuition
in fact, from which we abstract the universal concept»2.
Therefore, there are classes of experiences, whose contents is determined independently
from any kind of  conceptual  mediation,  and such acts  are  posed as  ground for  the
conceptual capacity which leads and allows cognition. According to Husserl, such acts
are  intuitions  [Anschauungen]  indeed  and,  referring  to  the  above  cited  concrete
intuitions, they seem to be closely related to what Stumpf indicated in his 1873 Über
den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung as concrete representations:
«The most  original  [Das  Ursprünglichste]  is  the  sensation or  actual  [wirklich]
representation (…). When I play a sound to someone or when show a color, and he
takes notice of that, we call therefore what he's actually experiencing a sensation
or actual representation. Of phantasy-presentation we speak yet, when he becomes
aware of the sound, without the sound being played. A phantasy-representation
with the awareness of the being already presented of the very content, that is a
thought-representation. 
1 E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch, cit.,
p. 77. The same insight is retaken even later in the 1925 lecture on phenomenological psychology:  «The
connection [within the psychical life] is not something hypothetical excogitate, something thought up, but,
as something lived-experienced, is accessible in internal experience to immediate and articulating analysis
and description».  In  E.  Husserl,  Phänomenologische Psychologie.  Vorlesung Sommersemester  1925,  in
Husserliana IX, cit., p. 14. 
2 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 79. The quote above remembers Hume's
Teatrise statement «That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions».
See, D. Hume, Teatrise of Human Nature, ed L. A Selby-Bigge (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1978), p.
33.  
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All the above exposed are concrete representations. If many sounds are therefore
heard of, and it is spoken about a sound in general, that is, what it is meant with
an abstract representation or a concept»1.   
Concrete presentations are therefore a large and mostly various class of experiences.  
Even Brentano, whose analysis regarding the field of conceptual thought are notoriously
pretty  pondered,  seems  to  call  for  some  sort  of  basis-function  for  intuitions.  For
example, according to his analysis in the 1889 Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, what
he calls «abstract representations, i.e., concepts» are in all cases derived from concrete
representations  (i.e.,  intuitions).  By  no  means  however,  it  is  claimed  that  mere
sensations  are  the  origins  of  all  concepts,  even  for  concepts  such  as  “willing”  and
“inferring”,  whose  peculiar  psychical  “availability”  would  surely conduct  to  such a
position. Rather, 
«They stem from intuitions of psychical content [i.e.,  inner intuitions]. This is
where  the  concepts  “purpose”,  “cause”  (we  notice,  for  instance,  a  causal
connection between our belief in the premises and our belief in the conclusion),
“impossibility” and “necessity” (we obtain them from judgments which affirm or
reject something not simply assertorically,  but rather -  as one likes to express
oneself-apodictically)  and many others  which  some moderns,  having failed  in
fathoming  their  true  origin,  wanted  to  regard  as  categories  given  from  the
outset»2.
Thus,  it  is  of  no  surprise  that  concrete  intuitions  are  the  kind  of  psychological
phenomena which come to play a role in the very first Husserlian attempt to indicate the
origin of concepts; in fact, concrete intuitions are the kind of intuitions, which concepts
are in first instance leaded back to by Husserl,  which means, with respect of which
Husserl  inquiry  into  their  origin  starts.  In  this  sense  the  first  part  of  Husserl's
Habilitationsschrift “Über den Begriff der Zahl: psychologische Analysen“ represents a
study on the fundamental concepts of mathematics like multiplicity, (cardinal) number
[Anzahl], unity, in so far as they are presented properly, which means, intuitively given.
1 C. Stumpf, Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung (Hirzel, Leipzig, 1873), p. 3. 
2 F. Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (Duncker & Humblot, Leipzig, 1889), p. 51.
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Husserl writes similarly in the Philosophie der Arithmetik: 
«In the first  of its  two parts,  the Volume I before us deals with the questions,
chiefly psychological, involved in the analysis of the concepts multiplicity, unity,
and number, insofar as they are given to us properly [eigentlich] and not through
indirect symbolization»1.  
This interpretative strategy will later on develop and already around 1892 and 1894,
which means, in the works followed after the Philosophie der Arithmetik, i.e, the series
of the psychological studies on logic, the works on the “philosophy of space” and the
various confrontation with the logical works of his time, some fundamental relations
involved in the conceptual analysis will undergo a deeper understanding. Those studies
represented in fact, on the one side, both theoretically in historically «a first project for
the  Logical  Investigations»2,  i.e.,  a  first  draft  of  what  will  be  therefore  part  of  the
explicative strategy of the later work, on the other side, the first attempts to extent his
psychological-logical inquiry beyond mathematics to logic in a more comprehensive
sense,  an  attempt  already  indicated  in  the  lecture  on  Psychology in  1891  as
desideratum3.  The majority of the studies  are  in  fact  directed to  clarify the kind of
presentation  (representation)  and  abstraction  relevant  for  logic4.  In  1893  Husserl
composes a manuscript on «intuitive and representative presentations»5, which followed
another earlier work on «abstract and concrete presentation»6, which represent Husserl's
psychological  analysis  of  the relationship between presentations  and representations,
between contents, and of the kind of «representation  [Räpresentation] in the sense of
concept»7. 
In third and final place (3), we have stressed that concepts are psychologically complex,
1 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 6 – 7.
2 E. Husserl, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/07, in Husserliana XXIV, cit.,
p. 443.
3 Ibid., p. 440.
4 Ibidem.
5 E. Husserl, “Vorstellung und Repräsentation”, in Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890 – 1910),  in Husserliana
XXII, cit., p. 283f.
6 K. Schumann, Husserl-Chronik, cit., p. 39.
7 E. Husserl, “Vorstellung und Repräsentation”, in Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890 – 1910),  in Husserliana
XXII, cit., p. 285. These works are in fact, as Husserl in 1897 in a self-review does comment, «part of
purely descriptive  psychology»,  even  if  the  not  published  manuscripts  shows more  the  character  of  a
«genetic» inquiry. In “Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik aus dem Jahre 1894“, in ibid., p. 133, and
p. 451.
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and that's because they are founded on connections [Zusammenhänge] of presentations.
The inquiry into the composition of a concept represents, as clearly exposed in Husserl's
1887  Habilitationsschrift,  «the  first  question»  to  which  a  «psychological  analysis»
should give answer, i.e., «the question about the  origin  of concepts [multiplicity, set,
numbers]»1. Even this kind of analysis is already well delineated in the psychological
field  of  study  to  which  Husserl  refers  at  the  time  of  the  writing  process  of  the
Habilitationsschrift,  where  in  fact  a  clear  example  of  what  is  understood  under
“psychological analysis” in an appropriate sense is well showed by Stumpf's Über den
psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung: 
«Under the inquiry into the psychological origin of a representation we understand
the inquiry into the representations, from which the same representation is formed
of, and the vein, in which it has being formed (…). In order to do that, is to be
figured out a resolution of the composed representation into the more simple ones
and the most  simple (…). But,  among this  case,  others are  still  thinkable,  for
example, where a representation is originated by separation of a representation-
content and not by composition, and such a separation is, anyway, to be define
more close and differently. Other, in the case a representation is aroused by others,
and not because it was really oft connected to, but immediately and necessarily,
like  in  the  case  of  a  physical  effect  with  its  cause.  Or  even,  when  a  third
representation origins from two others, where the former is not the mere sum of
the earlier representations, exactly like in the case of a chemical solution, to which
does not belong the sum of characteristics of the elements, but new ones. (…) 
This kind of inquiry described should be named psychological analysis, in analogy
with  the  chemical  analysis.  Even  the  latter  is  all  about  lead  back  composed
materials, with which we always deal, to their elements, and equally in this case,
there are different way in which the composed materials are made of, mixture,
composition etc.»2.      
According  to  this  kind  of  analysis,  the  consciousness  content  is  resolved  into  its
composing elements in order to face the problem of defining the dependence among the
composing representations.    
1 E. Husserl, “Über den Begriff der Zahl. Psychologische Analysen“, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 298.
2 C. Stumpf, Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung, cit., p. 4 – 5. Italics mine.
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What is here investigated is nothing else than the relationship between the grounding
concrete  intuitions  and  what  can,  even  according  to  a  law,  emerge  from it  in  full
consciousness, which is, in other words, the question about the possible or necessary
founding  relation  between  the  concrete  intuitions  and  the  concept.  Obviously,  this
relation must be yet correctly understood in its very peculiar nature. Such relationships
in  fact,  allows  the  emerge  of  different  concepts  from  different  compositions  of
presentations and thus, the concepts itself should not be reduced to the presentations
simpliciter.  
1.2)  The  peculiarity  of  Husserl's  descriptive  approach  to  the  inquiry  into  concepts
origin. The role of Frege and Stumpf.
If the concept of number is the first concept on which all the mathematical analysis
develops,  Husserl  tried  therefore  in  its  first  logical-mathematical  work  to  sketch  a
psychological  inquiry  into  its  origin,  which  poses  its  investigation  logically  and
epistemologically prior to others inquiries. For that very reason Husserl defines, at this
time, «psychology as indispensable for the analysis of the concept of number»: 
«The analysis of elemental concepts, which are the concepts presenting their self
only in a low level of complication (like the case of the concept of number), must
be  actually counted with the most  fundamental  aims  of  psychology.  (…) The
comprehension of the first and most simple form of connection of presentations is
the key to the comprehension of higher levels of complication, with which our
consciousness constantly operate as with uniformly and stable formations»1.
The psychological analysis should lead in fact to the point that we can determine the
origin of a concept, which is, to describe the «essential course» of experience through
which  we  come  to  posses  the  concept.  This,  of  course,  raises  in  first  and  general
instance  the  question  about  the  nature  and  universal  uniformity  of  the  complex
articulation of acts by which the abstract concept is consciously obtained. With respect
to this methodological question Husserl looks back for example in his later  Formale
und  transzendentale  Logik to  the  positive  aspects  of  the  inquiry  framework  into
1 Ibid., p. 295.
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concepts as present in the Philosophie der Arithmetik:
«I had already acquired a determined view of the formal and a first understanding
of its sense already by my Philosophie der Arithmetik, which even if immature as
first book,  represents a first attempt to obtain clarity on the proper and original
sense of the fundamental concepts of set- and number-theory, by falling back on
the  spontaneous  activities  of  collecting  and  counting  in  which  collections
(“aggregates”, “sets”) and numbers are given. (...)  It can be recognized a priori
that  each  time  the  form  of  this  spontaneous  activities  remains  the  same,
correlatively, the form of their constructions remains the same»1.
Here we find Husserl fundamentally stressing two points which characterize his first
descriptive approach: in order to obtain the original sense, which means, the very first
meaning function of concepts (in this case of set and number), we must “fall back” to
the stratification of the consciousness activities involved in its formation, even in case
of  higher  order  concepts  such as  numbers;  the  recurring  structure  guarantee  for  the
recurring formations, i.e., if we find the recurring articulation of the acts involved in
concepts formation, this applies for every case.           
This kind of investigation on the fundamental concepts presents Husserl's approach as
essentially different from the ones which limit the inquiry into such concepts by offering
a definition:
«Mathematicians  have  followed  the  principle  of  not  regarding  mathematical
concepts  as  fully  legitimized  until  they  are  well  distinguished  by  means  of
rigorous  definitions.  But  this  principle,  undoubtedly  quite  useful,  has  not
infrequently and without justification been carried too far. In over-zealousness for
a presumed rigor, attempts were also made to define concepts that,  because of
their elemental character, are neither capable of definition nor in need of it»2.
For  example,  the  concept  of  set  is  elementary,  which  means,  it  cannot  be  defined,
considering  the  fact  that  for  Husserl  a  definition  can  only be  given  in  the  case  of
1 E. Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik, in Husserliana XVII, cit., p. 90 – 1.
2 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 96.
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complex concepts by offering the components which compose the concept. Husserl's
criticism concerns the status of definitions: «One can define only that which is logically
compound», as he states in his work on arithmetic, assuming that there are no possible
definitions of «the last and elementary concepts»1. Definitions should in fact satisfy the
condition  according  to  which  the  definiendum must  be  explainable  in  terms  of  the
definiens, where the converse won't be valid. 
Among the critics moved also to other theories, in the Philosophie der Arithmetik are to
be  found  in  fact  remarks  against  the  attempt  to  provide  a  definition  of  such  an
elementary concept as number by logical abstraction, as presented for example by Frege
in his 1884 Grundlagen der Arithmetik, and against the insight according to which, it
suffices for the definition of a concept to define its extension2. Both criticisms link to
Husserl asserts against the possibility to define the concept of number by equivalence
[Äquivalenz],  which is  the attempt to  define the concept  of  natural  number through
equality3. 
Assuming in fact that the concept of equality is also elementary, if conceived as the
standing in the one-to-one correspondence relation, as well as in the case of the equality
of two sets, which is the equinumerosity [Gleichzahligkeit] of two sets, it cannot be in
both cases defined. Frege recalls Leibniz's definition of equality as «substitutivity salva
veritate»4, but already this theoretical move leads to, at least, three problems: Leibniz's
definition define identity and not equality5; the fact that two contents can be substituted
salva veritate is not the reason of their equality, but instead their equality is the reason
of their substitutivity salva veritate, and, finally, it does not provide a suitable criterion
for equality: for proving the substitutivity salva veritate of two contents we are leaded
back to prove an infinite number of equalities in which the two contents appear. 
Therefore, Husserl assumes as object of analysis the definition of equality in terms of
the ones of two multiplicities with respect to their  number,  i.e.,  equinumerosity.  He
recalls notoriously Stolz's definition of equality in terms of the equinumerosity of sets:
1 Ibid, p. 119.
2 See,  C.  Ortiz  Hill,  “Tackling  three  of  Frege’s  problems:  Edmund  Husserl  on  sets  and  manifolds”,  in
Axiomathes, 13, Issue 1, (Springer, 2002), p. 95 – 6.
3 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 111f.
4 G.W. Leibniz, “Non inelegans specimen demonstrandi in abstractis”, in Akademieausgabe, VI, A, 4, N. 178,
(Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1999). G. Frege,  Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Eine logisch mathematische
Untersuchung, (Wilhelm Koebner, Breslau, 1884), p. 76.
5 Husserl notes in fact:«So long as there is a remainder of difference, there will be judgments in which the
things under consideration cannot be substituted salva veritate». E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in
Husserliana XII, cit., p. 97.
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«two multiplicities are said to be equal to each other (or more correctly: equally many,
equinumerous) if each thing of the first can be correlated with one thing of the second,
and none of these remain unconnected»1. Besides its circularity, such a statement does
not represent, nominally speaking, a definition of equinumerosity, because definiens and
definiendum are  not  conceptually  equivalent:  “being  two  equal  multiplicities”  and
“being  two  multiplicities  in  one-to-one  correspondence”.  The  one-to-one
correspondence can only warrant for the equinumerosity of two sets, but it is not the
reason for and it is not what determines equinumerosity; putting them in a one-to-one
correspondence can only have practical value: 
«It may well happen that, in order to verify in concreto  the equality of two sets
with  respect  to  their  multiplicities,  we  place  pairs  of  elements  alongside  one
another  or connect  them in some other  way;  but  neither  can we consider  this
operation necessary everywhere, nor, where this happens, the essence of the act of
comparison resides only in this»2.     
Thus, the fact that two sets can be putted in the one-to-one correspondence is not the
reason  for  their  having  the  same  cardinality,  by  which  we  know,  by  counting  the
elements of the two sets, if they have the same number, which was the kind of definition
of equality token in object by Husserl. “Having the same cardinality” and “being in a
one-to-one correspondence” are not concept with the same content, but only with the
same extension, and, as long giving a definition means to univocally fixing a concept,
not a definition of equality. 
The theory of equivalence is based on a misapplication of the concept of one-to-one
correspondence,  which  is,  in  the  correct  application,  only  a  practical  criterion  to
establish equinumerosity, but «what equivalent sets have in common is not merely the
‘equinumerosity’ or, more clearly, equivalence, but rather the same cardinal number in
the  true  and  proper  sense  of  the  word»3. Such  a  theory  defines  nominally  number
through its belonging to a class, while, secondly, leads the establishment of the number
of elements belonging to a set by inserting the set in a class of equivalent sets. Two sets
1 O.  Stolz,  Vorselsungen  über  allgemeine  Arithmetik.  Nach  den  neueren  Ansichten,  erster  Theil,  (B.G.
Trubner, Leipzig, 1885), p. 9. 
2 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 99.
3 Ibid., p. 116.
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have the same cardinality only if they are equivalent, which leads to establish equality
as the origin of the concept of number, but this cannot be assumed as a definition, in
Husserl  terms,  because  having  the  same  cardinality  and  being  equivalent  poses  an
identification only in the sense of the extension of the two concept, but not of their
contents. 
Even  if  Frege's  theory  of  number  cannot  be  completely  labeled  under  a  theory  of
equivalence, Husserl criticized Frege's view on natural number as a sort of appendix to
its general critic against such an approach to mathematical concepts. But we can also
see, that Husserl's criticism links more generally to the profound difference between his
approach to mathematical problems and Frege's  war against every spurious attempt to
grounding  arithmetic  on  any  kind  of  psychological  framework1.  Remarks  in  fact
Husserl:  «a foundation of arithmetic on a series of formal definitions out of which all
the theorems of that science could be deduced purely syllogistically is Frege’s ideal»2.
In fact, even if Husserl's and Frege's natural numbers answer theoretically to the same
question, “how many?”, already the fact that for Frege numbers are not presentation
stresses the distance between the two approaches and exactly this point represent one of
the main core of Frege's critic to Husserl. 
As  «principles of [his] investigation» in the  Grundlagen Frege «sharply distinguishes
the  psychological  from  the  logical,  the  subjective  from  the  objective»,  and  thus,
«following» this principle, «he always used the word “representation” [Vorstellung] in
psychological  sense  and  distinguished  representations  from concepts  and  objects»3.
Such a principle does exclude from the realm of arithmetic psychology, in the attempt to
states the objective nature of numbers by, on the one side, stressing their independence
from sensation, intuition, presentation e.g., on the other, underestimating the description
of the internal experience connected to the process leading to abstract concepts for the
1 For that, see also, R. Tieszen, Phenomenology, logic and the philosophy of mathematics, cit., p. 318. 
2 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 118.
3 G. Frege,  Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik.  Eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung,  cit.,  p. X. Frege
moved a similar critic also against Richard Dedekind in the sense of an alleged psychological foundation of
the  concept  of  “system”  pursued  in  his  Was  sind  und  was  sollen  die  Zahlen (F.  Vieweg  und  Sohn,
Braunschweig, 1893). Writes Frege in the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, first quoting Dedekind: «”it very
often happens that different things a, b, c . . . regarded for some reason from a common point of view, are
put together in the mind, and it  is then said that they form a system S.” A hint  of the truth is  indeed
contained in talk of the “common point of view”; but “regarding”, “putting together in the mind” is no
objective characteristic. I ask: in whose mind? If they are put together in one mind, but not in another, do
they then form a system? What may be put together in my mind must certainly be in my mind. Do things
outside me, then, not form systems? Is the system a subjective construction in the individual mind? Is the
constellation Orion therefore a system? And what are its elements? The stars, the molecules or the atoms?»
G. Frege, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, begriffschriftlich abgeleitet, Band 1, (Pohle, Jena, 1893), p. 1 – 4.
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understanding of the nature of such elements like numbers: 
«such a [psychological] description of the internal processes which precede the
occurring of a numerical judgment can never, even if it is the more appropriate,
substitute a proper concept definition. (…) Thus, the number is even less an object
of psychology or the result of psychical processes, as it is, for example, the North
Sea»1.    
That  leads  and  had  notoriously  leaded  to  a  long  debate  among  the  fregean  and
husserlian  commentators.  Obviously  the  main  issues  concern  the  role  of  Frege's
accusation of psychologism directed to Husserl, which is already to find in the quote
above  and  should  have  leaded  Husserl  to  abandon  his  psychologism  in  the
Prolegomena2.  Much  work  is  therefore  done  to  explain  the  real  extent  of  Frege's
influences on Husserl later development3, a work which leaded to a refutation of such an
influence,  by showing,  for  example,  that  the  concept  of  «ideal  objective  meaning»,
which is contrasted against the mere subjective presentation and compose the central
concept of the pure logic exposed in the  Prolegomena,  was already present in 1891
review of Schröder's Vorlesung über die Algebra der Logik and “Der Folgerungskalkül
und die Inhaltslogik“ of the same year4. Husserl finds in fact that Schröder 
«lacks the true concept of the meaning of a name. That requirement of univocity is
also  expressed  in  the  form:  The  name  shall  be  of  a  …  constant  meaning”.
However (…) he identifies the meaning of the name with the representation of the
object named by the name, from which the striking consequence follows, to be
sure,  that  all  common  names  are  equivocal.  It  is  not  as  if  the  author  had
overlooked the distinction between equivocal and common names – and besides,
who  could  overlook  it!  (…)  Moreover,  he  uses  the  term  “meaning”  itself
equivocally, and that in an already intolerable degree. In the above quotation (…)
1 Ibid.., p. 34.
2 A thesis notoriously introduced by Dagfinn Føllesadal in his 1958  Husserl und Frege. Ein Beitrag zur
Beleuchtung der Entstehung der phänomenologischen Philosophie (H. Aschehoung und Co., Oslo, 1958),
p.  25. A thesis shared at  the time also by R.C. Solomon, “Sense and Essence:  Frege and Husserl”,  in
International Philosophical Quarterly, 10, 1970, p. 380.
3 See, the fundamental work by J. N. Mohanty, Husserl and Frege, (Indiana University Press, Bloomington,
1982), p. 1 – 42.
4 E. Husserl, Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890 – 1910), in Husserliana XXII, cit., p. 3f and p. 44f.
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what is intended is the ordinary sense; in other occasion, however, what is actually
meant is the object named by the name. (…) And even that is not enough; the class
corresponding to the common name is also called its meaning»1.
This paragraph shows, as Mohanty already stressed out, that Husserl does distinguish
already in 1891 between sense (or meaning) of a term, the object to which it refers and
the presentation of the latter, even if thereby there is no clear assert in respect to «the
thesis of the ideal objectivity of meanings», which is much more to  be derived from
such distinctions2. In this sense, Frege's critic   about the lack of distinction in Husserl
early  work  between  concept,  presentation  and  object,  or  the  collapse  of  all  those
distinction  into  the  only concept  of  presentation,  does  not  strike  properly  Husserl's
position3. 
Husserl  even  does  take  under  critic  Frege's  definition  by  logical  abstraction  of  the
concept  of  natural  number  as  exposed  in  the  Grundlagen.  Frege  exemplifies  his
definitional method starting by giving the definition of the concept “direction of a line”
and  then  applies  the  same  procedure  to  the  concept  of  number.  Starting  from  the
consideration that, if line (a) is parallel to line (b), then the extension of the concept
“line parallel to line (a)” is equally extended of the second concept, says, “line parallel
to line (b)”, therefore the definition of “direction of a line (a)” is the extension of the
concept “parallel to the line (a)”. Thus, to define the concept of number he analogously
substitutes concepts for lines and one-to-one correspondence, and makes correspond the
objects which falls under one concept and the objects which falls under the other: «the
concept F is equinumerous to the concept G whenever there is the possibility» to put the
objects  that  fall  under  G and those that  fall  under  F in  one-to-one correspondence.
«Consequently I define: the number that belongs to the concept F is the extension of the
concept “equinumerous to the concept F”»4.
Number is defined as the concept to which an object belongs if it is the number of F for
some concept F. Thus, Frege is also able to prove Hume's principle in paragraph 63 of
his Grundlagen which asserts that, for any two concepts G and F, the number of Gs is
1 Ibid., p. 11 – 12.
2 J.  N.  Mohanty,  Husserl  and Frege,  cit.,  p.  3.  The explicit  assertion regarding the  ideal  objectivity of
meaning is to be found in the Second Logical Investigation.  
3 Frege writes: «First of all, everything becomes presentation. The references of words are presentations (…)
Objects are presentations (…) concepts, too, are presentations». In G. Frege, “Rezension von E. Husserl,
Philosophie der Arithmetik”, in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 103, 1894, p. 327.
4 G. Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung, cit., p. 79 – 80. 
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identical  to  the  number  of  Fs  if,  and  only  if,  G  and  F  stand  in  a  one-to-one
correspondence relation1.  Husserl's critic of Frege's definition is consequently directed
to the same point already seen in the case of equinumerosity. Such a definition does not
define the contents of concepts like “direction of a line” and, by parallel, “number”, and
that  is  by  defining  exclusively  their  extension,  which,  in  Husserl's  view,  is  not  a
definition  stricto sensu: «We note,  however,  that  all  the  definitions  become correct
statements if the concepts to be defined are replaced by their extensions. Correct, but
certainly entirely obvious and worthless statements as well»2. 
Husserl even notices that «Frege himself seems to have sensed the questionable status of
this definition, since he says in a note to it: “I think that we could simply say 'concept'
instead of 'extension of the concept'”»3.  This could have leaded Husserl also to refuse
the idea of an autonomous extensional logic of classes, and that's because  «in reality,
every extensional judgment is  an intensional judgment», and to a definition of “class”
which  comprehends  the  concepts  of  “conceptual  content”  and  “object  of  content”4.
Even,  as  showed  already  in  Schöder's  review,  there  is  for  Husserl  no  substantial
1 Ibid., p. 73. «When two numbers are so combined that the ones has always a unity which corresponds to the
unity of the other,  therefore,  we state  them as equal».  Hume's principle is, together with the so called
“Context principle”, which states that one should «never ask for the  meaning of a word in isolation, but
only in the context of a proposition» (Ibid., p. XXII), are the two principles on which is based Frege's
theory of abstraction.  
2 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 122.
3 Ibidem., note 1. Frege defended his position of the Grundlagen a year later, in Über den Begriff und Object,
while  responding  to  Benno  Kerry's  similar  critic.  But,  as  Frege  assumes,  to  identify  “concept”  and
“extension of a concept” means to have misunderstood the content of the work done in the Grundlagen: «I
simply have expressed my view that, in the expression ‘the number  that belongs to the concept F is the
extension of the concept  equinumerous to the concept F’, the words ‘extension of the concept’ could be
replaced  by ‘concept’»,  G.  Frege,  “Über  Begriff  und  Gegenstand”,  in  Zeitschrift  für Philosophie  und
philosophische  Kritik, 16,  1892, p. 199. However, Frege's position is even not easy to assets considering
that he agrees with Husserl on the fact that the extension of a concept does presuppose the intension of the
concept. He writes in fact: «In reality I hold the view that the concept logically precedes its extension, and I
consider it a mistake to attempt to found the class, as extension of a concept, not on the concept itself but
on the individual things», but still  he asserts in the same occasion that, «nevertheless,  [he is] in many
respect possibly closer to the author [Schröder] than to those whom one can call logician of content». See,
G. Frege, Freges kleine Schriften, ed. I. Angelelli (Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1967), p. 209 - 210. In a work
between 1892 and 1894 however, Frege states clearly: «the “extension-logicians” are right when, because
of their preference for the extension of a concept to its intension, they admit that they regard the reference
of words, and not their meaning, to be essential for logic. The contents-logicians only remain too happily
with  the  meaning,  for  what  they call  “content”  [Inhalt],  if  it  is  not  quite  the  same  as  representation
[Vorstellung], is certainly the meaning [Sinn]. They do not consider the fact that in logic it is not a question
of how thoughts come from thoughts without regard to truth-value,  that,  more generally speaking, the
progress from meanings to reference [Bedeutung], must be made; that the logical laws are first laws in the
realm of references and only then mediately relate to meaning». G. Frege, “Ausführungen über Sinn und
Bedeutung”,  in  Nachgelassene  Schriften,  ed.  H.  Hermes,  F.  Kanbartel,  F.  Kaulbach  (Felix  Meiner,
Hamburg, 1969), p. 133.
4 E. Husserl,  “Besprechung von E. Schröder,  Vorlesung über die Algebra der Logik (Exakte Logik)“,  in
Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890 – 1910), in Husserliana XXII, cit., p. 19.
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advantage from a extensional logic in respect to an intensional one, which means, «that
exactly what an extensional logic does perform, even that logic of ideal contents is able
to perform; that every issue solved by the former, even the former can solve, and that
even with the same laws, forms and calcula»1.
«As soon as we hit upon ultimate, elementary concepts, all defining comes to an end»,
the only resource we have is to provide the psychological analysis:  
«What one can do at most in such cases is to determine the concrete phenomena
from which or on the basis of which  the simple concepts are abstracted and to
clarify the  nature  of  this  abstraction  process  (...).  What  one might  reasonably
expect  from the  linguistic  description  of  such  a  concept  (for  instance  in  the
presentation of a science which is based on it) ought thus to be fixed as follows:
the description must be such as to put us into the correct disposition to determine
the  intended  abstract  moments  in  inner  or  outer  intuition or  to  reproduce  in
ourselves  the  mental  processes  which  are  required  for  the  formation  of  the
concept»2. 
Thus,  such  an  analysis  should  provide,  according  to  Husserl,  a  description  of  the
concrete phenomena that lay, as intuitive ground, on the basis of the abstracted concepts
and the abstraction itself, but also, and as representing the more psychological aspect of
the analysis, the description must put the subject performing and understanding it in a
position to reproduce in his internal experience the process which leads to the concepts3.
The road taken by Husserl starting from the works on numbers and arithmetic, which
marks his interest in the role of the intentional life of consciousness in contrast with the
framework of Frege's  Begriffsschrift and that will be fully developed in and from the
Logische Untersuchungen, leaves already for us much issues open. Even if, as recently
stressed, «the objectivity» of the concepts taken into account by Husserl, and in the case
of  number,  «the  objectivity  proper  to  the  logical  unity  of  the  concepts  of  (…)
collections,  for  example»,  is  «never  in  question  for  him»,  although  in  need  to  be
1 Ibid., p. 47.
2 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 119. Italics mine.
3 Such  a  description  marks  eventually  the  difference  of  a  descriptive-psychological  inquiry  from  other
descriptions which may appear acceptable, as the case of a neuro-physiological description of the process:
grasping  an  abstract  concept  is  basically  different  from  understanding  the  physiological  and  neural
processes by which a biological entity  does implements the process leading to the concept. 
45
accounted, that does not solve ipso facto the issue of psychologism1. As issue directly
connected to the descriptive nature of Husserl's early works and early phenomenology,
it is already worth of few other words here. 
If in the Philosophie der Arithmetik a great role in the account of the concept of number
is played by the totalities formed by the relation of collective combination, as we will
see in the following section2, such an account seems refer only to a psychic relation,
pushing  numbers  to  become,  apparently,  nothing  more  than  mere,  even  subjective,
presentations. One of the main point of criticism against psychologism but also against
psychological description, as we have indicated above in our brief exposition of the
famous  Frege-Husserl  debate,  is  that  everything  seems  to  become  presentation,
especially  if  such a  interpretation  remove  all  the  differences  between  presentations,
objects and concepts. That such a distinction was present in Husserl's early works has
already be indicated. In Husserl  Philosophie der Arithmetik can only be found now a
sort of “weak” logical psychologism probably originated, in our opinion, by Stumpf,
which  states  the  inquiry  into  the  psychical  sphere  as  necessary  but  not  sufficient
condition for any investigation in logic.
1.2..1) Weak Psychologism and Stumpf.
 
In his 1891 work Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie Stumpf comes to speak about the
scientific  relation  between  the  psychological  inquiry  and  the  epistemological  ones,
where a position very close to Husserl's one is exposed with some clarity3. Where it is
assigned to epistemology and the theory of knowledge the task of an inquiry into the
conditions of knowledge, especially,  the origin and truth of our representations, it  is
affirmed  as  necessary for  such  an  investigation  on  logic  and  «logical  elements»  to
proceed  essentially  «in  connection  with  psychology»4.  In  this  sense,  Stumpf
distinguishes between Kriticismus and Psychologismus as the two “views” in opposition
in respect to the proper evaluation of the role for logic of a psychological inquiry5.
1 B. C. Hopkins, “Husserl's  Psychologism, and Critique of Psychologism, Revisited”, in  Husserl Studies,
2006, Issue 2, (Springer, 2006), p. 92.
2 See, section 2.
3 C. Stumpf, “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie”, in Abhandlungen der philosophisch-philologishen Classe
der königlich bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Band 19 (Akademie, München, 1982). 
4 Stumpf recalls Eduard Zeller's work  Ueber Bedeutung und aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie (Karl Groos,
Heidelberg, 1862).
5 Of Kantian and Neokantian origin the first, while the second is said to be originated by Benno Erdmann.
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Consequently, Stumpf in comparing the two interpretations raises the question about the
«need of a combined effort and psychological, preparatory work in the question about
the origin of our concepts»1. Obviously, the limit of such a connection between the two
spheres is indicated in the notorious non-deducible validity of the categories from the
single  psychological  fact.  On  the  other  side,  after  having  stressed  the  difficulty  in
justifying the relationship between «kantian categories» and phenomena2, from which it
would  follow  that  «the  application  would  lay  only  on  an  arbitrary  law  or  an
incomprehensible psychological constraint», Stumpf indicates the possible degeneration
of such an epistemology into «the worst psychologism»3. 
Stumpf criticizes now the exclusion of psychology from epistemology operated by the
Kriticismus on the base of the leading position of the “reason” as origin of every law. In
fact,  even  if  it  is  possible  within  a  Kantian  framework  to  operate  fundamental
distinctions in perception, for example between Form and Materie, without reference to
any «psychological considerations» but only by «metaphysical expositions»,4«what it is
thereby  found  must  pass  the  test  of  psychology  anyway»,  according  to  Stumpf.
«Something which is epistemologically true», he continues now, «cannot be at the same
time  psychologically  false»5.  Moreover,  among  others  distinctions  exactly  the  one
indicated is one of the main topic with respect of which psychology could bring insight
on the correct interpretation of the relationships between contents of consciousness6. For
example, from the fact that color qualities do order in space and that the same qualities
1 C. Stumpf, “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie”, in Abhandlungen der philosophisch-philologishen Classe
der königlich bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, cit., p. 470.
2 For example, by means of the «obscure» schematism. 
3 Ibid. p. 477. According to Stumpf, a step forward is already represented by Natorp and his distinction in
consciousness  of  the  “being  conscious”  [Bewusstheit]  and  the  content  of  consciousness:  «In  being
conscious as such there is no such a unity, on which the unity of law, and thereby the ones of the object, can
be based (…). The being conscious is determined only to some extent by the content definiteness. Thus, it
is the content only, and that is with reference to its connection with every consciousness, which gives to the
psychical  or  the  fact  of  consciousness  their  proper  positive  sense  (…).  Thereby,  the  fundamentally
determinative  element  are  exactly  the  objective  (contents-)  unities».  P.  Natorp,  Einleitung  in  die
Psychologie nach kritischer Methode (J.C.B. Muhr, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1888), p. 112 – 113.
4 See, I. Kant, KrV, AA 03, p. 51f. 
5 C. Stumpf, “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie”, in Abhandlungen der philosophisch-philologishen Classe
der königlich bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, cit., p. 482.
6 Stumpf refers to his querelle with Hermann Cohen exactly about the correct interpretation of the following
quote from Kant first Kritik: «if I take away from our representation of a body all that the understanding
thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as
impenetrability,  hardness,  colour,  etc.;  yet  there is  still  something left  us  from this  empirical  intuition,
namely, extension and shape. These belong to pure intuition, which exists a priori in the mind, as a mere
form of sensibility, and without any real object of the senses or any sensation». (I. Kant, KrV, AA 03, p.
50). Stumpf stresses the psychologically untenable thesis about the possibility to think an extension without
color. 
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can manifest  itself  in different spatial order,  does not give reason for the distinction
between  space  as  form  of  sensibility  and  the  whole  of  sensible  contents.  Instead,
«principles for order of the most different kind can be drawn in general from the content
of  sensations»,  and  different  kinds  of  sensible  qualities  even  do  constitute
«multiplicities of one or more dimensions» that allow the application of a mathematical
approach  without  meaning  the  latter  a  mere  transposition  of  spatial  analogies1.
According to Stumpf, even the order of the sensations must be immediately co-given
[mitgegeben] with the sensations as immanent property, «and even in the case of the so
called pure concepts of relation, like unity and plurality, holds that the plurality is not
something added to the perceived sounds or colors, but must be something somehow
already given itself in them»2. 
In this sense, the scope of psychology with reference to epistemology is to interpret the
origin of the representation of space, time and relations, where for the latter, an inquiry
into  the  contents  of  internal  or  external  perception  would  come  in  question.  By
articulating the given contents it results possible the abstraction of the relations from the
rest of the perceptual contents, even if it is previously necessary to reduce the concept of
a relation into its composing parts. It results the aim of this psychological work in the
«genetic  classification  of  the  simplest  relation  concepts»3.  Thus,  the  following
psychological question would be about the origin of its necessity, which in the light of
the Kantism, is guaranteed against the skepticism by the immanent lawfulness of reason,
on which the laws of the experienced objects is settled. If we refuse to lead back to such
a solution to follow a descriptive-psychological framework, we must anyway recognize
the limits imposed by the nature of the logical elements we aim to analyze. «In the case
of the identity», for example, «we do not call a judgment necessary as psychological
process, but with respect to what it is meant by that». It is in fact such a Materie that,
according to its own internal nature, cannot be judged otherwise; necessity is therefore
primarily a property of certain judgment contents. It is abstracted not from the external
world, and also not from the psychical condition as such, as much as it is not an a priori
form  added  to  the  “matter”,  but  results  immanent  to  certain  contents  and  it  is
distinguished by «conceptual abstraction»4. 
1 C. Stumpf, “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie”, in Abhandlungen der philosophisch-philologishen Classe
der königlich bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, cit., p. 485.
2 Ibid., p. 488.
3 Ibid., p. 491.
4 Ibid., p. 495.
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Every  science  is  oriented  trough  its  very  core  of  questions,  which  do  not  develop
together with other, on the contrary, produces the division in specific sciences. But what
belongs to the formulation of such questions, does not for the dealing and response with
such  issues.  For  that  reason,  we  must  seek  help  from every  source,  only  without
breaking the laws of the «universally logical prescriptions». In this sense, confronting
the aim of psychology and theory of knowledge, proper to the first is the «inquiry into
the origin of the concept, the ones of absolute content as well as the ones of relative»1. If
it is true that a concept is not thinkable for itself but only within a concrete presentation,
therefore such a  psychological  task coincides  with determining the relative concrete
presentation and of the moments belonging to their mode of changing, which makes
possible the concept abstraction. 
But what we eventually obtain by that, the concept, is not a judgment or knowledge
already. If we assume that concepts appearing together in a judgment belong to us a
priori,  even  so,  it  could  be  always  possible  that  an  experience  or  a  perception  do
legitimize their connection in judgment, as well as a judgment can be a priori and true a
priori. The two questions should not be confused, exactly like in the case of the nature
of the geometrical axioms in respect to the psychological inquiry into the genesis of the
space-presentation:  «the  two  questions  have  been  mixed  together,  effecting  both
psychology  and  epistemology».  But  the  sciences  have  been  separated  while  the
questions mixed, instead of the other way around. «In this sense», in Stumpf's eyes:
«the completely different complex of tasks of both sciences seems to differ, but
we must therefore even more get back to the fact that a successful solution of such
tasks results unthinkable without a  plural and mutual support. Who deals with
theory of knowledge cannot pass the question about the origin of concepts, he
must have penetrated in the deep and difficulties of such a problem, while the
psychologist must act, for his part, as such theorist. Not merely because cognitive
judgment  constitute  a  special  class  of  phenomena  of  judgment,  that  will  be
described  exactly  as  the  other  psychical  phenomena,  but  firstly  because  like
everyone, who does not take his science as mere technique, must come in clear
about  the  foundations  of  all  knowledge.  It  arises  yet,  like  in  the  case  of  the
“internal perception”, also real boundary issues, which both scientists can easily
1 Ibid., p. 501.
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well  attribute  to  himself  without  prejudice  to  the  difference  of  their  aims
whatsoever»1.
Stumpf, from what emerges from this few observations, aims to a mediation between
descriptive psychology and theory of knowledge aware of the limits imposed by logical
necessity, and which must have, at least, partially influenced Husserl in the first years of
work. At least and besides the profound differences,  with respect to Husserl's initial
attempts  to  describe  the  arising  of  elemental  logical  formations.  The  kind  of
psychologism present in the early Husserlian works does not evidently claim to be a
foundation of logic or mathematics (at least not in the sense of Frege's logicism), but to
clarify  the  sense  of  the  concepts  by  tracing  them  back  to  their  origin  in  intuitive
presentations, combinations, abstraction and reflexion. 
1.2.2) A Shaking Ground.
Still, a critical point with respect of an alleged logical psychologismus can be traced at
least,  in  the  two  thesis  that  Husserl  expose  in  the  Habilitationsschrift  but  more
extensively in the Philosophie der Arithmetik: that of the role of collective combination
by the  arising  of  wholes  and  totalities,  and  the  role  of  reflection  upon  acts  in  the
formation of formal categories. Assuming in fact the extreme variability of the elements
comprehended  in  the  collective  combination,  and  the  variability  of  the  kind  of  the
relationship between the elements combined (that for its part differs from the physical
relations that can be found among the elements related), this two assumption lead to the
definition of the collective combination in terms very close to the act-object relation,
which must be therefore “psychical”: 
«The collective combination plays  a  very important  role  in  the totality of our
psychical life. Every complex phenomena which supposes parts noticed for itself,
every high-order psychical and mental activities supposes, in order to generally
exist, the collective combination of partial phenomena. It can never be reached
even the presentation of a more simple relation (…), if  a unitary interest  and,
therefore, at the same time an act of notice, would not single out together and hold
1 Ibid., p. 508.
50
unified  the  fundamentals.  This  psychical  relation  is  even  an  indispensable
psychological precondition for every relation and connection whatsoever»1.      
Such an attribution of a “psychical” nature to the act of collective combination have
been linked by many commentators2 and by Husserl himself to Brentano's «explicative
model», according to which, if «all real is “physical” or “psychical”», such a collection
can only be something “psychical”, and thereby, «the idea of collection originates by
“reflection” on psychical form of unity»3. The objectivity of sets and multiplicities must
be even different from that of ordinary things, because it arises entirely from subjective
mental  activity:  a  set  does  not  exist  qua set,  for  it  is  formed  by a  psychic  act  of
collecting, which is, as expressed by Sokolowsky, «a certain paradox (...), the paradox
of something objective which exists only by virtue of subjective mental activity»4.
Again,  by  the  exposition  in  the  Philosophie  der  Arithmetik of  the  origin  of  the
«fundamental abstract concept of “one”», Husserl expresses very clearly the connection
of a certain class of acts and the related «contents of the concept» on one side, and the
concept  itself,  when he says:  «The abstract  concept  of  unity cannot  arise  without  a
bearing act of thought – namely, a certain act which belongs to its contents»5. Here,
besides the affirmation of the explicit function of acts, in this case of collection, in the
first «bearing together» of the most different element composing the intuitive collection
- even the arising of fundamental concepts under which the elements fall supposes a
peculiar  kind  of  act.  In  the  Philosophie  der  Arithmetik in  fact,  the  «concepts  of
something, one, multiplicity and number, those concepts which are the most general and
the  most  content-independent,  as  concept  of  form»,  and  which  are  called  hereafter
«categories»,  find  «their  easy  explanation»  for  their  arising  «in  the  reflection  on
1 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 75.
2 See, E. Holenstein, “Einleitung des Herausgebers”, in E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band,
in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. XXI.  
3 E.  Husserl,  “Zwei  Fragmente  zum  Entwurf  einer  Vorrede  zur  zweiten  Auflage  der  Logischen
Untersuchungen (September 1913)”, in E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Ergänzungsband, erster Teil,
in Husserliana XX/1, ed U. Melle (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Bston, London, 2002), p. 295.
4 R. Sokolowsky, The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution, in Phaenomenologica, 18 (Martinus
Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 16. In this old but still important study, it is for example stressed how Husserl
is, in Sokolowsky interpretation, does not treat explicitly the status of sets and in general of all the psychic
relationships, speaking of both their subjective and objective aspects without focusing on the “paradox” of
such realities. That condition, i.e. such a «double treatment», if on the one side leaved space for criticism,
especially by Frege, is in his interpretation «not due to inconsistency on Husserl's part, but to the nature of
[sets] and of all psychic relations», which lead to the paradox indicated even years later in the case of the
categorical objects in the Logische Untersuchungen. See, ibid., p. 17.    
5 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 87.
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psychical acts that can be exercised on all contents»1.
Letting aside for the moment the difficulties involved in the specific exposition of the
process demanded by the arising of such concepts in the  Philosophie der Arithmetik,
which shows various difficulties, what it is only to stress by now is Husserl's call for act
analysis as mandatory for showing the origin of those latter. Even in the Prolegomena
and Logische Untersuchungen in fact, much effort is made by Husserl to describe the
process that lead to «categorical object, i.e. categorical forms»2; for «all these concepts
must be fixed,  their  “origin” must be individually sought out» and by being logical
entities constituted in categorical acts, Husserl tries to give a description of their origin
by an act analysis, this time, leading to the distinction of simple and categorical acts3.
But here Husserl has already a more deeper understanding of the demarcation between
his descriptive-phenomenological and psychological investigation with respect to the
origin of the fundamental elements of logic; a demarcation by means of which he can in
fact now remarks: 
«Not that psychological questions as to the origin of the conceptual presentations
or representional dispositions here in question, have the slightest interest for our
discipline [pure logic]. This is not what we are inquiring into: we are concerned
with a phenomenological origin or – if we prefer to rule out unsuitable talk of
origins, only bred in confusion – we are concerned with insight into the essence of
the  concepts  involved  (…).  We  can  achieve  such  an  end  only  by  intuitive
presentation of  the essence in  adequate ideation,  or,  in  the case of complicate
concepts,  through  knowledge  of  the  essentiality  of  the  elementary  concepts
present in them, and of the concepts of their forms of combination»4.
From this  point  of  view  it  is  to  understand  why Husserl,  even  by recognizing  the
positive  contribution  of  his  view about  the  arising  of  set  presentation  by collective
combination which is, still in the 1913, not rejected, express his «deep dissatisfaction»,
in  the  same  text,  about  his  «radical  analysis  of  the  “psychological  origin”  of  the
1 Ibid., p. 84 – 5. Even in the Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl refers to the concepts treated in the
early works as «categorical objects as formed objects», Formale und transcendentale Logik, in Husserliana
XVII, cit., p. 88.
2 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. 245.
3 Ibid., p. 246.
4 Ibidem.
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mathematical  ground-concept  belonging  to  his  early  philosophy  of  mathematics»,
especially regarding the problem of the difference between the «concept of (cardinal)
number and of the collecting», and moreover, regarding all the «categorical concepts
and (…) all concepts of objectivities of every kind»1. Looking back to his work started
around 1894, Husserl states in fact that if some problems were solved, like the function
of the «mere symbolic thought», 
«still,  how  symbolic  thinking  should  be  “possible”,  how  the  objective
mathematical and logical connection constitute in the subjectivity and how is to
understand “evidence”, how can be the given mathematical something valid in
itself in medium of the psychological, all that remained puzzling»2. 
Already in his 1894 Psychological Studies in The Elements of Logic in fact, Husserl is
still stressing the importance of the psychological study of the most elemental intuitive
and representative processes for a priori sciences, but he has now a more deep insight
with respect to the peculiarity of the elements of logic and the impossibility to gain full
clearness  about  their  function  in  knowledge  and  proper  nature  within  a  mere
psychological investigation3. But still, in the same 1894 work he certainly reaffirm the
function of a descriptive analysis, by affirming for example, «that no theory of judgment
has the possibility to gain a proper understanding of the matters in question unless it
does  not  rest  on  a  deep  study of  the  descriptive  and genetic  relationships  between
intuitions and representations [Repräsentation]»4. In other words, he certainly not denies
that one can considerably advance logical understanding of the soundness of symbolic
thought (and above all, of mathematical thought) without a more penetrating insight into
the essence of the elementary psychical processes involved.  «But without such insight
one surely cannot obtain a full and truly satisfactory understanding of (…) any logical
1 E.  Husserl,  “Zwei  Fragmente  zum  Entwurf  einer  Vorrede  zur  zweiten  Auflage  der  Logischen
Untersuchungen (September 1913)”, in E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Ergänzungsband, erster Teil,
in Husserliana XX/1, cit., p. 294 – 296.
2 Ibid., cit. p. 296.
3 Notoriously, an exception on the Husserlian amend from a spurious inquiry into «the foundation of every
theory of judgment» is represented by the 1897 “Berichtes über deutsche Schriften zur Logik aus dem Jahre
1894“,  where  both,  the  descriptive  and  genetic  psychological  inquiry  is,  by  founding  the  theory  of
apperception through the inquiries into intuition and presentation,  the principal  aim for  psychology as
laying as ground for every such theory. E. Husserl, Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890 – 1910), in Husserliana
XXII, cit., p. 134, note.     
4 E. Husserl, “Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik”, in Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890 – 1910),
in Husserliana XXII, cit., p. 120.
53
process»1.  
Husserl  seems  therefore  to  struggle  against  the  proper  definition  of  the  boundaries
imposed  by the  matter  under  investigation  to  the  framework  within  which  concept
analysis is conducted. This struggling emerges nearly 10 years later the Philosophie der
Arithmetik well  summarized  in  the  Foreword to  the  first  edition  of  the  Logische
Untersuchungen where Husserl, looking back to the «many years of work» that leaded
to the «new foundation of pure logic and epistemology» exposed there, writes:
«I began work on the prevailing assumption that psychology was the science from
which logic in general, and the logic of the deductive sciences, had to hope for
philosophical clarification. For this reason psychological research occupy a very
large  place  in  the  first  volume  of  my  Philosophy  of  Arithmetic.  There  were,
however, connections in which such a psychological foundation never came to
satisfy  me.  Where  one  was  concerned  with  questions  as  to  the  origin  of
mathematical  presentations,  or  with  the  elaboration  of  those  practical  methods
which are indeed psychologically determined, psychological analysis seemed to
me  to  promote  clearness  and  instruction.  But  once  one  had  passed  from the
psychological connections of thinking, to the logical unity of the thought-content,
no true continuity and unity could be established»2. 
Husserl  was certainly disquieted  by doubts  of  principle,  as  to  how to  reconcile  the
objectivity  of  mathematics,  and  of  all  science  in  general,  with  a  psychological
foundation for logic. The first edition of the Logical Investigations represented in fact,
as well known, even Husserl's own clarification with respect to his «whole method»,
which  means,  that  «psychological  analysis»  aiming to  illuminate  the  given science.
Surely he was pushed towards general critical reflections on the essence of logic, as it is
already partially being documented3, and especially, around the time of his 1896 Lecture
on Logik4, for what concerned, for example, the grounding idea of pure logic as inspired
1 Ibid., p. 122. By symbolic thought, indeed, «into the essence of those elementary process of intuition and
the Representation which everywhere make that thought possible», ibidem.
2 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. 6 – 7.
3 See,  for  example,  C.  Bayer,  Von  Bolzano  zu  Husserl,  in  Phaneomneologica,  139  (Kluwer  Academic
Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London), 1996.
4 E. Husserl,  Logik, Vorlesung 1896, in Husserliana, Materialienbände, I, cit. The  Prolegomena  do in fact
represent a reworked version of part of this lecture, according to the corresponding material composing the
two works.
54
by Lotze's  interpretation  of  Bolzano's  Wisseschaftslehre and  the  overcoming  of  the
initially  uncleared  elements  of  concealed  Psychologismus.  Much  of  such  critical
reflection  was  therefore  basically  connected  to  the  proper  understanding  of  the
«objectivity of the content known», both, in relation to the «subjectivity of knowing»
and in relation to the definition of its nature as emerging within the act analysis1.
Within  this  general  clarification of  the  very methodological  basis  of  Husserl's  early
investigations, also Husserl's surely critical acknowledgment and endorsement of the
descriptive  characters  of  the  psychological  analysis  represents  a  point  in  need  of
clarification. In this sense, the confrontation with Brentano, which intensively develops
till at least the early years in Göttingen, helped Husserl in his struggles to shed light on
different aspects of the descriptive act analysis. Two of such aspects, relevant for us
under two connected point of view, will be taken into account in what follows. 
The fact that such a clarification was yet not only important under specific theoretical
points deserves at least mention. A very informative example of  Husserl's struggles for
a  correct  definition  of  the  descriptive  aspect  of  his  analysis  and  of  the  arising
phenomenology, still  conceived around 1900 as a form of descriptive psychology, is
showed for example by the later refutation of the leveling between phenomenology and
descriptive psychology operated in the First Edition of the Logical Investigation:
«Phenomenology is descriptive psychology. Epistemological criticism is therefore
in essence psychology, or at least only capable of being built on a psychological
basis. Pure logic therefore also rests on psychology – (…). The necessity of this
sort  of  psychological  foundation  of  pure  logic,  i.e.,  a  strictly  descriptive  one,
cannot lead us into error regarding the mutual independence of the science, logic
and psychology. For pure description is merely a preparatory step towards theory,
not theory itself. One and the same sphere of pure description can accordingly
serve to prepare for very different theoretical science. It is not the full science of
psychology  that  serves  as  a  foundation  for  pure  logic,  but  certain  classes  of
description  which  are  the  step  preparatory  to  the  theoretical  researches  of
psychology»2.
1 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. 7.
2 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Theil, First Edition, cit., p. 18.
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Besides the curious resemblance of Husserl's position to Stumpf's own definition of the
different sphere of competence assigned to psychology and logic, what must also be
mentioned here  is  the  fact  that  in  the  Second Edition  of  the  Logical  investigations
(1913)1,  the  above  mentioned  definition  of  phenomenology  in  terms  of  descriptive
psychology changes radically. Husserl writes in fact in the new version of the Note 3 to
paragraph 6:
«If our sense of phenomenology has been grasped, and if it has not been given the
current interpretation of an ordinary “descriptive psychology”, a part of natural
science,  then  an  objection,  otherwise  justifiable,  will  fall  to  the  ground,  an
objection to the effect that all theory of knowledge, conceived as a systematic
phenomenological clarification of knowledge, is built upon psychology. On this
interpretation  pure  logic,  treated  by  us  as  an  epistemologically  clarified,
philosophical discipline, must in the end likewise rest upon psychology, if only
upon its preliminary descriptive researches into intentional experiences. (…) We
naturally reply that if psychology is given its old meaning, phenomenology is not
descriptive psychology: its peculiar “pure” description, its contemplation of pure
essences on a basis of exemplary individual intuitions of experiences (often freely
imagined ones), and its descriptive fixation of the contemplated essences into pure
concepts, is no empirical, scientific description»2.
Phenomenology  in its later understanding immediately after the  Logical Investigation
should therefore  «not be understood»  as descriptive psychology «simpliciter». On the
one side, because «all the metaphysical or scientific - in the sense of the science of
nature  –  objectivations  [Objectivations]  remain  excluded»3,  and,  on  the  other  side,
because  the  phenomenological  description  gazes  upon what  is  strictly  given,  i.e.,  it
1 In 1911, in the so called “popular piece” of phenomenology as Husserl called at the time the Philosophie
als strenge Wissenschaft,  he also writes «The  Logische Untersuchungen,  which in their fragments of a
systematic  phenomenology for  the first  time employ essence analysis  (...),  have  again and  again been
misunderstood as attempts to rehabilitate the method of introspection [Selbstbeobachtung]. Admittedly, part
of the blame for this lies in the defective characterization of the method in the “Introduction” to the First
Investigation in  the  Second  Volume,  the  indication  of  phenomenology as  descriptive  psychology».  E.
Husserl, “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft”, in  Aufsätze und Vorträge (1911 – 1921), in Husserliana
XXV, cit., p. 36.
2 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 23.
3 E. Husserl, “Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik in den Jahren 1895 – 99 (1903/04)“, Dritter Artikel,
in Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890 – 1910), Husserliana XXII, ed B. Rang (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
The Hague, Boston, London, 1979), p. 206
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gazes upon the lived-experience in the manner in which it is in itself; it analyzes the
“thingly”  [dinglich]  manifestations  and  not  what  is  manifesting  in  them.  The
epistemological  clarification  based on  such  analysis  is  now «nothing  more  than  an
intuitive,  adequate  abstraction,  which  brings  to  evident  consciousness,  trough  the
phenomenologically fixed, the universal essence, the “true and proper content” of the
logical concepts and laws, and thereby brings it to “clear and evident” comprehension»1.
Such an abstraction moves «progressively trough reflections on the contents of acts of
cognition  just  performed»  and  what  is  phenomenologically  fixed  and  described  are
therefore  essences,  but  not  objects  essences,  but  of  the  essences  of  kind  of  lived-
experience, i.e., of kinds of correlation between the experiencing and the experienced. 
The  confrontation  whit  the  descriptive  aspect  of  Husserl's  task  has  therefore  its
counterpart also under the point of view of the later definition of phenomenology itself.
1.3) Early Stage of Descriptive Psychology and Brentano.
Prior to the first edition of the  Logical Investigations and initially and partially in the
same 1900 work, much of Husserl effort is devoted to the proper understanding of the
nature  of  descriptive  psychology  and  the  sphere  of  phenomena  under  investigation
within it, especially in relation to the question of the proper definition of the arising
phenomenology. Such task is  obviously connected to the problem of delineating the
research area of psychology and the natural science (or science of matter of facts),  as
possible explicative [erklärend] framework for the theory of knowledge. The distinction
between the  explicative  and the  clearing  function  of  a  science  aiming to become a
theory of knowledge applied to experience, and thus, the “clearing” task assigned later
on to phenomenology, is well summarized by Husserl in the introduction to the Logical
Investigations: 
«Its  aim is  not  to  explain knowledge in  the  psychological  or  psycho-physical
sense as a factual occurrence in objective nature, but to shed light on the idea of
knowledge in its constitutive elements and laws. It does not try to follow up the
real  connections  of  coexistence  and  succession  with  which  actual  acts  of
knowledge  are  interwoven,  but  to  understand  the  ideal sense  of  the  specific
1 Ibid., p. 207.
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connections  in  which  the  objectivity  of  knowledge  may  be  documented.  It
endeavors to raise to clearness the pure forms and laws of knowledge by tracing
knowledge back to the adequate fulfillment in intuition. This “clearing up” takes
place in the framework of a phenomenology of knowledge, i.e., a phenomenology
oriented (...) to the essential structures of pure experiences and to the structures of
sense that belongs to these»1
 
Phenomenology, starting from the  Logical Investigations, aims therefore to the “pure
forms” of knowledge and the fulfilling process in “intuition”, which in fact characterizes
Husserl's  approach  to  the  permanent  core  of  knowing  in  general,  i.e.,  «the  puzzle
represented  by  the  being  in  itself  of  the  ideal  sphere  in  its  relationship  to
consciousness»2.  This process includes a complex development, and the assuming of
concepts and perspectives from other thinkers, who also, even if influential, still never
accomplished  -  in  Husserl's  opinion  –  such  a  task,  mostly  for  methodological  or
conceptual reasons3.
But  first  Husserl  notoriously  recalls  with  the  indication  of  descriptive  psychology
Brentano's  distinction  between  descriptive  psychology  and  genetic-physiological
psychology,  the  latter  interpreted  as  causal  explanation  of  the  kind  of  psychical
phenomena which descriptive psychology exposes. Descriptive psychology, according
to Husserl's notes on Brentano's Lecture on Descriptive Psychologie aims in fact
«To give clarity about  what  inner  experience immediately shows, hence not  a
genesis of facts, but first and foremost a description of the subject-matter. This
part is not psycho-physiological, but purely psychological. We must in advance
know how things are: and this is shown by an inner glance into the psychical»4.
Its exactness differs from probabilistic sciences, by aiming descriptive psychology to
«intuitively grasp general laws» in the psychological field using inductive and deductive
1 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 27. 
2 E. Husserl, Briefwechsel, I, Die Brentano Schule, in Husserliana Dokumente, cit., p. 39.
3 Among others, in the time between the  Philsophie der Arithmetik and the  Logische Untersuchungen, are
surely to  be mentioned Bolzano and  Lotze.  E.  Husserl,  “Besprechung von M. Palágyi,  Der Streit  der
Psychologisten und Formalisten in der modernen Logik, Leipzig 1902”, in Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890
– 1910), in Husserliana XXII, cit., p. 156.
4 E. Husserl,  Q 10/4.,  Unpublished lectures notes from 1887 Brentano's lecture  Descriptive Psychologie,
Signature Q 10, Husserl Archives Louvain. Cited by E. D. Rollinger,  Husserl's Position in the School of
Brentano, Phaenomenologica 150 (Springer Science and Business, Dordrecht, 1999),  p. 24
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methods1, while the topic of genetic psychology is, on the other hand,  «the laws by
which psychological phenomena arise and disappear». But since, according to Brentano,
«these phenomena depend undoubtedly on the processes of the nervous system, the
conditions  of  their  appearance  and disappearance  are  largely physiological,  and  the
investigation of genetic psychology must be entangled with that of physiology»2. 
Husserl himself now, still at the time of the Logische Untersuchungen, remembers and
stresses  how  basically,  «our  problem  of  circumscribing  the  general  concept  of
“psychical act”, is closely connected with this problem of division [Sonderung] <of the
psychical and physical phenomena>», since the concept of psychical act arose precisely
in  this  context,  as  «supposedly  marking  off  the  psychological  sphere»3. Thus,  the
problem is related to Brentano's distinction between psychical and physical phenomena;
the distinction is in fact a possible scientific criteria in order to define the research area
of psychology, assumed that this latter is defined as «science of psychical phenomena»4.
But,  according  to  Husserl,  Brentano's  distinction  does  not  seem to  offer  a  suitable
criterion. Writes in fact Husserl: 
«It can be shown that not all “psychical phenomena” in the sense of a possible
definition  of  psychology  are  psychical  phenomena  (i.e.  psychical  acts)  in
Brentano’s  sense,  and  that,  on  the  other  hand,  many  genuine  “psychical
phenomena” fall under Brentano’s ambiguous rubric of “physical phenomena”»5.
By Husserl's effort to clarify and define the proper sphere of investigations belonging to
descriptive  psychology,  concurring  on  the  unstable  classification  of  phenomena  in
Brentano's psychology, is therefore the notion of physical phenomenon, more precisely,
the  confusion  in  this  notion  of  contents  and  objects.  In  the  Logical  Investigations
Husserl  recognizes  in  fact  a  misunderstanding,  or  better,  a  confusion  in  Brentano's
examples of physical phenomena. By remembering how Brentano defines as physical,
phenomena such as «a color, a figure, a landscape which I see (…) as well as similar
1 F.  Brentano,  Deskriptive  Psychologie.  ed. R.  M.  Chisholm,  W.  Baumgartner  (Felix  Meiner,  Hamburg,
1982), p. 3.
2 F. Brentano, Meine letzte Wünsche für Österreich (Cotta, Stuttgart, 1895), p. 34 – 5.
3 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 355.
4 «We must consider only mental phenomena in the sense of real states as the proper object of psychology.
And it  is  in reference only to  these phenomena that  we say that  psychology is  the science of  mental
phenomena». F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte, Erster Band, cit., p. 130.
5 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 378.
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images which appear in the imagination»1, Husserl stresses the referring of the physical
phenomena  in  Brentano's  sense  to  both,  the  object  and  the  «sensed  content»;  and
moreover, the following confusion of these contents and the external objects or even
their properties. Thus, according to Husserl, in Brentano 
«the division into psychical and physical objects (contents, properties, relations
etc.)  is  confused.  He  simply  opposes  physical  to  psychical  phenomena,  and
defines them unmistakably as a division of experiences into acts and non-acts. But
he at once mixes up, under the rubric of physical phenomena sensed contents and
apparent external objects  (or their  phenomenal properties),  so that the division
now becomes a division of phenomenal objects into physical and psychical (in an
ordinary  or  near-ordinary  sense),  in  which  the  latter  division  furnishes  the
names»2. 
 
Besides the correctness of Husserl's interpretation, what it is more important for us is
now to stress some critical points stimulated by the critic against Brentano's erroneous
distinction. 
In fact,  Husserl  notoriously stressed out  in the  Logical  Investigation,  that a positive
definition of physical phenomena should more importantly take account and therefore
be determined by the «intuitive interconnection» between moments of sensation and the
qualities necessarily connected with them. In a manuscript linked to the works on the
Logical  Investigations Husserl  firstly  affirm  the  fact  that  «if  we  now  consider  the
phenomena  presented  by  these  various  classes  of  perceptions,  they  unmistakably
constitute  essentially  distinct  classes».  A  purely  «descriptive  consideration»  must
establish in fact «an unbridgeable gulf between these phenomena».
1.3.1) Primary Content and Psychical Acts.
For  what  concern  the  phenomena  that  may  fall  under  the  label  of  “physical
phenomena”, for Husserl is now important to stress how by such phenomena we can
descriptively find  
1 F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte, Erster Band, cit., p. 104.
2 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/2, cit, p. 774.
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«In  first  instance  (...)  the  sensory  qualities,  which  in  themselves  form  a
descriptively closed  class,  whether  there  are  such things  as  senses  and sense-
organs or not. They form a kind in the strict Aristotelian sense of the word»1. 
And moreover,  
«To these  are  added  features  necessarily  attaching,  either  to  sense-qualities  in
general, or to single ranges of such qualities (again strict Aristotelian species), or,
conversely, features themselves necessarily presupposing qualities, and only able
to achieve concrete being in association with them»2. 
Here,  well-known propositions  are  to be found and come up for  treatment,  like for
example: no intuited spatiality without quality, or the even more notorious, «no color, no
tactile quality without something spatial»3. In this sense, it  has to be understood the
doubt  about  the definition of  the physical  phenomena,  and the relationship between
physical and psychical phenomena, already present at the time of the Philosophie der
Arithmetik. Husserl proposes in fact to avoid the expression «physical phenomenon» for
the primary and «absolute contents», which are for Brentano non-relational, while for
Husserl  are  completely  and  necessarily  structured  by  relations,  i.e.,  fundamental
relations,  which  will  represent  the  task  of  the  Third of  the  Logical  Investigations.
Basically, Husserl in the Philosophie der Arithmetik avoids the recurs to the expression
“physical phenomenon”,  «because it is somewhat awkward to designate a similarity,
gradation, and the like as a “physical phenomenon”». In fact, Brentano himself had in
mind  with  that  phrase  «only  the  non-relational  absolute  contents  –  and,  indeed,
individual phenomena, not abstract moments in an intuition»4.
Husserl  even develops in  the  Philosophie der Arithmetik (and will  apply with more
understanding starting from the Logical Investigations) two different kinds of relations,
the one belonging to the primary and absolute contents, and the one proper only to
psychical  acts.  The  first  kind  is  part  of  presentations,  but  not  intentionally,  and
composes therefore a primary content5. Such relations are represented, for example, by
1 Ibid., p. 755
2 Ibidem.
3 Ibidem, and Cfr., E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 229f.
4 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 70.
5 Ibid., p. 68.
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the connection between color and spatial extension already seen, but also of higher-
order logical connection, like a color Specie and a specific nuance. 
The second kind instead, is characterized by the presence and a certain “use” of an act.
To this  second class do belong in fact «phenomena like presentation,  judging, hope
etc.», like in the case of the kind of presentation where we find an act that «binds to
each  other  the  different  elements  which  are  therefore  unified  into  a  collection»1.
Between the two kinds there is a fundamental difference to be found: while in the first
class «the relation is immediately given» with the grounding elements, the presentation
of a  relation requires  a reflection on the act  establishing the relation,  and therefore,
represents an higher level of psychical phenomena in respect to the mere presentation of
primary contents2. 
Thus,  triggered  by the  need  of  clarify  the  confusion  within  descriptive  psychology
between object and content, Husserl seems to concentrate his work around 1891 on the
correct distinction between primary or absolute content and psychical acts on the one
side, and on the descriptive distinction of the kinds of acts which are intertwined by the
arising of elementary formations on the other, which will be the basis of his analysis of
concept origin and theory of abstraction as presented in the work on arithmetic. 
But the confrontation with Brentano's framework offered to Husserl also another critical
point which need to be mentioned here before moving to the just mentioned analysis.
1.3.2) The 1893 – 89 Critic and its Function in Husserl's Development. 
Around 1894 in the second part of the  Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik
entitled  “Anschauung  und  Repräsentation“,  Husserl  introduces  another  important
distinction between two different modes of intentional referring of consciousness to its
content. This kind of distinction find its  clear  expression in our being aware of the
fundamental difference between merely experiencing a content in first instance, and the
perceived object which could result: to the same object can correspond different and
even changing sensory contents, while the perceived object remains the same. To this
difference  corresponds  now  the  distinction,  within  the  main  class  of  presentations,
between representation [Repräsentation] and intuition. The first class is defined as a
1 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/2, cit, p. 756.
2 Ibid., p. 70.
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«psychical  lived-experience  (…)  which  does  not  include  its  “objects”  as  immanent
contents, but it (…) mere intends», where this latter expression means «to tend through
a given content whatever in consciousness, to another one not given»; while the second
class is characterized also as a «psychical lived-experience», which does not merely
intend its “objects”, «but really comprehend this objects as immanent content in itself»1.
The  distinction  between  this  two  classes  poses  a  hierarchy  of  two  modes  of
consciousness: the ones that is presentation or is based on presentation «acquires an
intentional relation to objects», and represents the class, for example, of affirmation,
negation e.g.; while the second, is the «genetically earlier and more primitive» mode of
consciousness,  where  there  is  no  intentional  relation  to  objects,  like  in  the  case  of
phenomena such as «sensory pleasure or displeasure»2. 
To exemplify the two modes of consciousness, Husserl uses the famous example of the
perception of  arabesques.  In this  case,  the same sensory content  is  the basis  for an
intuition  and a  presentation,  where  the  transition  between a mere  sensing,  or  sense
intuition, to our perceiving the arabesques as signs, depends on what he calls the “act-
character”. This latter in fact 
«ensouls sense, and is, in essence, that which make us perceive this or that object.
(…) Sensations,  and the acts ‘interpreting’ them or apperceiving them, are alike
experienced,  but  they  do  not  appear  as  objects,  they  are  not  seen,  heard,  or
perceived by any sense. Objects on the other hand, appear and are perceived, but
they are not experienced»3.
Now, according to Husserl, Brentano's lack of distinction between content and objects
has  its  counterpart,  assuming  the  explicative  strategy  exposed,  in  his  misleading
interpretation of the phenomenon of perception. Brentano would tend and even would
be forced, according to Husserl, to interpret “sensing” [Empfinden] as an act, close to
the lived-experience defined by Husserl as presentation, and therefore, would conduct to
an interpretation that actually obliterate the psychological evidence according to which
sensing is not an act at all. 
Around 1898 Husserl expresses in fact very clearly the nature of the mere “sensation”:
1 E. Husserl, Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890 – 1910), in Husserliana XXII, cit., pp. 107 - 8.
2 E. Husserl, “Selbstanzeige”, in ibid., p. 135.
3 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 399.
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«we  call  “sensations”  the  mere  fact  that  a  sense-content  and,  further,  a  non-act  in
general, is present in the experiential complex». In relation to appearing of such sense-
content, «the talk of “sensing” only serves to point to the apperceptive function of such
contents», which means, «that they function as bearers of an interpretation [Deutung] in
which the appearance in question is carried out perceptually or imaginatively)»1.
On the one side, therefore, this 1898 critic to Brentano interpretation of sensing leads to
the  introduction  of  the  function  of  apperception,  even  if  still  expressed  with  a
misleading expression “act-character” indicated above,  which establishes,  in Husserl
analysis of experience, the “surplus” granted by that: even by basing on the same sense-
content, endows this sensory material with its objective sense and marks perception as
perception  of  a  transcendent  object2.  On the other  side,  refines  the  interpretation of
primary content of the Philosophie der Arithmetik, which even if referred by Husserl to
«figural moment» and moment of unity and even if already interpreted as «structured
complexes»  they  must  now explicitly  undergo  the  «being  apperceived»  in  order  to
explicate their function in experience3. Even if the function of apperception is in fact
hardly explicable for its non-intentional but also not active nature, it is now possible to
distinguish two functions associated with it and characterizing therefore two kinds of
fundamental relations. 
The act-character of perception is in fact indicated in 1898 as an appresentative function
belonging to the whole perception and which explicates two functions: interprets the
sensory contents and orients this interpreted content towards the object of perception. It
is in fact the act-character which confers to the contents their presentative function for
the  perceived  object:  «The  presentative  [präsentierende]  content  of  an  external
perception is the experienced content of perception which undergoes the interpretation
[Deutung], the objective “apprehension”, and therefore, provides the object which the
perception  intends»4. The  sensory-content  can  be  endowed  not  only  with  this
presentative function, but also with different ones (arabesques as piece of art, as words,
1  E.  Husserl,  “Abhandlung  über  Wahrnehmung  von  1898“  in  Wahrnehmung  und  Aufmerksamkeit,
Husserliana  XXXVIII,  cit.,  p.  137.  Also,  E.  Husserl,  Logische  Untersuchungen,  zweiter  Band,  in
Husserliana XIX/2, cit, p. 774.
2 Cfr.  The  first  part  of  the  lecture Hauptstücke  aus  der  Phänomenologie  und  Theorie  der  Erkenntnis.
Vorlesungen  aus  dem  Wintersemester  1904/05,  in  Wahrnehmung  und  Aufmerksamkeit,  Husserliana
XXXVIII, cit., p. 8f.
3 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 203f. Cfr. “V. Logical Investigation”, in
E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 352f.
4 E.  Husserl,  “Abhandlung  über  Wahrnehmung  von  1898“  in  Wahrnehmung  und  Aufmerksamkeit,
Husserliana XXXVIII, cit., p. 140. 
64
as piece of marble, e.g.) and therefore, this function must be granted by the act-character
which confers to the sensory-content its determinate sense. 
This interpretation of the act-character evidently recalls also the question of the double
referring of the act consciousness to both, the immanent content and the object which
does not undergo any modification. In 1893 this was the kind of referring in question in
different works related to the debate on the collapsing within the Brentano's Schule of
the difference between the two relations1,  a  «conflation» which will  be criticized in
1901 and which
«consists in the confusion of the phenomenological relation (the purely descriptive
psychological) between the act-character of the apprehension and the psychical
content belonging to the actual subject, whose content functions as substratum of
apprehension, with the relation between the act, i.e. the mental experience, which
we call presentation, and the represented object»2.
Husserl defines the first kind of relation, i.e., the relation between the act-character and
the content which function as basis for the apprehension, as “real” and the second, i.e.,
the ones between presentation and object, is rather defined as «ideal»3. But it is only in
the  later  Fifth  of  the  Logical  Investigations  that  we  find  a  deeper  descriptive
comprehension of this act structure, in which we find the expression of the relation to
objects,  with  this  now  explicitly  called  intentional  Objects.  We  speak  about  the
distinction in the act between its «real» and its «intentional content»4. The first content,
i.e., the sensory content is in fact defined as the real act element, while the latter, the
properly intentional, is now explicitly associated with the ideal or meaning content. In
fact, the «primary contents», i.e., “sensory contents” here indicated, will be investigated
even in the more articulated definition of the «contents of consciousness» delineated in
the  Fifth of  the  Logical  Investigations and here excluded from the intentional  ones,
which are «the intentional object», «the intentional material» and «intentional essence».
1 E.  Husserl,  “Intentionale  Gegenstände”,  in  K.  Schuhmann,  “Husserl  Abhandlung  “Intentionale
Gegenstände”. Edition der ursprünglichen Druckfassung”, in Brentano Studien, 3, 1990/91, p. 142f.
2 1901 letter to  A. Marty, in E. Husserl,  Briefwechsel, I, Die Brentano Schule, in Husserliana Dokumente,
cit., p. 78.
3 Ibid., p. 82.
4 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 411. By “real” Husserl
aims to express not their being «external to consciousness», but rather their being «not merely intended»,
see, E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/2, cit, p. 775.
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We can now try to briefly indicate some conclusions emerging from this section, before
continuing in the following one dedicated to the more specific meditations on concepts
emerging from Husserl's early production. 
First, the concept analysis conducted within the framework of descriptive psychology
basically aims and partially accomplished, at least in Husserl's opinion, to show what it
has to be indicated as the origin of concepts. The analysis, in this sense, leads back to
the origin of this truly elemental meanings-formations which are concepts, by allowing
to consciously access to: 1) the intuitive components (concrete intuitions, for example)
on  which  concepts  as  properly  given  relay,  2)  the  psychological  articulation  and
stratification  of  the acts  of  cognition which are  present  when we posses  a  concept,
whose nature and articulation indeed, must still go under investigations.
A descriptive concept analysis aims therefore to stress the impossibility or triviality of a
mere definition of concepts, or better to say, the necessity not to underestimate also a
preliminary psychological description of the process by which we come to posses of
such elementary logical-elements that by nature cannot undergo any definition. If they
are in fact logically simple and therefore, according to Husserl, unsuitable for definition
(for example, in terms of merely extension), they are surely psychologically complex,
both, for being composed elements and being based on complex acts.          
The  analysis  of  this  chapter  seems  to  indicate  a  slow  but  distinct  development  in
Husserl's  early philosophy from the  Philosophie der  Arithmetik through the  Logical
Investigations.  The  main  aim of  his  investigation  remains  a  possible  psychological-
descriptive understanding of the relation between act of consciousness and the logical
content of knowledge. However, exactly the necessity of a better understanding of the
ideal  nature  of  such  content  and  the  securing  of  its  objectiveness  for  granting  the
peculiar  evidence of such knowledge does start  what  has not to  be understand as a
rejection  of  the  early  analysis,  but  better,  as  a  deeper  taking  into  account  of  the
methodological and ontological  effect of such a granting. The framework remains in
fact the descriptive in the sense indicated, but it develops, partially due to confrontations
with the roots of such a framework (Brentano, Stumpf etc.). What does it mean that the
framework remain the same, is to be indicated in the necessity of exposing, or better
clarifying, the complex structure of the acts which posses such an ideal component of
knowledge.    
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«For Husserl as for Frege, what is at issue is to understand the type of objectivity of
human  thinking  and  its  linguistic  expression,  an  objectivity  that  is  public  and
independent of the contingencies of any particular human subject»1. But evidently, for
Husserl  and to some extent even for Frege,  the kind of objectivity here in question
reaches  a  dimension far  beyond the  actuality  of  any utterances  even if  it  found its
expression within it. In this sense, the history of the complex attempt to reach the proper
instrument  in  order  to  clarify  such  objectivity  has  already  been  indicated  in  the
Husserlian literature. With the second and third part of this section we have tried to
show  other  aspects  of  roots  of  Husserl  first  investigations,  especially  underlying
Stumpf's  position  with  respect  of  the  question  about  the  boundaries  imposed  by
descriptive-psychological inquiry into the formal aspects of knowledge. 
On the other side, hopefully we have also offered some new insights into the complex
debate between Husserl and Brentano, that is, by taking into account part of the critic
moved  by  Husserl  against  his  former  mentor  in  the  years  before  the  Logical
Investigations under two theoretical points of view of sure relevance for Husserl later
development. 
Having said that, Husserl's  earliest writings like the  Philosophie der Arithmetik  from
1891 or the Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik, are still in some terms and
to some extent psychological inquiries, still showing Brentanian influences, as we will
see, in the definition of the psychical and physical phenomena. But in his long path from
this  early  works  to  phenomenology,  Husserl's  aim  is  already  to  stress  the
epistemological importance of descriptive psychology against any possible drift towards
a physiological psychology; a need this latter which certainly influenced Husserl by his
own methodological clarification:
«Since it is epistemologically of unique importance that we should separate the
purely descriptive examination of the knowledge experience, disembarrassed of
all  theoretical  psychological  interests,  from  the  truly  psychological  research
directed toward empirical explanation and origins, it  will  be good if  we speak
rather of ‘phenomenology’ than of descriptive psychology»2.
1 J.  Benoist,  “Husserl  Theory  of  Meaning  in  the  First  Logical  Investigation”,  in  Husserl's  Logical
Investigations, ed. D.O. Dahlstrom (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 2003), p. 17.
2 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 23.
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Of course, his logical-mathematical research is also equally important in the early years
of the arising phenomenology, leading him, for example, to the idea of pure logic and to
the theory of science around the time of the  Prolegomena. If the very idea of a pure
logic is the dealing with the problem of science determination and definition, and that
means, with the problem of what defines science as science or science as such, what we
can stress with Husserl, is that «(…) what makes science science, is certainly not its
psychology, nor any real context into which acts of thought are fitted», but the certain
objective or ideal interconnection which gives these acts a unitary objective relevance
and an ideal validity1. This ideal interconnection as the «interconnection of the things to
which our thought-experiences (actual or possible) are intentionally directed», and on
the other hand, «as interconnection of truths, in which this unity of things comes to
count objectively as being what it is» are stressed to be given, later on, together a priori
and as  mutually inseparable2.  But  under  this  point  of  view,  even if  problematically,
Husserl's  investigations in the realm of the mathematical concepts must certainly be
evaluated.                 
1 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. 230.




The fundamental  Traits  of  the  Investigation  into  Concepts  in  The early
Works.  
2.0) Introduction
Already in its very first work Über den Begriff der Zahl. Psychologische Analysen and
the following more elaborated Philosophie der Arithmetik. Logische und psychologische
Untersuchungen1, as we have already introduced, the aim carried out by Husserl is a
descriptively-oriented psychological clarification of ideal objects, establishing therefore
an  epistemological  investigation  and  «critique  of  the  foundations  of  arithmetic  and
logic» by starting with a psychological inquiry into the «concepts of multeplicity, unity
and  cardinal  number,  so  long  they  are  properly  given  to  us  and  not  due  to
symbolization»2. 
Some thirty-eight years after the publication of the  Philosophy  of Arithmetic, Husserl
wrote the following appraisal of it: «Thus it was, expressed in my later way of speaking,
a phenomenological-constitutional study.  It  was also the first that attempted to make
“categorical objectivities” (...) understandable out of constituting intentional activity»3.
The psychological analysis that are to be found in those early works will be in fact later
assume a more clear phenomenological methodology and nature, certainly induced, in
part by the critical confrontations with other approaches, as we have already seen4, in
part by the self criticism through which the first philosophical venture went at the time
it appeared. Anyway, the self-criticism does not prevent yet to stress immediately how
this “subjectively” oriented explanation of ideal and categorical objects (in the case of
1 The first part of the Philosophie der Arithmetik repeats in fact, according to Husserl, the content of Über
den Begriff der Zahl almost «word for words», E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII,
cit., p. 8.
2 Ibid., p. 5 – 7.
3 E. Husserl, Formale und Transzendentale Logik, in Husserliana, XVII, cit., p. 90.
4 The most “famous” criticism, already exposed in the pages above, is Frege's 1894. “Rezension von: E.
Husserl,  Philosophie der  Arithmetik,  Leipzig,  1891”,  in  Zeitschrift  für Philosophie und Philosophische
Kritik 103, 1894, pp. 313–32. For a another reappraisal of this debate, see, for example, C. Ortiz Hill, Word
and Object in Husserl, Frege  and Russell,  the Roots of Twentieth Century Philosophy,  (Ohio University
Press, Ohio, 1991).   
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this  early  works,  manly  mathematical  and  logical  objects),  may  have  appeared  in
Husserl's  eyes  in  the  years  to  follow  as  somehow  “psychologistic”,  only  if  the
psychologically  described  acts  of  cognition,  assumed  as  touchstone  in  Husserl's
exposition,  are directly compared with the explicitly eidetical and phenomenological
ones designated in later works. 
The path of the descriptive psychological analysis is already showed by looking at the
methodological statement indicated in the pages of the Philosophy of Arithmetic, where
Husserl,  in  first  instance,  assumes  the  impossibility  or  triviality  of  defining  such  a
categorical concept like the number in terms of a formal-logical definition. Where «all
defining comes to an end», affirms Husserl, the investigation is forced to point out the
«concrete phenomena from which such basic concepts are abstracted», and by means of
which  the  psychological  analysis  is  therefore  performed,   clarifying  the  origin  of
concept  as  a  result,  by  showing  “how”  we  posses  the  concept1. In  this  sense,  «a
psychological analysis is to Husserl an analysis of an experience of the presentation of a
number, and in particular an elucidation of its “origin”», as also recently formulated2. 
This  analysis  is  set  in  relation  to  the  general  aim  of  Husserl's  work,  which  is  a
«philosophical  understanding  of  arithmetic».  To  such  a  general  scope,  such  a
psychological  analysis  of  the  fundamental  concepts  (number,  unity,  e.g.)  is  to  be
performed, and consequently, also a logical explanation of its symbolic method must be
offered.  In  this  sense  must  be  therefore  understood  the  articulation  of  Husserl's
Philosophie  der  Arithmetik.  In  fact,  supposed  that  the  establishment  of  a  complete
«system of philosophy of arithmetic» lacks of sure foundation, Husserl felt the necessity
of a «psychological inquiry» into its basic concepts before they are given to us in form
of symbols,  leaving for the second part  the explanation of the logical  origin of  the
general  arithmetic,  starting  from  the  role  played  in  knowledge  by  the  «symbolic
presentation of number»3. 
1 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 199.
2 M. Hartimo, “The Development of Mathematics and The Birth of Phenomenology”, in Phenomenology and
Mathematics,  Phaenomneologica,  195, ed.  M. Hartimo (Springer,  Dordrecht,  Heidelberg,  London,  New
York, 2010), p. 112. 
3 E. Husserl, “Selbstanzeige” to the  Philosophy of Arithmetic,  in  Vierteljahrsschrift  für wissenschaftliche
Philosophie,  15, 1891, p.  360.  Regarding Husserl's  purpose in approaching mathematical  questions,  R.
Tieszen has correctly pointed out that, under the point of view of mathematics, Husserl can not be taken as
an intuitionist, as long as for example,  one of the main difference is that even if  «entities and mental
processes» are sure requested for knowledge, entities like natural numbers for example, those objects itself
are not, as object of knowledge, mere mental entities, but «ideal objects». Also in respect to others point of
views in mathematics, Husserl strongly posed in respect to other philosophers of mathematics like Frege,
Russel,  Cantor,  e.g.,  the  necessity  to  «combine  an  inquiry  into  the  fundamental  trait  of  human
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Supposed the limitation of our intellect in fact, we can have an intuitive understanding
of only a small part of mathematics, a limitation which is overcome due to our making
use of symbols and by means of which the distinction  of  «authentic and inauthentic
presentation of number» is introduced. The necessity to operate with symbolic concepts
or graphic signs for number is fact notoriously linked by Husserl to the impossibility to
proper count «beyond ten or twelve»1. In this sense, after the first fundamental work, the
second part  of the  Philosophie der Arithmetik  aims to propose a view of arithmetic
based on the use of signs. 
This second part has yet its roots already in the first one. If we can have intuition of
groups of  only few elements,  in  fact,  by counting them trough enumeration we are
already relying on symbolic method. Writes therefore Husserl at the end of the first part:
«Certainly is the determination of the number by means of the easiness of the
notorious method of symbolic enumeration the first resource in our disposal. That
is  a  totally-mechanical  method;  we  proceed  with  that  without  thinking  of  the
concepts themselves and we are also sure, that the resulting cipher really represent
the correct concept-number, if we bring to awareness its meaning. (…) That the
mechanical process of enumeration proceed already by sets  of relatively small
number incomparably faster and surer in comparison with the only in appearance
so easy process of one-to-one correspondence, it does not need any proof»2.
From here, the problem guiding Husserl in the development of, on the one side, the
second part of Philosophie der Arithmetik and on the other, the «logical inquiry into the
arithmetical algorithm (...) and the justification of utilizing in calculations the quasi-
numbers  originating  out  of  the  inverse  operations»,  aim  of  the  announced  Second
Volume of the same work, is to elucidate how all the remaining parts of the realm of
arithmetic is given3. 
consciousness, which is intentionality,  with the inquiry into the fundamental problems in philosophy of
mathematics and logic». This perspective characterized Husserl's works in his linking the subjective and
objective aspects of the mathematical problems, connecting yet also the problem of the “superimposition”
in   both,  mathematics  and  logic,  of  their  very own  epistemological  and  ontological  requests.  See,  R.
Tieszen,  Phenomenology,  Logic  and  The  Philosophy  of  Mathematics (Cambridge  University  Press,
Cambridge, 2005), p. 127f.
1 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 339.
2 Ibid., p. 104 – 5.
3 Ibid., p. 7. Husserl answered to this very problem basically establishing a complete parallelism between the
system of concepts and the system of signs. The idea is to start from certain concepts, translate them into
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Unfortunately  yet,  the  Second  Volume of  the  first  ground work  on  the  concepts  of
mathematics was never realized, leaving behind only an history of different approaches
and a puzzle of short works on mathematics and geometry. The «logical investigations»
have caused him in fact, as he stated already after the  Philosophie der Arithmetik, «a
large amount of problems and underwent several changes», while the psychological one
seems  to  have  followed,  apparently,  a  smoother  development  till  the  Logical
Investigations and  partially  beyond,  in  the  «phenomenological  and  constitutional
investigations» of Formale und transzendentale Logik1. 
But however,  both, the logical in wider sense and the descriptive psychological will
make substantive  steps  beyond the  initial  approaches  in  the  mathematical  field  and
which, all together, represents the work, maybe more necessary of what Husserl himself
thought, which leaded to the  Logical Investigations and which was carried out under
both point of view. 
Husserl claims there, notoriously, that the work «have arisen out unavoidable problems
which have constantly hindered and interrupted the progress of <his> efforts (…) at
achieving a philosophical clarification of pure mathematics»2. The problems indicated
by Husserl were actually methodological questions regarding «the origin of the basic
concepts» in mathematics and the deductive logic also applied in science, especially its
«formal unity and symbolic methodology»3. Certainly, a main problem which played an
important yet even thought complex role in Husserl formation through the late '90s, and
especially in 1895 and 1896, is the theory of manifolds [Mannigfaltigkeitslehre] which,
by going beyond all  peculiarities  regarding special  forms  of  number and extension,
gives Husserl a hint as to approach logically the issue of a universal theory of formal
deduction  and  relations,  and  with  that,  «a  different  interpretation  of  logic,  a  more
comprehensive  one,  which  now  encompasses  arithmetic»4.  Obviously,  this  new
approach supposed the «generalization of formal arithmetic» whit its method, especially
signs, and then to operate on the signs in accordance to given rules . The generated signs would in the end
interpreted as a concept. This may also let to Husserl's interpretation of the arithmetica universalis as based
on computation, and in the belief in the «completeness and soundness of the two parallel systems». Hussel
also presupposes therefore, the existence of purely formal concept that correspond to the final result of the
computation process. 
1 E.  Husserl,  Formale  und  transzendentale  Logik,  in  Husserliana,  XVII,  cit.,  p.  91,  and  Studien  zur
Arithmetik und Geometrie, in Husserliana, XXI, cit., p. 252.
2 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. 5.
3 Ibidem.
4 E.  Husserl,  Aus  der  Vorlesung  “Über  die  neueren  Forschungen  zur  deduktiven  Logik“  (1895),  in
Husserliana, Materialien, I, cit., p. 271.
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the calculation1, and the release from the boundaries of its application «within the field
of quantity» with respect to mathematical and the formal in wider sense2. 
Also, Husserl's interest was even conduct to confront the works of «mathematicians,
(…) who have no less idea than to develop the fundamental parts of formal logic pure-
deductively and even in the form of an algebraical discipline»3. Here, he thought to be
able to find a mathematics free of quantity and methodologically applicable within a
much wider realm. Accordingly,  he approached for example calculus, which is, with
respect of its generality,  free from its coupling with number and quantity by arising
«higher logical interests than those belonging to the arithmetica numerosa»4. 
The  space  of  inquiry  just  recalled  would  and  could  eventually  define  Husserl's
philosophy of mathematics, by pointing out in fact the epistemological, semantical and
ontological  aspects  of  his  pre-phenomenological  path.  However,  it  was  exactly «the
philosophical-mathematical investigation» that was led aside by Husserl for good, at
least till Formale und transzendentale Logik, because in need of a deeper understanding
of the more basic questions of epistemology and logic. Husserl was in fact fully aware
of the decisive and fruitful development under which both, mathematics and logic were
undergoing at the time, and their efficacy was in fact never put in question5. His interest
also in the very last inquiry in both discipline is also well documented by his lectures
and in his works, but also is effective “taking part” on the debate among mathematicians
over the “imaginary” in arithmetic, over the definiteness (and later on completeness) of
an axiom system, as  in the case of  the encounter  with Hilbert6.  But  what  seems to
remain constant, even though such a engagement, is Husserl's recognition of the «lack
of investigation» into the strictly «theoretical foundation» of both, which means, in his
view,  the  inquiry  into  the  «presuppositions»   whit  which  they  work  and  that  are,
traditionally, theme of «metaphysical foundation» and which compose a «science for
1 According to Husserl, calculation is defined in the Philosphie der Arithmetik as «any rule-governed mode
of derivation of signs from signs within any algorithmic sign-system according to the “laws” – or better: the
conventions  – for  combination,  separation and  transformation peculiar  to  that  system»,  in  E.  Husserl,
Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 258.
2 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. 6.
3 E.  Husserl,  Aus  der  Vorlesung  “Über  die  neueren  Forschungen  zur  deduktiven  Logik“  (1895),  in
Husserliana, Materialien, I, cit., p. 268.
4 E. Husserl,  Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 258. See also, S. Centrone, Logic and
Philosophy of Mathematics in the early Husserl, cit., p. 75f.  
5 E. Husserl, Logik, Vorlesung 1896, in Husserliana, Materialienbände, I, cit. p. 3.
6 See, for a view on such topics, J.J. Da Silva, “Husserl’s two notions of completeness, Husserl and Hilbert
on completeness and imaginary elements in mathematics”,  in, Synthese,  125, 2000, p. 417f. M. Hartimo,
“Towards completeness: Husserl on theories of manifolds (1890 – 1901)”, in Synthese, 156, 2007, p. 281f,
S. Centrone, Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics in The Early Husserl, cit., p. 149f.
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itself». Such “metaphysical foundation” is anyway not enough, at least, for all sciences
«which have to do no not with real “things”, but instead with ideas», and where it is
rather necessary the apportion of the «science of science»1.     
Even  in  the  other  direction,  i.e.,  the  psychological  and  epistemological  side  of  the
logical-mathematical investigations, the work on arithmetic starts to «became shaken»,
as Husserl affirms in the same Introduction. Psychology for itself became in fact a no
more theory for explaining logic and all deductive proceeds within sciences. We already
know  how  Husserl  starts  to  pose  the  question  of  «the  origin  of  mathematical
presentation»,  i.e.,  the  origin  of  the  mathematical  concepts,  within  a  descriptive
framework and through «psychological analysis», and we will now see more carefully
the  fundamental  traits  of  this  analysis  (2.1)2.  We  will  here  try  to  expose  Husserl's
approach to formal concepts, i.e., categories, in his early work on arithmetic. This aim
will carry us  to follow the emerging of such concepts by a three-tier act structure which
mirrors the concepts analysis already seen in the previous section. An insight into the
very  problems  and  limits  of  Husserl's  approach  will  be  given  and  also,  a  possible
alternative interpretation of the direction of reflection in categorical acts is offered and
evaluated.  In (2.2) the specific concept of number is investigated under the point of
view of his veiled definition, especially with respect to its having been placed within the
framework of a  theory of formal  abstraction and intentionality still  in  development.
Especially taking the problem of abstraction, Frege's and Cantor's basically different
approaches  will  be  exposed.  The  assumption  that  Cantor's  inquiry  into  the  number
concept, if takes on the one side common traits with the Husserlian one offers on the
other a more ontologically defined concept of number, is evaluated. Some of the main
reasons for the still  unstable description of the origin of concepts and the following
limits of Husserl's approach with respect to the definition of the ontological status of
such entities are offered in the last chapter.      
1 E. Husserl, Logik, Vorlesung 1896, in Husserliana, Materialienbände, I, cit. p. 6 – 7.
2 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. 7.
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2.1) Fundamental Traits of Husserl's Analysis of Concepts in the early Works on
Arithmetic.
Husserl's  analysis  of mathematical elements,  in particular of the concept of number,
begins  assuming  the  «preconception»  regarding the  conception  of  cardinal  number,
according to which the number is understood «as a complex objectivity», as a «plurality,
ensemble, aggregate, collection, set» of unities1. The inquiry is in fact directed from the
beginning  towards  the  particular  kind  of  multiplicity  that  makes  up  the  concept  of
number, that could serve as the “intuitive basis” for the proper presentation of number,
i.e.,  that  could  offer  the  basis  for  the  process  from  which  the  concept  arises.  By
descriptively analyze that process, and therefore by showing how we come to posses
such a concept we may obtain its origin. Hence, the inquiry starts with the concrete
phenomena  represented  by  the  «concrete  multiplicities»  to  which  we  refer  by
determinate  number  and  fall  under  the  general  concept  of  multiplicity,  in  order  to
understand:  how the  more  universal  and  less  determinate  concept  of  multiplicity  is
abstracted from them, and how is even the determinate concept of number is obtained in
the same manner. 
First, it is anyway possible to ask in general why does number presuppose multiplicity.
Husserl claims that both concepts coincide essentially with one another; «the difference
consists only in that the concept of number already presupposes discrimination among
the  abstract  forms  of  multiplicity,  whereas  the  concept  of  multiplicity  does  not»2.
Therefore,  Husserl  even expressed this  way their  relation:  «numbers are  the distinct
species  of  the  universal  concept  of  multiplicity»3.  Numbers  arise  when  we  make
distinctions, among the various forms of multiplicities that can be given to us, and in
fact  represent,  according  to  Husserl,  a  more  refined  concept,  it  represents  «a
considerably  deeper  level  of  concept  formation»4.  But  in  order  to  understand  this
formation and even other kind of concept formation, we must start with the lower level
1 E. Husserl, “Über den Begriff der Zahl. Psychologische Analysen“, in Husserliana XII, cit., p.  297. The
problem  of  explaining  the  reason  for  the  different  names  used  by  Husserl  for  referring  to  the  same
conceptual content, and in particular, his referring to the collective or distributive modes of conceiving the
whole, is to be found in C. Ortiz Hill, “Tackling three of Frege’s problems: Edmund Husserl on sets and
manifolds”, in Axiomathes, 13, 2002, p. 80.
2 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 82.
3 Ibid., p. 221. R. Sokolowsky interprets therefore the relation between multiplicity and number in the same
sense of the one between genus and species. Cfr., R. Sokolowsky, The Formation of Husserl's Concept of
Constitution, in Phaenomenologica, 18, (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 9f. 
4 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 83.
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of phenomena.
The  starting  phenomena,  are  collections  of  determinate  objects,  whose  nature  is
completely indifferent with respect to the mere formation of such collections: to this two
series  of  objects  whatever,  like  (this  tree,  the  moon,  Italy)  and (this  red,  love,  this
window), we assign in fact the same multiplicity, they fall under the same concept. But,
how works the transition from a concrete set to a general concept, like the concept of
multiplicity? Husserl says:
«Concepts,  we  assume  now,  generate  through  comparison  between  particular
presentations,  which  fall  under  the  concepts;  abstracting  from  the  different
characteristics, just the common ones are held, and those are what constitute the
general concept»1.
In  general  therefore,  concepts  arise  by  means  of  this  articulated  process,  which
immediately recall a long tradition in philosophical explication of concept “generation”.
What  Husserl  stresses  immediately  is  the  fact  that  not  the  single  contents  are
representing the basis for abstraction, but the concrete collections as wholes in which
they are comprehended2. If abstraction is preliminarily taken as a «leaving aside» the
peculiarities of the constituting elements and their being taken as distinct units3, those
latter do not constitute for themselves a whole. But what we find as invariant in all
collections as wholes, is the fact that we do not simply have a sum of elements, but a
single act which holds all the elements together in their distinction4. In fact, even if the
parts,  pieces,  fractions  etc.  constituting the collection are completely heterogeneous,
there is  at  least  one characteristic  of  the whole which  is  common in  every case  of
collection: the connection of the single elements into a whole. Writes Husserl in his On
the Concept of Number:
«It is not those particular contents that are, in fact, the basis of the abstraction.
Rather,  the  basis  is  the concrete  collections  as wholes  in  which  the particular
contents are comprised. But even comparison of the collections appears not to
1 E. Husserl, “Über den Begriff der Zahl. Psychologische Analysen“, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 299.
2 E. Husserl,  Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 15. Cfr., also, C. Ortiz Hill, “Tackling
three of Frege’s problems: Edmund Husserl on sets and manifolds”, in Axiomathes, 13, 2002, p. 81. 
3 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 18. 
4 D. Lewis, Parts of classes, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1991), p. 3.
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offer  the  desired  result.  The  collections,  one  might  say,  consist  merely  of  the
particular contents. How, then, are the wholes to exhibit some common attribute,
when the  parts  constituting them may be utterly heterogeneous? However, this
specious difficulty is easily resolved. [...] There still is present in them something
more than the particular contents: a “something more” which can be noticed, and
which is necessarily present in all cases where we speak of “collection”. This is
the connection [Verbindung] of the particular elements into the whole»1.
Here, we find the same situation as in different kinds of relations, where, even taking
into account the differences between the contents, there is similarity [Gleichartigkeit]
with  respect  to  the  connecting  relations.  The  connections  are  in  fact  what  can  be
“noticed” beyond the different contents. Even, we find in different spheres and fields,
between  psychical  or  sensuous  phenomena,  similarities,  increment,  continuous
mediation. In the case of the general concept of multiplicity, we find similar connections
as basis for the formation of such a concept. Husserl inquiry moves therefore into the
connections peculiar for multiplicity. 
For what concern the process of abstraction which should lead to the concept, Husserl
recalls  first  the  formations  of  other  concepts  of  connections  (wholes).  The  case  of
interconnection  between  the  single  points  of  a  line,  or  the  nuances  of  colors  in  a
continuous series of colors, would lead to the concepts of  continuous connection and
therefore, to the ones of continuum. The latter concept is not a partial content, notable
for itself, belonging to the presentation of all the concretely given continua; what we
notice  in  concrete  continua  are  the  points  or  the  extensive  parts,  and  the  peculiar
connections, and those are similarly present in all cases2. The same it is now possible,
writes  Husserl,  in  the case of  the peculiar  connection,  in  objects  of  the visual  field
whatever, between the spatial extension and its color, and even between the latter and its
peculiar intensity. On such a basis «we can now again build up the concept of a whole,
whose parts are unified as seen»; thus, summarizes Husserl: «where we are confronted
with a specific class of wholes, here the concept of this latter can only being formed by
reflection  on  the  kinds  of  the  similar  connections  of  parts,  which  are  completely
characterizing in all the wholes of this classes»3.
1 E. Husserl, “Über den Begriff der Zahl. Psychologische Analysen“, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 299
2 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 19.
3 E. Husserl, “Über den Begriff der Zahl. Psychologische Analysen“, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 300.
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Thus, the fact that the multiplicity is essentially conceived by Husserl «as a whole»
poses the concept of multiplicity along with other kinds of wholes which are the basis
for the concept of continuum1. As basis for such a concept are also to be found either the
presentations,  and  the  bestowing  of  attention,  the  “noticing”,  in  particular  «on  the
relations among the points of a line, the moments of a duration, the nuances of colors
within a continuous series of colors, or the different qualities of sounds in a “dynamic of
tones”»2. This presentations are complex ones too, by reason of the composing parts
which can be recognized and even the connections as well can be indicated. But, by the
continua, are exactly the connections and relations that are of characteristic nature. 
If it is in fact easily conceivable that the different nuances of a series of colors presents
the parts of a whole, the lack of precise and easily identifiable borders among them
makes the unity of  the  parts  and the  connections  less  recognizable.  The continuous
connection  does  not  arise,  by  the  nuances  series  but  by  the  duration  as  well3,  by
summing or adding the different nuances. Rather, it seems to belong as property to the
whole itself, and it is not the results of a direct collecting of parts properties. It is also
«given to us as connections of many contents», but not due to «a synthetic» or «creative
acts» as basis for the «cogency of the contents»4. The connection is given, but in a differ
manner as by the partial presentations which are collectively connected as unities.
The concept of continuum, which for itself is not a partial content of presentation, does
arise  now according  to  Husserl,  «by reflection  on  this  characterizing  connection  of
contents,  as  the  concept  of  a  whole,  whose  parts  are  unified  in  the  form  of  the
continuous connection».  The latter  does emerge when we abstract  from all  concrete
constituent, and therefore, the concept of «the special class of wholes» which are the
continua, «only arises by reflection on the same kind of connection of parts belonging to
all wholes of this class»5. 
Husserl introduces here what we can call the third element by the process or concept
arising, which is reflection. This latter for its part, is defined around 1891 normally as
the  possibility  for  the  consciousness  to  direct  to  its  own  lived-experiences,  and  in
particular to its acts. In this context however, i.e., by continuous connections, it seems
more reasonable to think that reflection does direct rather on the content of acts in the
1 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 19.
2 Ibidem.
3 Cfr., Ibid., p. 24f.
4 Ibid., p. 41.
5 Ibid., p. 20.
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sense  of  presented  intentional  object.  To  the  content  of  such  presentations  may
consequently belong, among the parts, also such connections (i.e., relations) which are
in  fact  directly  given and not  performed.  A basic  concept  like  the  continuum does
therefore thank its origin to, on the one side, abstraction, on the other reflection. 
Anyway, this analysis provides an opportunity to indicate more importantly the structure
of  the  «three  kinds  of  act  for  the  constitution  of  concept»1,  especially,  the  formal
concepts or categories. Starting from a presentation or a complex of presentations, we
find therefore: a) abstraction b) connection c) reflection
That this schema may and should apply not only in the more notorious case of collective
connection  and  number,  but  instead,  by  both  kinds  of  connections  (collective  and
continuous), is justified by the fact that, actually, wholes as such are taken into account
here: 
«[…] Things stand here as in the case of many other classes of relations: there can
be  the  greatest  of  differences  between  the  related  contents,  and  yet  there  be
identity  of  kind  with  respect  to  the  combining  relations.  Hence,  similarities,
gradations  [Steigerungen],  and  combinations  involving  continua  are  found  in
wholly heterogeneous domains; and they can occur between sensuous contents as
well as between psychical acts. It is, therefore, quite possible for two wholes to be
similar  as  wholes,  although  the  parts  constituting  the  one  are  completely
heterogeneous to those constituting the other»2.
All  kinds of wholes are firstly take into account, and that allows Husserl to assume
collective  and  continuous  connections,  multiplicity  and  continuum within  the  same
framework.  Referring  to  wholes as  such  does  not  anyway  deleted  the  important
differences enlightened by the concept analysis itself. But for Husserl it is possible to
speak about connection in both cases, the «collective» and the «continuous connection»,
even if, at least for the former, what it is «treated as a relation is actually a  psychical
act», due to the «homogeneity of function» shared by psychical and «primary relation»3.
«There is de facto», writes Husserl in fact, «so much in common between the primary
relation and the psychical relation,  as to their essential moment [Hauptmoment], that I
1 J. N. Mohanty, Husserl and Frege, cit., p. 23
2 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 18 – 9.
3 See also, S. Centrone, Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics in The Early Husserl, cit., p. 10.
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fail to see why a common term would not be  justified here»1. This essential moment
could  be  indicated,  generally,  in  the  function  of  connecting  of  objects  that  for
themselves would be result unconnected.
But to the analysis of collective connection and multiplicity is reserved special attention
anyway, not only because of the aim of the Philosophie der Arithmetik with respect of
the concept of number, but also because
«Collective combination plays a highly significant role in our mental life as a
whole. Every complex phenomenon which presupposes parts that are separately
and specifically noticed, every higher mental and emotional activity, requires, in
order  to  be  able  to  arise  at  all,  collective combinations  of  partial  phenomena.
There could never even be a representation of one of the more simple relations
(e.g., identity, similarity, etc.) if a unitary interest and, simultaneously with it, an
act of noticing did not pick out the terms of the relation and hold them together as
unified.  This  “psychical”  relation  is,  thus,  an  indispensable  psychological
precondition of every relation and combination whatsoever»2. 
To collective connection is in fact also to be linked the logical function corresponding to
the syncategorematic word “and” in all its practical uses, for instance in its «linking two
or  more  names  and  indicating  therefore  the  collective  combination  of  the  content
named»3.
But  even  thought,  that  does  not  prevent  to  recognize  the  differences  between
connections, primary, psychical and «metaphysical», and different kind of connections,
collective  and continuous4.  This  is  also indicated  by the  fact  that  Husserl's  analysis
comprehends a critical reading, in the second chapter of the Philosophie der Arithmetik,
1 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 73, note 1.
2 Ibid., p. 75. Cfr., also Dedekind, who in his 1888 Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen notes similarly: «If
we scrutinize closely what is done in counting an aggregate or number of things, we are led to consider the
ability of the mind to relate things to things, to let a thing correspond to a thing, or to represent a thing by a
thing, an ability without which no thinking is possible».  In R. Dedekind,  Was sind und was sollen die
Zahlen, cit., p. III. 
3 E. Husserl,  Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 75. The question of syncategorematic
terms  will  be  retaken,  for  example,  also  in  Logical  Investigations.  Cfr.,  E.  Husserl,  Logische
Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 311.
4 It is in fact notable here that Husserl defines the whole composed by <extension – color>, without referring
explicitly to the Brentanian «Metaphysical connection» or to Stumpf's definition in term of «psychological
parts», from his well know Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung, cit, p. 9. He refers to
both indications only in the footnote. 
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of different theories that also deal with collective connection, and that consequently,
give a different explanation of the origin of the concept of multiplicity and number1.
Part of them reduces now the collective connection to a «simultaneous presence of the
contents of set» in consciousness or to their «temporal succession»2. Other deals rather
with the presentation and the intuitive form of space or time3. Finally, also the relations
of identity of every content with itself, and difference, among all contents, are taken into
account as possible theories4. 
Such a critical  examination not only provides the historical background of Husserl's
investigation or a necessary counterpart for his exposition; rather, «brings into relief the
characteristic difference» of collective connection from the continuous one5. This may
helps to understand the possible relationship between the two kind of phenomena on
which the connections are founded; if one represents an higher function with respect to
the other, and if this distinction leads to recognize some “less evident” characteristic in
the concept-constitutive structure seen above6. 
In a very general manner, one can already stress with Husserl one first characteristic.
One could obviously treat consciousness as a continuum of phenomena, or as composed
by continua. But, who would ever or actually represent them as a set? At any time and in
any way, we can form various set or collection from there, but by doing this we are
conscious of a peculiar «spontaneity»:     
«It is important to stress that a collection [Inbegriff] (an authentic presentation of a
multiplicity) can have as elements only such contents as we are aware of in the
manner of things separately and specifically noticed [fur sich bemerkte]. All other
contents,  however,  which  are  present  only  as  things  incidentally  noticed,  and
which either cannot be separately noticed at all (like the points of continua), or
merely  are  not,  for  the  moment,  separately  noticed:  -  all  these  cannot  yield
1 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 22f. 
2 Ibid., p. 24 – 5.
3 Ibid., p. 33f. Among them, Lange, Kant, Baumann, Aristotle are named by Husserl.
4 Ibid., p. 49f.
5 Ibid., p. 22.
6 D. Willard notoriously proposed for example, to interpret historically Husserl's position by tracking it back
to Lotze, who «[...]  presents his general view of how relations come before consciousness in activities of
“higher order”. [...]  the activity of representing a relation is called “higher” by him in a sense that precisely
coincides with what Husserl later meant by the terms ‘founded’ and “higher order” as applied to  acts of
consciousness». D. Willard, Logic and the objectivity of knowledge: a study in Husserl’s philosophy, (Ohio
University Press, Athens, 1984), p. 30. 
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elements out of which a collection is constituted»1.
Not all the wholes are multiplicity, but all multiplicity are wholes, where it would be
therefore  «a matter of a unity in an act of representing that both throws contents into
relief and gathers them together, or matter of a unity of interest»2. This “spontaneity” is
represented therefore by what  Husserl  indicates  as  the «a unitary interest» with  the
«unitary noticing» that distinctly picks out and encompasses the very different contents
we have just seen and which, in this peculiar sense, «makes the many into one»3. Also in
the case of collection, it is in fact for Husserl this “phenomenon”  «to be explained»:
«that the same content appears to us now as “one” and now as “many”»4.
Even in the case of collection we can interpret this latter as a whole. It is basically a
presentation of given objects as unity, in which the presentations of the single objects
are comprehended as partial presentations and that, even if the connection between such
parts is far more “loose” than in other cases. The kind of collective connection is in fact
characterized by such a nature while it represents a connection5. 
In this sense, collection cannot be reduced to other kinds of connection (coexistence in
consciousness,  for  example)6.  It  cannot  also  be  reduced  on  the  simple  «form  of
difference»  among  parts  or  pieces;  according  to  him  in  fact,  difference  «is  not  a
presentation content immediately noticeable with the grounding elements», but rather is
«negative  judgment  based  on  it»7.  The  judgment  based  on  the  presentation  of  an
elephant and the moon which characterized the two as different supposes in fact, as
more original, that we can have the two as «distinct» in the presentation. Husserl affirms
in fact: «the judging function of the differentiation already supposes evidently distinct
contents, noticed for themselves, those contents could not just became noticeable by the
1 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 23.
2 Ibidem.
3 D. Lewis, Parts of classes, cit., p. 6.
4 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 155.
5 Notoriously,  in  the  inquiring  into  the  nature  of  this  peculiar  connection,  Husserl  criticizes  some
interpretations, which have their ancestor in Kant and Aristotle, that indicate in time as form of intuitions
the  origin  of  numbers.  But  in  Husserl  views,  time  could  only  play  the  role  of  a  «psychological
precondition»,  and  that  because,  on  the  one  side,  the  presentations  of  multiplicities  are  «results  of
processes, are wholes of elements successively formed», on the other side, it is obvious that the partial
presentations unified in the presentation of multiplicity are present at the same time in consciousness. But
the simultaneity does not enter in the contents constituting the concept of multiplicity, nor the temporal
series. Cfr., E. Husserl, “Über den Begriff der Zahl. Psychologische Analysen“, in Husserliana XII, cit., p.
310.
6 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit.,  p. 22f.
7 Ibid., p. 56.
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fact that they were differentiated»1. 
Here we find another aspect of the descriptive inquiry into the origin of concepts. By
trying to indicate the kind of lived-experiences which one has in possessing the concept
of multiplicity, Husserl indicates also how it is not mandatory the recognition of the
difference between objects, i.e., that the presentation of the multiplicity is more original
than differentiation, which is a concept based on a «negative judgment». But that means
also that as long as for Husserl the concepts of the constant forms of connection do arise
through reflection, and as long as a form of connection which is difference cannot be “a
presentation content”, reflection can only be directed to an act and not the content.
2.1.1) Formal Concepts and Abstraction
Now, for what concern specifically the formation of multiplicities  in concreto, is not
only  question  of  a  passive  assuming  or  noticing  a  content,  but  there  are  even
spontaneous functions, which we link to the contents, as we have just noticed.
According to our will or interest, we can comprehend together discrete contents, or from
already formed ones,  take  away or  add contents.  An unifying  interest  direct  to  the
totality of contents and, together with it, an act of notice, single out the contents, where
the intentional object of such acts results the presentation of the collection of contents.
Resumes Husserl very briefly: «this way the contents are at the same time and together
present, are one, and by reflection on such a unifying of separate contents operated by
those psychical acts,  originate the general concepts of multiplicity and number»2.  In
fact, the mere being together of objects in space isn't yet the collective unifying in our
presentation that is essential for number; such a unifying is first realized by us through
that psychical act of interest and notice.
Husserl concentrates therefore only on the kind of act that, on the one side, «sorts outs
each of the unities», and on the other and «at the same time holds each together with the
others, this unifying all of them»3. The phenomenon under consideration here, is in fact
the  unitary  treatment  of  the  different  multiplicities  of  objects  and  how we connect
objects and unify them in a new object. «Those homogeneous connections in all cases of
speaking of  multiplicities  are  now the  foundations  for  the  formation  of  the  general
1 Ibid., p. 57.
2 Ibid., p. 317.
3 Ibid., p. 337.
84
concept of multiplicity»1. The justification for this analysis lies, in Husserl's eyes, on the
fact that the formation of the concept of number has to be explained due to common
element of all «determinate wholes», which is the act of “collecting” implicit in all their
formation. 
Here the determinate whole forms the intuitive basis and, on its own, it is the result of a
comprehensive view of original unities, where a process of attention which exclude or
include some of them, establishes which unity is combined into the whole without any
reference  to  the  specific  determination  or  nature  of  the  unities  combined  or  their
ontological status (object of perception, phantasy, physical or psychical)2: apples, trees,
but even emotions and Italy can be counted3. The unities combined are in fact «contents
whatever», which are thought as «something or other» and as «one thing or another»,
and are according to Husserl, the first «formal concepts or categories»4. 
At this very point we see how the proper function of abstraction comes in question by
the formation of this first “formal concepts” or “categories”. We know in fact that, for
Husserl, no concept can be thought without foundation in a concrete intuition. Hence,
even when we represent the concept of the multiplicity we always have the intuition of
some  concrete  multiplicity  by  means  of  which,  indeed,  according  to  Husserl,  we
«abstract this general concept»:
«In what way, then, does this abstraction proceed? As we have established, total
abstraction from the peculiarities of the individual contents colligated [kolligiert]
must be effected, retaining, however, their connection. (…)
To disregard or abstract from something means merely to give it no special notice.
(...)»5. 
The grasp of the contents, and the collection of them, is of course the precondition of
the abstraction. In the abstraction therefore, the «isolating interest» is not directed upon
the  contents,   but  rather  exclusively  upon  their  connection  in  thought  -  and  that
connection is all that is intended.
1 Ibid., p. 19.
2 Ibid., p. 298.
3 Ibid., p. 16 – 17.
4 Ibid., p. 84.
5 Ibid., p. 79 – 80.
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«The abstraction to be carried out can now be described in the following manner:
Determinate individual contents of some sort are given in collective combination.
In abstractively passing over, then, to the general concept, we do not attend to
them as contents determined thus and so. Rather, the main interest is concentrated
upon their  collective  connection,  whereas  they themselves  are  considered  and
attended to only as some contents in general, each one as a certain something, a
certain one»1.
Hence,  multiplicity  is  nothing  other  than,  as  Husserl  express  himself:  a  certain
something and a certain something and a certain something, etc.; or,  «some one and
some one and some one thing, etc.; or, more briefly, one and one and one, etc».        
We can see now, how the question raised by Husserl is consequently not much the ones
concerning the definition of the concepts, even of certain formal concepts, which is,
even if possible, less informative and “original” as we have already seen; but rather the
ones  about  the  psychological  characterization  of  the  phenomena  on  which  the
abstraction  of  this  concept  rests,  this  representing  the  phenomena  which  are  to  be
indicated  instead  of  the  definition,  making  possible  the  «psychological-descriptive»
clarification aimed.  
The function of abstraction seems to lead from “concrete” presentations to the concept
of “something” and “one”, where therefore the so abstracted elements are considered by
means  of  the  «selective  interest»  in  their  «connection  in  thought».  The  concrete
presentations, i.e., object presentations, give the basis for the concept of “something” by
abstracting from all their single components, and it finds logical application, as formal
concept, with all presented objects.     
In order to understand now, what Husserl means with such “formal concepts”, it is first
to stress that what Husserl calls an «abstract name» such as “something” or “one”, can
refer to the «abstract concept as such» or to «an object whatever which fall under this
concept»2.  The  formal  concept  of  “something”,  for  example,  refers  therefore  to  the
“unities”  fully  emptied  of  content  and  which  come  in  play  in  the  collective
combination3. But  the  descriptive  investigation  into  its  origin  does  presents  a  more
complicated scenario. 
1 Ibidem.
2 Ibid., p. 136.
3 Ibid., p. 84.
86
According  to  Husserl  its  origin  must  be  found,  like  the  collective  unification,  in
reflection:
«Something is a name which fits every possible content. Every real thing or every
thing of thought is a “something”. (…) Obviously the concept of the “something”
owes  its  emergence  to  reflection  upon  the  psychical  act  of  presenting,  every
determinate object being given precisely as the content of this act. Naturally, the
concept “something” can never come to be thought except if  some content be
present in respect of which the reflection may be performed»1. 
In fact,  by looking closely to how Husserl  characterizes the process involved in the
grasping of  the concept  of  “something”,  what  seems to emerge is  the  fact  that  any
partial  content  of any objects could actually correspond to the “content” something.
That  means  also,  the  concept  “something”  could  not  be  gained  due  to  a  sort  of
“empirical  abstraction” which would suppose a common element among all  objects.
Writes in fact Husserl in his Über den Begriff der Zahl:   
«Naturally, the concept of something is not grasped due to any kind of contents-
matching [Inhaltsvergleichung] of all objects of physical and psychical art. Such a
matching  would  results  in  nothing.  The  “something”  isn't  in  fact  any  partial
content.  That  wherein  all  objects  –  real  and  possible,  actual  and  not  actual,
physical and psychical, etc. - agree, is just in being contents of a presentation or
they can stand for contents of a presentation in consciousness»2.
Taking in consideration such statements regarding the nature of the formal concept of
“something”, “one”, its origin presents many explanatory difficulties. Two aspects of
Husserl's  argument  seem to deserve some more attention.  On the one side,  the role
played by the “psychical act” of presenting: it could be in fact questioned, if it is the
reflection upon the act of presentation which must be necessarily present in order to
obtain the abstract concept of something, or if it  is rather the determined intentional
object itself that serve as ground for abstraction. On the other, the nature of the object of
1 Ibid., p. 335 – 6.
2 Ibid., p. 336.
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presentation, whether it is a simple object or, eventually, a “categorial” one, «a thing of
thought»1. Surely, reflection does not direct on the intuitive objects, but rather on the
acts  themselves  that  are  directed  to  the  objects.  This  these  is  to  be  deducted  from
Husserl's analysis of Sigwart's and Wundt's Logics2. 
2.1.2) Sigwart and Wundt and the Origin of the Formal Concepts in Reflection on Acts.
For what concern Sigwart, he already stressed in his 1878 Logik the peculiar «position
of the presentative life» within which, through «the sensuous impressions originated by
the countable things, the presentation of the number is obtained», and «by the simple
way of  abstraction are  obtained from different  groups of  object,  which  the number
corresponds  to,  the  presentations  of  the  number  2,  3,  4  etc.»3.  This,  according  to
Sigwart,  is  the common opinion shared  by many philosophers.  Among them, Mill's
opinion  in  the  System  of  deductive  and  inductive  Logic  (criticized  by  Husserl),
according to which, supposed the nonexistence of the number in abstracto, there must
be supposed identity between «the properties of numbers and the properties of things»4;
or even much more clear in Bain's  Logic, where «the number» is «a series of discrete
sensuous  impressions,  colored  extensions,  sounds»  and  «unit  the  abstraction  of
countable and concrete things»5. However, for Sigwart, «the one cannot for sure lay on
the sensuous impressions» and in the same sense, «the mere abstraction from concrete
things is  not be indicated as the path for gain unit  and the more simple concept of
numbers»6. Eve if we can indicate one or two presentations, 
«with that we are not already saying, that here and there the presentations of one
and two are already given with the objects, and that we can abstract for instance,
without any subsequent work, the presentation of the color Red from a number of
red things, and in the same manner the presentation One from so and so many
things, or the presentation Two from so and so many couples. Therefore, when we
1 Ibid., p. 335.
2 The «critical study of Sigwart's investigation leaded» Husserl to the development of the theory exposed,
Cfr., Ibid., p. 86. Hereafter, Wundt's insights on the concept of number follows the path of Sigwart's work.
Husserl refers to: C. Sigwart, Logik, Voll. II, cit., p. 39f..  
3 C. Sigwart, Logik, Voll. II, cit., p. 39. Sigwart's Italics.
4 J. S. Mill, System of deductive and inductive Logic, Voll. I, 2nd Book, (Harper Brothers, New York, 1882), p.
319.
5 A. Bain, Logic, Part II, (Longmans, Green Reader, Dyer, London, 1870), p. 200.
6 C. Sigwart, Logik, Voll. II, cit., p. 40.
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ask then, in what all the things  that we pose within the natural flow of our thought
as One are identical – the sun, the moon and stars, animals, trees, strokes of the
clock etc., hence, they are with respect to their sensuously perceptive content in a
absolute  way so  different,  that  absolutely  nothing  common  is  to  be  found  in
there».1.
To hear tree strokes is not have a presentation of a series, nor the presentation of the
number  tree.  Sigwart  stresses  therefore  the  role  and  the  function  of  the  act  and,
especially, the becoming aware of this act itself. Writes in fact in his Logik: 
«only  by  comprehending  them  together  thanks  to  recollection  and  by  newly
becoming aware of the transition of consciousness itself, the presentation of the
multiplicity can arise. In the same way, the presentation of unit supposes that we
differently become aware of the closed off and delimited act of perception of an
object in the difference with its repeated perception. Every thing we pose as One
in the sensuous realm is sorted out through such a closing-off and comprehending
act from the continuum. […] The changing of sensation is the precondition of this
function, but such a passive changing is not the function itself»2. 
Therefore, for Sigwart would be impossible to understand how we consider the same as
one  or  as  many if  here  we do  not  become aware  of  the  act-delimiting  and  of  the
proceeding involved, and we do not even suppose the «purely formal nature» of the
functions  here  involved3.  This  awareness,  which  seems  to  assume  the  traits  of  a
reflection, summed with the critic against the interpretation of the possible content of
the presentation on which number presentation would be based, must have represented a
point of interest for Husserl, and even for his interpretation of Wundt.     
Now, in his 1880  Logik  Wundt starts by stressing that «the point of departure for the
development of the concept of number is the unit», and its origin «seems» to must be
reconnected,  within  the  function  of  counting,  to  the  «abstraction  from  the  single
object»4. The number would be in this sense only an «after image» [Nachbildung] of the
1 Ibidem.
2 Ibid., p. 41. Italics mine.
3 Ibid., p. 42. Sigwart's Italics. 
4 W. M. Wundt, Logik, (Ferdinand Enke, Stuttgart, 1880), p. 468.
89
single  things,  whose  distinguishing  properties  are  «disregarded».  But,  according  to
Wundt, «it is clear, however, that the things can only become enumerable by thought by
means of grasping them as units»1. For sure, the presentation of things that could offer
the basis for an abstraction leading to the concept of unit does actually give cause for
such a characterization, as for instance, by their being «closed off and independent», but
now  
«it would be completely unintelligible how this motivation is to become effective
if our thinking did not have the ability to grasp the individual object as a unit. So
the  genuine  bearer  of  the  concept  of  unit  is  the  individual  act  of  thinking.
Therefore that alone is enumerable which can always be separated into individual
acts of thinking bound up with one another»2.
What seems to emerge from Wundt's quote, is the fact that the content of presentations
and even their properties do not suffice in order to obtain the concept of unit, where in
fact the thought already grasp them as such. Then, the function of counting must be
linked to the connection of the single acts of thought:
«The counting function is always constituted by a connection of the single acts of
thought in  composed unities, whatever this function would be even directed to.
Under this respect, the counting function is just a special expression of the logical
function  of  thought  itself.  It  arises  in  the  connection  with  subsequent  acts  of
thought when it is completely abstracted from the content of those latter»3.
Now, according to Husserl, Wundt indicates the «bearer» of the concept of unit in the
«single act of thought», where therefore, an abstracting act is necessary for the arising
of the concept of unit and where this act composes therefore the «content» of the same
concept4. But where the first instance, the abstracting act, is common to the “origin” of
all  concepts,  the  second  poses  the  problem  of  its  interpretation.  The  “content”
composing the concept of unit seems to must be interpreted in the sense of the extension
1 Ibidem.
2 Ibidem. Italics mine.
3 Ibidem. Wundt's Italics.
4 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 87.
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of the concept, which would be, in the case of the concept unit, Wundt's «bearer», the
single act of thought. This interpretation should in fact be linked to the famous principle
from the following quote of the Philosophie der Arithmetik:
«It  is impossible to explain the origination of the number concepts in the same
way as, say, that of the concepts color, shape, etc., which, as positive Moments in
the primary content, are isolated through mere analysis thereof. Therefore it was
not only Aristotle who was in error, when he attributed the numbers and the one to
the ἀισθητὰ κοινὰ, to the objects common to all the senses, but also Locke, when
he assigned the  one to the concepts that have their source simultaneously in the
domain of sensation and in that of reflexion. The enumerated contents certainly
can be physical as well as psychical, but the number concepts and the one belong
exclusively to the domain of reflexion. And accordingly it is also absurd from the
outset when Locke (like so many after him) considers the represented numbers to
be “primary qualities”, as perfect copies of original qualities, which have their
subsistence in the things themselves and independently of our mind»1.
What Husserl seems in fact to affirm, is that to the concept of “one”, “number” or “unit”
cannot be linked any “primary qualities” of any presentations, i.e., the concept of unit
cannot arise from the mere presentations of the objects where reflection cannot find any
abstractive basis in there. 
Another argument in order to clarify if formal concepts do arise by reflecting on acts
and not their content, may be deduced from the fact that, for Husserl, «the origin of the
two  concepts  of  unit  and  multiplicity  correlates».  He  writs  in  fact,  surely  pretty
convoluted, that «the concept of unit stands in the relation of correlative to the concept
of the multiplicity.  But this  latter is nothing other than the concept of the collective
whole. Thus the concept of the unit is nothing other than the concept  collective part»2.
Therefore, if we may establish the origin of multiplicity,  i.e.,  collective whole, from
reflection on act and not on content, relatively also unit would be establish in this sense.
Multiplicity does not basically differ yet from the concept of “collective wholes”, where
the unit would represent therefore collective part. 
1 Ibid., p. 85.
2 Ibid., p. 152.
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The presentation of a multiplicity represents surely a whole composed of parts, whose
connections do not yet belong to the presentation content for itself anyway. In fact, with
respect to the famous example of the presentation of a rose, Husserl stresses that, if we
are dealing for example, with the representational whole which we call “a rose”, we can
arrive at its various parts successively by analyzing the whole. So we find the leaves, the
stem, in general, the physical parts. Then we can also find the color, its intensity, the
scent, etc.,  which means, the properties. Each part is picked out by a distinct act of
noticing,  and is held together  with those parts already segregated. As the immediate
consequence of the analysis there results a totality, i.e., the totality composed by the
separately and specifically noticed parts  of  the whole.  Moreover,  Husserl  continues,
«with regard to the unification of the parts in the intuitive whole, there are still to be
added the combining relations - as distinct and specifically determinate primary contents
that are relational».  In the rose example,  we would find, for instance, the continuous
combinations among the leaves,  or even the combinations  of  the properties such as
redness and spatial extension. This kind of combining relations are therefore to by found
in  the  content  of  the  presentation;  but,  they  differs  essentially  from  the  kind  of
connection which collectively combine the parts of the whole. Writes in fact Husserl:
«Thus  these  combining relations  present  themselves  as,  so  to  speak,  a  certain
“more” in contrast  to the mere totality,  which appears merely to hold its parts
together, but not (really) to combine them. 
What, then, distinguishes the case of these primary combinations from that of the
collective combinations? Obviously it is this: that in the first case a unification is
intuitively noticeable among the representational contents, while this is not so in
the latter case»1.
The  collective  connections  are  not  “primary  relations”,  which  means,  they  are
essentially  different  from  the  continuous  connection  and  the  metaphysical  ones
(extension – color), or to other form of relation like similarity, increment or «logical
implication», which, as «physical phenomena» in a Brentanian sense,  «belong under
this respect to the same class»2. Collective connections are in fact  psychical relations,
i.e.,  intentional  one,  where the existence of  one of the terms in the relations  is  not
1 Ibid., p. 72.
2 Ibid., p. 330. F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte, Erster Band, cit., p. 101f.
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mandatory1 and the relation does not determine the nature of the elements connected2.
Psychical relations do not even suppose the physical one, and that means also, among
the parts of the whole by a collective connection is not to be supposed any “primary
relation”. 
We  have  in  fact  already  saw  how  also  spontaneous  functions  are  involved  in  the
formation of numbers and multiplicities  in concreto, and how therefore  «the contents
are, in this case, unified precisely by the act alone». Multiplicity arises as concept from
reflection  on  the  psychical  relation  of  collective  connection  indeed. Collective
connection is therefore a pure formal relations, independent from any primary relation,
and  multiplicity,  and if  we  accept  Husserl's  established  “correspondence”  also  unit,
represent a formal concept, or, as he express himself, a category3: 
«We  can  with  full  justification  designate  the  concepts  something  and  one,
multiplicity  and cardinal number  - these most general of all concepts, and most
empty of content - as form concepts or  categories.  (…)  The all-encompassing
character of these concepts finds its simple explanation in the fact that they are
concepts of attributes which originate in reflexion upon psychical acts. And such
acts can be brought to bear upon all contents without exception».4
What characterizes them as such is  the circumstance that «they are not concepts  of
contents of a determinate genus, but rather in a certain manner take in any and every
content». If they originates from reflection upon psychical acts, and if such acts “can be
brought to bear upon all contents without exception” as seen, may guarantee for the fact
that they take in any kind of content and any case whatsoever.  
But by speaking about the difference between the two classes of relations, Husserl goes
now  further  in  characterizing  the  psychical  relations. The  characteristic  difference
between the two classes of relations can in fact also be marked by saying that primary
relations belong in a certain sense among the representational contents of the same level
as their  fundamental elements [Fundamente],  which cannot,  however,  be said of the
1 An angel can be putted in relation to the moon, where instead, the non-existence of the extension implies
the non-existence of the color. 
2 While the relation of similarity, for instance, already determines the nature of the terms in similarity, as
“similar” indeed.
3 Cfr., D. Willard, Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge: A Study in Husserl's Philosophy, cit., p. 54.
4 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 84 – 5.
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psychical  relations.  In  the  first  case,  the  relation  is  immediately  given  along  with
representing the elements, as a moment of the same representational content. Instead, in
the second case of the psychical relation, «in order to represent the relation there is first
required a reflective act of representing bearing upon the relating act». The immediate
content of this latter is the act instituting the relation, and only through that, so Husserl,
«does the representation bear upon elements. The related contents and the relation thus
form, as it were, contents of distinct levels»1.
Here we see the first  traits  of  Husserl's  insight  into the articulation among the acts
involved in cognition, where the intentional act of higher order are founded on the lower
ones.  At  the  time  of  the  Philsophie  der  Arithmetik,  such  an  articulation  not  only
originates other questions and problems, but basically starts  to define some traits  of
Husserl's view on the concepts of relations. 
2.1.3) An Alternative Interpretation
In  relation  to  the  origin  of  the  formal  concepts  of  “something”  and  “multiplicity”
Husserl stresses in fact the role of abstraction in this sense, and in particular, one of the
aspect belonging to abstraction as characterized by Husserl,  which is the function of
«the unitary interest and the noticing». In the case of the concept of multiplicity for
example, we see Husserl calling in place the function of an act of «higher order», the
interest indeed, which «lets arise and comprehend different contents for themselves»2. 
Now, in the formation of “totalities”, which are basically composed unities (unities of
unities, sets, etc.), a concrete presentation must be present as basis for the abstraction. In
the case of totalities, a whole is in fact present, whose parts are connected by means of a
relation3. The parts, already conceived as whole for themselves, must be comprehended
as parts of the higher whole in order to establish a relation among them and the whole
itself, where there must also be yet, stresses Husserl, no identity established among the
parts. In this sense, we see how also in the case of complex formations the function of
abstraction  mentioned  above  is  called  explicitly  in  question.  Therefore,  the  more
complex concept would  in this sense arise due to reflection, in this case, on the act
establishing the relationship. 
1 Ibid.., p. 69.
2 Ibid., p. 92.
3 Like, for instance, in the case of two sets, the one bigger than the other.
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But now, according to Husserl, the concept of the more complex relationship would not
be  possible  to  establish  only  due  to  reflection  on  the  founding  act.  Writes  in  fact
Husserl:
«As to the psychological foundation of these more intricate modes of formation,
one recognizes  that  there are  here present  psychical  acts  of  higher  order,  i.e.,
psychical  acts  which  are  directed  in  turn  upon  psychical  acts  and  bear  upon
primary contents only through mediation of these latter. If in one act we represent
several totalities, there is required for the formation of each particular totality a
unifying act of the type described above. And if each of them is to be consciously
held fast in its unity, and thought as unified with the others, then a psychical act of
second order must be directed onto the acts of first order - upon which the specific
unification of the partial totalities rest - and only through them onto the primary
contents».1
       
What it is now interesting here, is the fact that, according to Husserl, the “psychical act”
of higher order is directed through the acts of first order to their contents. That would be
in fact the only way one could held fast several totalities in unity. But Husserl here also
importantly stresses, that «already by the most simple sets», i.e., by sets to which belong
elemental contents, «acts of the second order are present, to the extent, that is, that the
particular contents are thrown into relief by special acts and only then are encompassed
by a common act which unites them all»2. 
That slightly unclear formulation could lead to interpret in a different way the direction
of  reflection  by the  arising  of  formal  concepts,  which  would,  on  the  one  side,  see
Husserl's  position n the  Philosophie der Arithmetik as  more close to  the one of the
Logical Investigations, where in fact the formation of the “universal concept” do not
lead to a reflection only on the categorial act, but on the corresponding peculiar object
of this latter3; on the other side, to see abstraction as a categorial act in more wide sense,
by being directed also to primery contents.  
The act which “thrown into relief” is obviously an act of interest which, at the time of
the  Philsophie der Arithmetik, is also a form of attention or noticing, which is direct
1 Ibid., p. 92. 
2 Ibid., p. 93.
3 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/2, cit, p. 670.
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through act of first order to their “primery content”.  This «unitary act of interest» and
along with it the unitary noticing, distinctly picks out and encompasses various contents.
Then, a reflection let arise the concept of collective connection by directing upon the
psychical act which originates the totality. Writes in fact Husserl:
«collective  unification  is  not  intuitively  given in  the  presentation  content,  but
instead has its subsistence only in certain psychical acts that embrace the contents
in a unifying manner. [...] And obviously these acts can only be those elemental
acts that are capable of taking in any and all contents, however unlike they may
be. So, then, a careful examination of the phenomena teaches the following: A set
originates in that a unitary interest - and, simultaneously with and in it, a unitary
noticing  -  distinctly  picks  out  and  encompasses  various  contents.  Hence,  the
collective connection also can only be grasped by means of reflection upon the
psychical act through which the totality comes about»1.
In this sense indeed, the concept of collective connection seems to be closely related to
the  one  of  “something”,  “one”  and  “multiplicity”,  i.e.,  bestows  a  formal-categorial
function on a given content. Such a concept, as all concept of wholes, does arise due to
reflection on the connections among its parts or pieces, but while in the case of the
continuous connection, the relations were to be found in the content of the presentation
on which reflection must anyway be based, by the collective connection that  is  not
possible, as we have seen. There is no characteristic of a group of object which can
make them  “collectively connected”.
Here reflection seems therefore to be directed on this psychical act of first order, which
can be probably identified with abstraction, which, according to its definition, represents
the best candidate in order to function as such an act. Husserl describes in fact as follow
abstraction:
«It  is  easy  to  characterize  the  abstraction  which  must  be  exercised  upon  a
concretely given multiplicity in order to attain the number concept under which it
falls.  One  considers  each  of  the  particular  objects  merely  insofar  as  it  is  a
“something” or “one”, simultaneously retaining the collective combination; and,
1 Ibid., p. 73 – 4.
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in this manner, there is obtained the corresponding general form of multiplicity,
one and one and ... and one, with which a determinate number name is associated.
In  this  process  there  is  total  abstraction  from  the  specific  characters  of  the
particular objects. But this neither means nor implies that the concrete objects
have to disappear from our consciousness. To “abstract” from something merely
means to pay no special attention to it. Thus, also in our case at hand, no special
interest is directed upon the peculiarities of content in the separate individuals,
while those peculiarities, nonetheless, do constitute the pre-condition of the acts
of reflection which yield the “units” of the respective number, and are the ground
of the distinctness of those units»1.
Therefore,  we  will  characterize  closer  the  function  of  abstraction  in  the  following
section. But some  preliminary remarks are here mandatory in order to understand the
role abstraction may play, in our understanding, by the analysis of concept.   
The fact that the clarification of the sense of the formal concepts of «multiplicity and
number»  seems  to  recalls  the  function  of a  «psychical  act  of  second  order»2,  first
introduces in fact the question about the relationship between formal concepts of such a
kind and the sensuous, since for such object there is no equivalent in the realm of the
sensuous of the empirical experience. Indeed, at the very base of multiplicity and its
giveness must be supposed a categorial activity that synthetically unifies objects already
present as “something in general”.
The  concept  of  number  as  determinate  multiplicity  would  originate  therefore  by
reflection on the act of collectively connecting. The collective connection is in fact the
common characteristic belonging to all concrete wholes; upon the proper act of such
connecting from which originates collective connections could be operate abstractive
attention,  which  is  a  sort  of  reflection  directly  linked  to  the  act  of  collectively
connecting. This latter act consists essentially in discerning discrete contents already
given in consciousness and, at the same time, comprehending them in a unity3. The act
of collectively connecting is therefore intended as an act of second order which, while
collectively unifies them, refers to the psychical act in which the corresponding discrete
contents are discerned for themselves,i.e., proper abstraction. 
1 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 337.
2 Ibid., p. 74.
3 Ibid., p. 337.
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Collecting is indeed, according to Husserl,  a founded act which bestows for its part
categorial formations over an already given content, which is understood, at the time of
the Philosophy of Arithmetic, in terms of the act selective attention, an act of selective
interest and discernment:
«In reflection upon that elementary act of selective interest and discernment, an
act which possesses as its content the presentation of the whole, we acquire the
abstract presentation of collective connection. It is by means of this notion that we
form the general concept of multiplicity as a whole which combines parts in a
merely collective manner»1.
Only then, by means of the reflection upon the act of combining that we acquire first the
presentation of the collective combination and therefore form the general concept of
multiplicity and number.
Besides  the  difficult  formulation  of  the  function  of  abstraction,  which  seems  to
represents a complex function not immediately reducible only to the “not pay special
attention”, and that, even if we set aside the interpretation mentioned above, the proper
definition of the content  of such acts  seems to pay the higher  price,  at  least  in  the
Philosophie der Arithmetik. The question about the proper definition of the nature and
role  of  the  “logical  content”  of  the  presentation  in  its  relation  to  abstraction  and
reflection seems in fact not clearly settled. And since the role of the content seems to be
likely predominant, the question how a formal concept like “something in general” can
emerge from the reflection upon a determinate object of presentation, takes the shape of
the question, unsolved at least at the time of the Philosophie der Arithmetik, about the
proper understanding of the categorially formative activity. 
It is in fact only in the Logical Investigation that Husserl tries to deeply understand such
an activity.  By an inquiry upon the relation between the categorial  act  of intuitional
nature and the intentional objectivity, he stresses in fact that the formation of what he
calls  now  «universal  concepts»  does  not  lead  to  an  explicit  reflection  upon  the
corresponding  categorial  act.  He  writes  in  fact  in  the  Sixth of  the  Logische
Untersuchungen: 
1 Ibid., p. 335.
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«Not in these  acts as objects,  but in  the objects of these acts,  do we have the
abstractive basis which enables us to realize the concepts in question. (...) It is in
fact obvious from the start that, just as any other concept (or Idea, Specific Unity)
can only “arise”, i.e. become self-given to us, if based on an act which at least sets
some individual instance of it imaginatively before our eyes, so the concept of
Being can arise only when  some being, actual or imaginary, is set before our
eyes»1. 
This assumption and this fundamental changing in Husserl interpretation with respect to
the necessity of a reflection directed only on the categorial act in order to obtain the
“universal concept” holds, according to Husserl, for all kinds of universal concept, and
among them, «holds of all categorial forms (or of all categories)»2. In fact, by looking
closely to how Husserl explain now, even if in a less articulated way, how we reach the
formal concept of  set and the kind of conceptually universal consciousness connected
with its peculiar giveness, we still  find the formative activity leading to the peculiar
content. But now, Husserl explicitly asserts that the reflection does not direct on the
acts,  but  rather,  we  perform  directly  a  peculiar  grasp  of  the  special  kind  of
corresponding object  the act  presents.  Writes  in  fact  Husserl  pretty explicitly in  the
Logical Investigations:
«An aggregate, e.g., is given, and can only be given, in an actual act of assembly,
in an act, that is, expressed in the conjunctive form of connection  A and B and
C ... But the concept of set does not arise through reflection on this act: instead of
paying heed to the act which presents a set, we have rather to pay heed to what it
presents, to the  set  it renders apparent  in concreto,  and then to lift the universal
form of our set to conceptually universal consciousness»3. 
The «categorial object», how Husserl now explicitly calls the objective correlate of a
categorial act, seems to be therefore given as a stable acquisition, at least in his identity
and  «ideal  validity»,  in  an  act  which  gives  it  in  an  “analogue  way”,  i.e.,  as  «the
1 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/2, cit, p. 670.
2 Ibidem.
3 Ibid., p. 671.
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analogon», as Husserl says, of a common sensuous intuition1. That is of course, only the
very beginning of the complex of problems represented by the, slightly misleading in
Husserl choice of words, categorial intuition and even its specification as ideal intuition.
Also the concept of abstraction come to a redefinition within the Logical Investigations.
While in the 1891 work on arithmetic that was problematically interpreted as selective
attention, in 1900 Husserl speaks already of ideational abstraction, with which «I do not
naturally mean here “abstraction” merely in the sense of a setting-in-relief of some non-
independent moment in a sensible object, but proper ideational abstraction, where no
such non-independent moment, but its Idea, its Universal, is brought to consciousness,
and achieves  actual givenness»2.  Even more important for what concern the kind of
formal  concept  represented  by  the  categories  as  exposed  in  the  Philosophie  der
Arithmetik, is the introduction or better definition, between the time of the 1891 work
and the  Logical Investigations,  of the “formalizing” function of abstraction, which is
introduced indeed around the Logik Vorlesung in 1896. In this latter lecture on logic in
fact, we already find consciously applied what in the 1900 work is already more surely
defined and accurately distinguished, from other kind of empirical abstraction on the
one side, and even from the kind of abstracting process leading to the Specie or even the
Genus  of,  for  instance,  empirical  qualities.  Writes  in  fact  Husserl  trying  to  briefly
formulate the proper function of the “formalizing abstraction”:  
«We rise, in the case of any type of whole, to its pure form, its categorial type, by
abstracting from the specificity of the sorts of content in question. More clearly
expressed, this formalizing abstraction is something quite different from what is
usually aimed at under the title of “abstraction”: it is a quite different performance
from the one which sets in relief the universal Redness in a concrete visual datum,
or the generic “moment” of Colour in the Redness previously abstracted»3.
 
In  formalization  we basically replace  the  names  standing for  the  sort  of  content  in
question by indefinite expressions such as a «certain sort of content, a certain other sort
of  content  etc».  At  the  same  time,  on  the  side  of  the  meaning,  corresponding
substitutions of purely categorial for material thoughts take place. 
1 Ibidem.
2 Ibid., p. 290.
3 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 291 – 2.
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Husserl analysis in the early years fall short in interpreting the objective correlate of the
categorial act and its function as basis for further categorial acts like the formation of
universal concepts. For example, the concepts “collective connection” or “something”
are later on not grasped by reflecting on the act of collecting, but by the view toward the
formal combination of contents or an arbitrary object of thinking established by the act.
Even if he maintains the necessity of reflection upon the psychical act in order to obtain
the concepts however,  the formal concept of collective combination is not identified
with the psychical act of higher order which is the foundation of abstraction for the
concept. Therefore, such concepts must result from an abstractive consideration of their
corresponding presentations, those latter not considered as psychic phenomena, but by
referring to what Husserl call already in the 1891 work «the logical content [logischer
Gehalt] of the presentation»1.   
2.2) The Specific Inquiry into the Concept of Number.
We already seen how Husserl defines and applies abstraction by formal concepts. Now,
from this definition is much to be taken in order to try to briefly make clear what could
represent  a  way  for  interpreting  the  consciousness  of  a  “simple”  set  or  group  of
elements, this time in numerical determination. 
Suppose in fact we have objects in a given field of consciousness, such as <a,b,c,d,e>.
Already at the first glance, we are considering each object as “something a”, “something
b” etc., and already we could be aware of different groups of these objects, of small
ones  perhaps,  in  one  complex  act  as  presentation.  There  is  in  fact  no  need  of  a
succession of explicit acts of counting to determinate their number for such small group.
We are somehow already intuiting a totality all at once, otherwise we would need to
properly or  authentically “counting”  the  elements,  but  that  soon will  reach a  limit2.
Obviously, we can yet also look at them without such a grouping. Therefore, «to intuit
them as a “number” of things, one must perform a characteristic, complex type of act,
which we might describe as the intuitive enumeration of the objects in the group»3. 
1 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 218.
2 Ibid., p. 105f, 141f, 247.
3 D. Willard, “Translator's Introduction”, in E. Husserl, Philosophy of Arithmetic, Psychological and Logical
Investigations  with  Supplementary  Texts  from  1887-1901,   (Springer  Science  and  Business  Media,
Dordrecht, 2003), p. xviii.
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Part of the complex act does actually direct to a, b, c in such a manner that, this way, the
objects which properly correspond to the “something  a”,  “something  b” are noticed
within the kind of attention or noticing that “extract” the singularities composing the
totality. What seems to be necessary here then, is basically the progressive continuing of
awareness into the subsequent partial, and for that, also the retention of the awareness of
one thing to the other, i.e., «the act of reflection on the collection constituted by running
through the items in which we have the construction of the set (a, b, c)»1. The kind of
complex act, this simple and direct “taking together” of the objects extracted, does not
in fact already constitute the “one” object of higher order that is the totality enumerable;
it  is  in  fact  necessary  also  the  directing  of  the  awareness  toward  the  collective
connection, which is performed by reflection, as we have seen. This latter is mandatory,
also for in normal perception we do perceive distinct objects without directly taking
them as part of a totality, while the “collective connection” also exclude, at the same
time, other objects from the field of consciousness under consideration. 
By  this  latter  reflection  we  would  obtain  therefore  the  «abstract  multiplicity  form
belonging to the small group», by “diminishing” each of its elements to a mere “one” or
“something”  and «collectivelly grasping together  the  units  thus  originating» indeed.
How we then obtain the corresponding specific number is, according to Husserl, «by
classifying the multiplicity form thus constructed as a two, a three,  etc.»2.  To put it
simply, to grasp a number of things means to grasp certain objects as, or better to say,
«under the character of mere “somethings”», united by the psychical relation expressed
by the  verbal  expression  “and”.  In  this  sense,  multeplicity  is  a  still  unspecified  or
undetermined abstract form of “something and something and something etc.”, where
instead, a particular number, say 4, suppresses exactly this “etc.” at a specific point. A
specific  number  is  then  conceivable  as,  essentially,  a  defining  structural  property,
obviously non directly perceived, of similar groups when conceived as numerable, i.e.,
as “somethings” connected by “ands”. 
Obviously,  this  basically  represents  the  «original  [ursprünglich]»  or  proper  number
concept as definition by enumeration of the “how much” of a group. In this sense, is not
the  concept  of  number  used  in  mathematics.  Already  by  Husserl  analysis  of,  for
1 See,  for  example,  R.  Tieszen,  Mathematical  Intuition,  Phenomenology  and  Mathematical  Knowledge,
(Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1989), p. 151. Or, D. Willard,  Logic and the
Objectivity of Knowledge, cit., p. 54.
2 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 109.
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example, “Zero” is in fact to see how such number can be embedded in the series only
due symbolic-operation, for «they are no proper [eigentlich] number», i.e., «correlate of
collecting  act»1.  Even more,  the  function  of  the  symbolic  numerical  system is  well
showed, under the same point of view, by such numerical formations such imaginary or
transfinite  number2.  But  for  our  interest  is  exactly  this  concept  of  number  and  its
possible definition by Husserl in question. The number as «a multiplicity of units»3,
while a (cardinal) number is given in the enumeration of objects grasped together in
Kollektiva, whose elements a thought by abstraction as mere “something and something
etc” and where their collective connection, expressed by “and”, is a formal, content-
independent “think together”4.
If  we think  this  presentation  as  underlying the cardinal  concept  of  number,  we can
already stress how Husserl leaves out consideration the ordering, or at least, he does not
explicitly consider  it  in  the  Philosophie der  Arithmetik for  choosing,  and justify «a
posteriori»,  the  cardinal  number  «as  constitutive».  He considers  the choice between
ordinal and cardinal as irrelevant for the constitution of the concept of number5. We
1 Ibid., p. 129. 
2 See, E. Husserl,  Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890 – 1910), in Husserliana XXII, cit., p. 7.
3 E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 297.
4 Ibid., p. 335.
5 S. Centrone, Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics in the early Husserl,  cit.,  p. 28. Husserl's  accorded
prevalence to cardinal number with respect to ordinal derives basically from his critic, shared also with
Frege, against Helmholtz's and Kronecker's choice of the ordinal number as the fundamental concept for
arithmetic, a critic which has its roots into the misleading interpretation of both mathematicians of the
symbolical character of the numerical system and of calculation by posing the origin of the concept of
number in the process of computation. For Husserl, calculation is a symbolic activity which deal with signs
and not with concepts, where therefore, the symbolic results must be, nevertheless, be “interpreted” at the
end of  the  process  as  «sign  for  a  numerical  concept».  Writes  in  fact  Husserl  in  the  Philosophie  der
Arithmetik: «Let us abstract from the signification of the designations “1,” “2,” . . . , “X,” as well as from
the designations of the operations of addition, multiplication, and exponentiation, and take them as totally
arbitrary symbols without signification (as, for example, the counters in a game). Let us replace number
definitions and operation rules which are the regular medium of systematic procedure, with corresponding,
conventionally fixed formulas expressing the equivalences of sign combinations. One will then recognize
that, in this way, there actually originates an independent system of symbols which permits the derivation
of sign after sign in a uniform pattern without there ever turning up – nor could there ever, as such, turn up
–  other  sign  formations  that  appear  in  other  circumstances,  accompanying  a  conceptual  process,  as
designations of the concepts here formed» (E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit.,
p. 237-8). Which means that this «systematics of signs» works mechanically producing symbols through
laws, where both, symbols and laws of the systematics became independent with respect to the concepts
intended by the signs and their constituting laws (See, M. Hartimo, “Towards completeness: Husserl on
theories of manifolds 1890–1901”, in Synthese, 156, 2007, p. 288). This process guarantees of course, the
mechanical functioning of the construction of numbers by operations which lead also mechanically to a
solution, and that means also that calculating is not an activity with concepts, but with signs. On the other
side, for Helmholtz and similarly for Kronecker, «every number is determined only by its position in the
series of natural numbers», where the series is a concatenation of arbitrarily and conventional signs. The
meaning of each sign function therefore to denote the certain position in the natural ordering of the series
and from which therefore is to be deduced that ordinal numbers are the fundamental numerical concept
(See,  H.  v.  Helmholtz,  “Zählen  und  Messen  erkenntnistheoretisch  betrachtet“,  in  ed  F.  Vischer,
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have also already abstracted from what the particular objects of consciousness are and
that, all together, represents the “formal abstraction” at work in having “something  a
and something b...”. As we have indicated in the previous chapter, Husserl achieves a
better formulation of the formal abstraction around 1896, how seems to demonstrate
this passage form the Lecture on Logik held by Husserl in Halle the same year:    
«A single presentation can have multiple, i.e. not identical objects, together as its
proper object, for example, “Plato, and Aristotle, and Epicurus”. In this example
are the objects composing the plurality [Mehrheit] given in independent and direct
presentations,  as  well  as  the  whole plurality presentation is  a  composite  ones,
which eventually comprehend in itself as its removable constituting components
those  individual  presentations.  One  must  anyway  be  wary  of  mistaking  the
sequence  [Aneinanderreihung]  of  these  individual  presentations  for  the
presentation of the being-together of its belonging objects, and therefore think, it
may  be  here  given  not  a  single  presentation  but  a  mere  multiplicity.  The
presentations of Plato, Aristotle etc., individually taken for themselves and even
merely thought together in a subjective way, are certainly not the unity meant by
us as soon as we perform or understand the composed linguistic expression “Plato
Philosophische Aufsätze, Eduard Zeller zu seinem fünfzigjährigen Doktor-Jubiläum, Fuc's Verlag, Leipzig,
1887, p. 21). According to Husserl, we find here the confusion between ordinal and cardinal numbers and a
unacceptable nominalistic interpretation of the concept of number which interpret it as only signs. Behind
his not taking explicitly start from the ordinal number or the ordered sets nor from the cardinal number in
order to describe the number concept, seems to find explication, according to what emerge from Husserl's
parallelism between the “systematics of signs” and the “number concepts”,  as we can call it,  from the
necessity to recognize one kind of number as fundamental for arithmetic, to stress how the ordering of a
series is determined by the nature of the numerical concepts and it is not reducible to a sequence of signs
and to guarantee with the presence of “referential concepts” some meaningfulness to the “systematics of
signs” even if, by operating, one does not refer explicitly to it or the former is not the explicit object of
consideration  by  calculating  (E.  Husserl,  “Über  den  Begriff  der  Zahl.  Psychologische  Analysen“,  in
Husserliana XII, cit., p. 296f, and Philosophie der Arithmetik, in ibidem, cit., p. 181f.).
In the same sense, Frege in his 1903 second part of the  Grundlagen der Arithmeitik, refers explicitly to
what he ironically calls «a magic power gained by the signs for the disappearing of their references from
the eyes».  He also explicitly recalls Helmholtz's  quote from the  Philosophische Aufsätze where clearly
programmatic, the (also) mathematician from Postdam expresses his desire to develop a «formal theory»:
«I consider arithmetic or the theory of the pure numbers as a method grounded on purely psychological
facts, which is ruled by the sequential application of a system of signs (of the number indeed) of limitless
extension and possibility of improvement. Arithmetic search in fact which different forms of connection of
such signs (operations of computation) lead to the same resultate» (H. v. Helmholtz, “Zählen und Messen
erkenntnistheoretisch  betrachtet“,  in  ed  F.  Vischer,  Philosophische  Aufsätze,  Eduard  Zeller  zu  seinem
fünfzigjährigen Doktor-Jubiläum, cit. p. 20). Besides the misleading application and «mixing up» of the
two perspective, the formal and the empirical, Frege stress the futility of constructing a system of signs
which does not even reflect any kind of mathematical reality, «as if the two questions about the truth of a
thought and about its applicability may not be completely different! I can surely recognize the mere truth of
a  utterance  without  knowing  if  I  will  generally  make  some  use  of  it»  (G.  Frege,  Grundgesetze  der
Arithmetik. Begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet, II Voll., Verlag von Hermann Pohle, Jena, 1903, p. 139-140).     
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and Aristotle and Epicurus»1.
Besides the still briefly and problematic formulation, we see here a first more refined
insight into the function of a “formal abstraction”. Husserl makes use of a presentation
which, structure as “something a, and something b, etc.”, comprehends an unitary object
as  intentionally  meant  in  its  logical  and  meaning  function.  As  unitary  meaning-
formation is  also the identity meant  through the single presentation and beyond the
actual and different subjective act of cognition or, in this case, linguistic expression; but,
besides the reference to some kind of subjective acts in the process, we also find here
the possibly clashing account of mathematical “entities” seen as anchored to a intuitive
realm. 
The ontological status traditionally accorded to numbers for example, prevents such an
embedding. By virtue of their abstract nature, mathematical objects like numbers, sets or
operations and functions, cannot be in fact for example ostensively indicated in some
sort of intuition similar to the one relating to other perceptual objects, they cannot be
causally  related  to  our  senses,  are  not  objects  in  space  or  time  and  are  even  not
individually identifiable. This latter condition would even lead to  prevent considering
numbers as individual objects, but, for example in structuralism, as structure2. We find a
first  example of such a definition by Dedekind3,  who actually starts  from a general
position regarding the inquiry structure into number concept not that far away from the
one belonging to Husserl. 
Dedekind in his  Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen, a work at the time studied and
even criticized from Husserl  and Frege as  well,  by speaking of arithmetic  (algebra,
analysis) as a part of logic, states in fact how he also implies by that to
1 E. Husserl, Logik, Vorlesung 1896, in Husserliana, Materialienbände, I, cit. p. 86.
2 A recent formulation of mathematical structuralism intends the «use of the term “structuralism” to the form
that acknowledges that abstract structures exist, that the pure objects of mathematics are in some sense
elements of, or places in, those structures, and that there is nothing more to the pure objects of mathematics
than can be described by the basic relations of their corresponding structure », U. Nodelman, E. N. Zalta,
“Foundations for Mathematical Structuralism”, in Mind, 2014, 123, p. 40. A traditional definition of the
position of structuralism about mathematical objects is, rather, to be found, in Hellman, «mathematics is
concerned principally with the investigation of structures (…), in complete abstraction from the nature of
individual objects making up those structure», G. Hellman,  Mathematics Without Numbers, (Clarendon,
Oxford, 1989), p. vii. 
3 «A direct forerunner of ante rem structuralism is another logicist, Dedekind. His development of the notion
of continuity and the real  numbers, in  Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen,  his presentation of the natural
numbers via the notion of Dedekind infinity,  in  Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen,  and some of his
correspondence constitute a structuralist manifesto, as illustrated by the passage from §73 [of the same
work]», S. Shapiro,  Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology  (Oxford University Press,  New
York, 1997), p. 14. 
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«(...) consider the number concept entirely independent of the notions or intuitions
of space and time, that I consider it an immediate result from the laws of thought.
(…) Numbers are free creations of the human mind; they serve as a means of
apprehending more easily and more sharply the difference of things. It is only
through the purely logical process of building up the science of numbers and by
thus acquiring the continuous number-domain that we are prepared accurately to
investigate our notions of space and time by bringing them into relation with this
number-domain  created  in  our  mind.  If  we scrutinise  closely what  is  done in
counting an aggregate or number of things, we are led to consider the ability of the
mind to relate things to things, to let a thing correspond to a thing, or to represent
a thing by a thing, an ability without which no thinking is possible. Upon this
unique  and therefore  absolutely indispensable  foundation,  (…) it  must,  in  my
judgment, the whole science of numbers be established»1.  
By  starting  from  such  a  framework  for  the  explication  of  the  origin  of  the  more
fundamental “ability” of consciousness in relating things, Dedekind examines first the
“structure  of  number  concepts”,  which  means,  the  preliminary investigation  starting
with the question about,   
«In what way the gradual extension of the number-concept, the creation of zero,
negative, fractional, irrational and complex numbers are to be accomplished by
reduction  to  the  earlier  notions  and  that  without  any  introduction  of  foreign
conceptions»2.
And in the famous § 73 of his 1888 work, he exposes as following the determining
relationship  between  the  system and  the  relations  of  its  composing  element,  which
appears  as  the  element  truly  in  question  in  the  determination  of  the  numbers  as
mathematical entities within a theory:
«If  in  the  consideration  of  a  simply  infinite  system  (...) set  in  order  by  a
1 R. Dedekind, Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen, cit., p. vii – viii.
2 Ibid., p. xi.
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transformation  (...)  we  entirely  neglect  the  special  character  of  the  elements;
simply retaining their distinguishability and taking into account only the relations
to one another in which they are placed by the order-setting transformation (...),
then  are  these  elements  called  natural  numbers  or  ordinal  numbers  or simply
numbers»1.
According to such theories, what it is basically instituted is a strong connection between
theory or system and elements in there, mathematical objects are «always in the context
of some background  structure», where accordingly, «the objects have no more to them
than can be expressed in terms of the basic relations of the structure»2. 
A kind of «eliminative» theory could even, on the other hand, avoiding any commitment
to the existence of mathematical structures and their structural elements3. It could be in
fact even argued that numbers,  and among them, other mathematical objects  are  no
objects at all, no abstract, no ideal objects whatsoever4. Hence, the structures by which
one characterizes  mathematical  objects  like,  in  Dedekind's  case,  natural  numbers  or
ordinal  numbers,  but  also  sets,  spaces,  and so  on,  determine  all  that  there  is  to  be
determined  about  the  objects  in  question.  The  properties  show  by  the  structure
characterize  also  the  objects,  which  have  no  properties  independently of  those,  and
therefore relating them to all other objects and entities of the structure.
To assert mathematical and logical objects as objects, does not solve all the problems
either. Even if we suppose the possibility of their individual identification, the problem
of how to characterize such  entities remains open. It can be in fact argued that abstract
objects, such as numbers, are constituted by the characteristics and properties through
which we conceive them, from which would follows that they are connected to those
characteristics  in  a  different  way  from  the  way  “perceptual  objects”  bear  their
characteristics. In this direction, it has been argued for example, that abstract objects
such  the  mathematical  ones  «encode  the  constitutive  properties»,  though  they
«exemplify», or instantiate (in a more traditional-fashioned way of speaking) and even
necessarily exemplify also other properties independently from the encoded ones, while
1 Ibid., p. 21.
2 C. Parsons, “The Structuralist View of Mathematical Objects”, in Synthese, 84, 1990, p. 303.
3 Cfr., for instance, H. Putnam, “Mathematics Without Foundations”, in Jourrnal of Philosophy, 64, 1967, p.
5f. “Eliminative” is Parsons' terminology.  
4 P.  Benacerraf,  “What  Numbers  Could  Not  Be”,  in  ed.  P.  Benacerraf,  H. Putnam,  Philosophy  of
Mathematics: Selected Readings, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983), p. 7.
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on the contrary, perceptual or “ordinary” objects only exemplify their properties1. 
Taking for example empirical triangular objects, such as some road signs or the faces of
some physical  pyramid,  these objects  exemplify properties  like “having side with a
particular length”, or “being made of this substance” etc. By contrast,  the Euclidean
triangle  does  not  exemplify  any  of  these  properties.  It  exemplifies  their  negations
indeed, by encoding only the geometrical characteristics implied by being triangular
(i.e., being trilateral, having interior angles summing to 180°). Every object whatsoever,
including perceptual triangular objects and the the Euclidean triangle, is complete with
reference to the properties it exemplifies, while the Euclidean triangle encodes only the
properties which are imply by “being triangular”2. In classical logic, such a incomplete
object would be excluded on the basis of the «exemplification mode of predication»,
while  by the  «encoding mode  of  predication»  the  existence  of  the  abstract  objects,
whose  properties  are  defined  accordingly  to  a  mathematical  theory,  is  granted  by
satisfying the conditions on properties of a given formula3.  
1 E. Mally, Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen der Logik und Logistik,  in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und
philosophische Kritik, Supplement to n. 148, 1912, p. 14. Such a kind of distinction was presented, among
others, by Saul Kripke in his Locke's Lectures. See, S.A. Kripke, Reference and Existence, The John Locke
Lectures (Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2013), p. 55f, esp. 73-4. 
2 E. Mally, Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen der Logik und Logistik, p. 4f.
3 The distinction recalled was introduced by Ernst Mally, a Meinong's former scholar, who develops a theory,
recently further developed, about abstract objects of the kind of fictional but also mathematical ones. The
theory is grounded, as we have only briefly sketched out, on the distinction between exemplifying and
encoding a property. This reflects also on a distinction between two fundamental kinds of predication, the
exemplifying and the encoding, and it is formally represented in the theory as the distinction between the
atomic formulas “Fx” (x exemplifies F) and “xF” (x encodes [determiniert] F). The formula “Fx” represents
the classical kind of predication and it is used, as we know, to logically analyze simple sentences such as
“Paul is hungry” or “Jack is a dog”. In essence, the idea behind this position, introduced by Meinong, who
regarded things such as the fountain of youth or the round square as genuine objects despite their non-
existence  or  lack  of  being  (See,  A.  Meinong, “Über  Gegenstandstheorie”,  in Gesamtausgabe  Voll  II,
Abhandlungen Zur Erkenntnistheorie Und Gegenstandtheorie.  Akademische Druck-  und Verlagsanstalt,
Graz, 1971, p. 486 – 88), was that we should  not  represent sentences about fictional objects of the kind
“Zeus lived on the Olympus” in terms of the notation “Fx”, for only real, concrete objects can exemplify
the properties of being living on the Olympus. Nevertheless, it can be reasoned in effect that there must be
some mode of predication, some sense of the words “is” and “has” according to which it is true to say
“Zeus lived on the Olympus”. Otherwise, we wouldn't understand Greek mythology properly if we didn't
imagine objects that, in some sense, were instances of the properties in question. An answer was proposed
indeed by Mally, and recently retaken  and even interpreted in a Platonic framework (See, for example,
C.C.  Meinwald,  “Good-bye  to  the Third  Man”,  in  ed  R.  Kraut,  The Cambridge  Companion  to  Plato,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, 1992, p. 378), who introduced the notion “x encodes
F” as a “mode of predication” that is more appropriate for a logical analysis of kind of sentences about
fictions or abstract objects. For example, whereas the real detective Pinkerton exemplifies detectivehood -
“Dp”, Sherlock Holmes encodes this property - “hD” (following S. Kripke work cited above). This idea can
be extended to other objects, to what can be indicated as abstract object, such as numbers, sets, etc. While
one can identify and individuate concrete objects in terms of their being located spatiotemporally, we face
the problem of identifying and individuating abstract objects in some other way, being abstract objects not
the kind of  thing that  could have a location in  space and time. The properties  that  an abstract  object
encodes, according to this position, are part of its intrinsic nature and even more essential to it than the
characteristic or properties that those objects as such necessarily exemplify.
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Surely, not only «from <the> phenomenological point of view», but even in the pre-
phenomenological, «mathematical objects are recognized to be of a different type from
physical objects»1. Husserl own analysis and illustrations are in fact mainly concerned
with the phenomenology of perceptual intuition of ordinary physical objects. Surely he
also partial developed what could be taken as an «account of mathematical intuition»,
even considered  the fact  that  other  authors  later  one have  retaken and carried even
farther in mathematics some aspects of Husserl theory, such as Becker, Weyl or even
Gödel2.  But what Husserl  tried to develop since the  Philosophie der Arithmetik and
explicitly  in  the  Sixth  of  the  Logische  Untersuchungen,  for  therefore  continuing  to
develop in a different methodological framework in works such as Erfahrung und Urteil
and  – especially for the logical-mathematical objects –  Formale und transzendentale
Logik, is a  broader account for the intuition of numbers and other abstract objects. In
this  sense, much of Husserl  efforts  will  concentrate on the problem of the evidence
[Evidenz] suitable for such kind of objects like the mathematical and the logical ones,
stating for example in the late '20s how: 
«The evidence of irreal objects, i.e., ideal objects in the broadest sense, is, in its
effect, quite analogous to the evidence of ordinary so-called internal and external
experience,  which alone – on no other grounds than prejudice – is  commonly
thought capable of effecting an original Objectivation. The identity and, therefore,
the  objectivity  of something ideal can be directly “seen” (and, if we wished to
give the word a  suitably amplified sense,  directly experienced)  with the same
originality as  the  identity of  an object  of  experience in  the usual  sense – for
example, an experienced object belonging to nature or an experienced immanent
object (any psychic datum)»3.
On the basis  of  repeated  experience  and the  possibility of  the  modification of  «the
momentary  perception»  and  «recollection»  with  their  synthesis  comes  about  the
consciousness of the Same as experience of the «sameness». It belongs, according to
Husserl, to the sense of every object, as its essential correlate, the possibility of such an
original identification, where the sense is determined to the effect that experience is an
1 R. Tieszen, Mathematical Intuition, Phenomenology and Mathematical Knowledge, cit., p. 66.
2 Ibid., p. 21.
3 E. Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik, in Husserliana, XVII, cit., p. 163 – 4. 
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«evident grasping [Erfassung] and having» of an individual datum itself, and now, «in
just  the  same  fashion,  we  say,  there  belongs  to  the  sense  of  an  irreal  object  the
possibility of its identification on the basis of its own manners of being itself grasped
and had». Actually the effect of this “identification” is, according to Husserl, very like
that of an “experience”, except that an irreal object «is not individuated in consequence
of a temporality belonging to it originally», which means in Husserl later terminology,
is the  individuation of the «ideal»1.
This interpretation is obviously embedded in an explicit intentional analysis and even
within a transcendental framework, which has for itself called attention considered the
need for clarification about the intuitionistic view regarding our access to the «mental
constructions  that  make up the subject  matter  of  mathematics»2.  But  even Husserl's
remarks on «acts of abstractions» and reflection, and in general the idea of hierarchies
of  acts  or  the  view on complex acts  prefigure such a  position.  This  later  explicitly
phenomenological position can recall the notion of «intentional object» and, in order to
carry  out  a  phenomenological  analysis  of  the  consciousness  linked  to  objects  of
1 Ibid., p. 164. Husserl's italics
2 Even  Gödel  has  argued  that  we  can  cultivate  the  intuition  or  “perception”  of  abstract  concepts  in
mathematics and logic. In 1944, by commenting Russel general position about logical proof, he comments
for example: «The analogy between mathematics and a natural science is enlarged  upon by Russell also in
another respect (in one of his earlier writings). He compares the axioms of logic and mathematics with the
laws of nature and logical  evidence with sense perception, so that  the axioms need not necessarily be
evident in themselves, but rather their justification lies (exactly as in physics) in the fact that they make it
possible for these "sense perceptions" to be deduced; which of course would not exclude that they also have
a kind of intrinsic plausibility similar to that in physics. I think that (provided "evidence" is understood in a
sufficiently strict sense) this view has been largely justified by subsequent developments, and it is to be
expected that it will be still more so in the future. It has turned out that (under the | assumption that modern
mathematics is consistent) the solution of certain arithmetical problems requires the use of assumptions
essentially transcending arithmetic, i.e., the domain of the kind of  elementary indisputable evidence that
may be most fittingly compared with sense perception», ed. S. Feferman, Kurt Gödel Collected Works, Voll.
II, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 1990), p. 121. Gödel, as recently pointed out (See, R.
Tieszen,  Phenomenology,  Logic,  and the Philosophy of  Mathematics,  cit.,  p.  149f.),  has  developed his
position with respect to the problem of intuition of abstract and ideal objects, and especially, the question
about «what kind of account could be given of the intuition of abstract concepts», especially with respect of
his aim to elucidate the meaning of mathematical concepts (ibid.).  And in this sense, around 1961, he
notoriously recalled Husserl's  phenomenology as  offering a  possible account  for  overcoming the view
which  confine  intuition  in  mathematics  and  logic  into  «reflection  on  the  combinatorial  properties  of
concrete symbols», while instead the «reflection» on meaning or intuition of concepts is a intuitive function
of higher level. Writes in fact Gödel with respect of Husserl's phenomenology that: «Here clarification of
meaning consists in concentrating more intensely on the concepts in question by directing our attention in a
certain way, namely, onto our own acts in the use of those concepts, onto our own powers in carrying out
those acts, etc. In so doing, one must keep clearly in mind that this phenomenology is not a science in the
same sense as the other sciences. Rather it is [or in any case should be] a procedure or technique that should
produce in us a new state of consciousness in which we describe in detail the basic concepts we use in our
thought, or grasp other, hitherto unknown, basic concepts», K. Gödel, “The Modern Development of the
Foundations of Mathematics in the Light of Philosophy”, in ed. S. Feferman, Kurt Gödel Collected Works,
Voll. III,Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 1995, p. 383). 
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knowledge we have to consider the acts in which objects are intended and the how of
this intention, without making any naïve metaphysical assumption about the objects. 
Still, at the time of the Philosophie der Arithmetik, much of this kind of address is not
yet present. What it is rather present, is the idea that by reflectively living through the
experiences  that  constitute  the  «psychological  origin  of  a  concept»,  in  this  case  of
number, we are led to the properties essential to any object falling or that falls under that
concept. Hence, those latter properties, i.e., the properties or characteristics of all the
objects originally belonging to a concept, make up the content of the concept, which at
this stage of Husserl's philosophy it is essentially the concept content as still no further
specified  object,  i.e.,  «what  the  concept  is»  originally  «of»  or  «about»,  as  recently
formulated1. In this sense, a concept is in Husserl's understanding a repeatable thought,
which on the one side, presents aspect of a universal of a certain type that also belongs
to some extent to a lived-experienced, but it is also, on the other side and in the same
extent, shareable. To comprehend and to analyze a concept is therefore not only the
concept analysis in the terms already seen, i.e., its “psychological origin” mandatory,
but as its necessary and connected counterpart,  to discern what is necessarily meant
when  it  is  deployed.  This  involves  the  intentionalities  involved  and  descriptively
revealing the origin of the concept brings eventually in an “experience” at  least  the
concept content before our eyes when it is possessed and deployed. 
At  the time of  the  Philosophie der Arithmetik anyway,  we find also other  positions
dealing  with  the  problem of  connecting  a  theory  of  abstraction  with  a  more  clear
statement and definition of the conceptual element resulting from it. Especially in the
field  of  logic  and mathematics  we find in  fact  two approaches  which  are  worth  of
attention. 
2.2.1 Frege, Cantor and Husserl On The Role Of Abstraction.
At the time of his  querelle with Frege, one of the most diffused theory of abstraction
was  certainly  what  it  has  been  called  “logical  abstraction”2. Logical  abstraction  is
essentially a procedure by which it is possible to single out what is in common among
1 D. Willard, “Translator's Introduction”, in E. Husserl,  Philosophy of Arithmetic, in E. Husserl, collected
Works, X (Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, 2003), p. XV.
2 G. E. Rosado Haddock, C. Ortiz Hill,  Husserl or Frege? Meaning, Objectivity and  Mathematics, (Open
Court, Chicago, 2000), p. 68.
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the members of a given set, and therefore, to isolate a property on the base of which an
identity is established among the objects belonging to the set possessing the property.
What characterizes logical abstraction is now, the fact that the common predicate related
to the property is interpreted as a common relation to the class of terms which are equal
under the property indicated by the predicate. This class replaces therefore the property,
while all the other properties which distinguish the objects from each other or from
other objects equal under the respect of the same property are now “abstracted”, i.e.,
deleted1. Logical abstraction does help in the cases where it is necessary to translate
expressions,  which  would  not  lend for  themselves  to  extensional  treatment,  into  an
extensional language. The use of predicates is in fact “translated” into the use of classes
as extensions, i.e., the class composed by the objects of which the predicate is true. The
other important aspect is the leaving out of unwanted properties in the definition of the
predicate and the class.
As we have already seen, part of Frege's project of founding arithmetic was grounded
on the establishment of a relation for define number as independent objects in identity
statements, where on both side of an identity, based on the one-to-one correspondence, a
number is to be found2. In order to do so, we already know, Frege recalls for defining
identity Leibniz's “substitutivity salva veritate” principle, i.e., that «things are the same
as each  other, of which one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth» 3. By
doing  so,  Frege  also  “freely  interpreted”  Leibniz's  relation  between  identity  and
equality, as seen. 
Now, Frege comes to use in a certain extent a form of logical abstraction in order to
accomplished his aim, in other words, for transforming statements in which objects are
posed  as  equivalent  with  respect  of  a  property  predicated  of  them  into  equality
statements  of  objects  formed out  of  those  properties.  In  this  manner,  he  thought  to
accomplishing the task of translating statements about objects equal under a specific
property  into  statements  expressing  identity.  This  leaded,  as  recognized  by  Frege
himself,  also to nonsensical statements4.  Erasing the difference between identity and
1 Quine defines it in such terms: «given a condition '---' upon x, we form the class x--- whose members are
just those objects x which satisfy the condition. The operator ' ̂x' may be read “the class of all objects x such that”. The class  ̂x---  is definable, by description, as the class y to which any object x will belong if and only if--- Wx' may be read “the class of all objects x such
that”. The class  x---  is definable, by description, as the class y to which any object  x will belong if and
only if--- ». W. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1961),
p. 87. 
2 G. Frege, Grundlagen der Arithmetik, cit., p. 73.
3 Ibid., p. 76.
4 Ibid., p. 77 – 8.
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equality means in fact to affirm that “being the same in any one way” is equivalent to
being the “same in all ways”. 
«All identities would then amount simply to this, that whatever is given to us in
the same  way is to be reckoned as the same. This is, however, a principle so
obvious and sterile as not to be worth stating. We could not, in fact, draw from it
any conclusion which was not the same as one of our premisses. The multiple and
significant applicability of identities lays instead much more on the fact that we
are able to recognize something as the same again even although it is given in a
different way»1. 
It is also been recently stressed and investigated, how Cantor's definition of cardinal
number  was  close  to  Husserl's  account  of  number,  where  both  see  a  process  of
abstraction involved in the “arising” of the concept of number2. In fact, Cantor saw not
only  the  possibility  for  the  «ordinary  finite  whole  numbers»  to  be  «produced  by
abstraction from the reality», but also «for his transfinite numbers», and both «both with
the same necessity», even being the first class of numbers the possible basis for «all
other mathematical concept-formations»3. 
In his 1884  Principien indeed, Cantor briefly exposes the two aspects of abstraction
which have been indicated as the «double» abstracting process4:
«The power of a set M is hereupon defined as the presentation of what is common
to all of the sets M of equivalent sets and only those and hence also of the set M
itself;  it  is the  representatio generalis...  for all  sets  of the same class as M.  It
therefore  seems  to  me  to  be  the  most  primitive,  pyschologically,  as  well  as
methodologically  simplest  root  concept,  arisen  through  abstraction,  from  all
particular characteristics which a set of a  specific class may display, both with
respect to the  nature of its  elements, as well as with regard to the  relations and
order in which the elements are to each other or can stand to things lying outside
1 Ibid., p. 79.
2 See, especially for this chapter, C. Ortiz Hill, “Abstraction and Idealization in Georg Cantor and Edmund
Husserl Prior to 1895”, in G. E. Rosado Haddock, C. Ortiz Hill, Husserl or Frege? Meaning, Objectivity
and Mathematics, cit., p. 109f; K. Fine, “Cantorian abstraction: a reconstruction and defence”, in Journal
of  Philosophy, 95, 1998, p. 599f. 
3 G. Cantor, Briefe, ed. H. Meschkowski, W. Nilson, (Springer, New York, 1991), p. 135 – 6.
4 K. Fine, “Cantorian abstraction: a reconstruction and defence”, cit., p. 602. 
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the  set.  The  concept  of  power originates  in  reflecting  only  upon  what  is  in
common to all of one and the same class of member sets»1. 
An a year later, in his  Beiträge zur Begründung der transfiniten Mengenlehre,  Cantor
comes  to  define  more  closely  the  meaning  of  the  “power”  of  a  set,  which  is  its
cardinality, and the function or “result” of the “double abstraction”: 
 
«We will call by the name “power” or “cardinal number” of M the general concept
which, by means of our active faculty of thought, arises from the aggregate M
when we make abstraction of the nature of its various elements m and of the order
in which they are given.
We denote the result  of  this  double act  of abstraction,  the cardinal  number or
power of M, by
Since every single element m, if we abstract from its nature, becomes a “unit”, the
cardinal number
is a definite aggregate composed of units, and this number has existence in our
mind as an intellectual image or projection of the given aggregate M»2.
One  main  difference  with  respect  to  Husserl's  account,  we  can  already  see,  is  the
Cantorian abstraction from the order of the element of a set, while Husserl, as stressed
by Fine,  «would  start off with an unordered set M»; the common element would be
instead, generally considered, the process «of freeing an object of its peculiar features»
assigned by both to abstraction3.
Even is his famous 1887 Mitteilungen zur Lehre vom Transfiniten Cantor's efforts are
also directed to show how the concept of «actual infinite number» is formed due to
«natural abstraction» in the same manner of the finite number from finite sets. Here we
1 G. Cantor, “Principien einer Theorie der Ordnungstypen”, in Acta Mathematica, 124, 1970, p. 86. Quoted
according to C. Ortiz Hill, “Abstraction and Idealization in Georg Cantor and Edmund Husserl Prior to
1895”, cit. 
2 G. Cantor,  Contributions to The Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers,  ed.  P. E. B. Jourdain
(Dover  Publications,  New  York,  1955),  p.  86.  English  translation  of  the  1895  article  edition  in  the
Mathematische Annalen, n. 46, pp. 481 – 512.  
3 K. Fine, “Cantorian abstraction: a reconstruction and defence”, cit., 600 – 2.
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find in fact a summary of the «forms of comprehension of the totality of numbers and
types of order as Universalien [Universalien], which refer to sets and are formed from
them when it is abstracted from the properties of the elements». In such an abstraction,
every set of «completely different thing can be seen as a unitary thing for itself», where
every element become therefore «constituting elements» of this set1. 
Even considered Cantor's recalling of a “natural abstraction”, his idea of abstraction and
the  process  leading  from sets  to  their  “power”  must  be  considered  rationalist.  The
proper cifra of this rationalism is to be found in the idea of Unit which is, from the time
of his Mannigfaltigkeitslehre till the Beiträge, the “Ones” [Einsen] comprehended in the
set, and have its existence «in our mind». By arising from «the nature» of all possible m
composing the set,  can be linked to the  «propertyless thing» [eigenschaftslos Ding],
which is «at first nothing other than a name or a sign A», and to which «infinitely many
distinct  predicates»  are  given  «whose  meaning  is  generally  known through  already
existing ideas and which may not contradict each other»2. 
We find here therefore, the idea of an abstraction operated on set and not directly on the
sensuous, by recognizing the “unit” as not perceptual content but as a «form» of object-
thinking3. «The concept of cardinal number» obtains in fact only a «immediate objective
[gegenständlich] representation» in what Cantor defines, in the Mannigfaltigkeitslehre,
«our internal intuition»4.
Cantor  conceived  therefore  abstraction  as  linking  to  an  «abstract  realm  of  ideal
mathematical  objects  which  could  not  be  directly  perceived  or  intuited»,  and
consequently, to his conception of numbers as  arithmoi eidetikoi  and sets as Platonic
eidos. But the basis of his theory is anyway to be interpreted, as he affirms too, within a
realist  framework5,  while  the  platonic  element  is  to  be  found  in  the  “awaking”  of
1 G. Cantor,  “Mitteilungen zur Lehre vom Transfiniten”, in Gesammelte Abhandlungen mathematischen und
philosophischen Inhalts.  Mit  erläuternden Anmerkungen sowie mit  Ergänzungen aus dem Briefwechsel
Cantor-Dedekind,  ed.  E.  Zermelo  (Springer,  Berlin,  Heidelberg,  1932)  p.  379.  Husserl  even  explicitly
approved in the  Philosophie der  Arithmetik Cantor's  definition of  number in  the  Mitteilungen,  Cfr.  E.
Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 115, note 2. 
2 G.  Cantor,  “Grundlagen  einer  allgemeinen  Mannigfaltigkeitslehre.  Ein  mathematisch-philosophischer
Versuch  in  der  Lehre  des  Unendlichen”,  in  Gesammelte  Abhandlungen  mathematischen  und
philosophischen Inhalts.  Mit  erläuternden Anmerkungen sowie mit  Ergänzungen aus dem Briefwechsel
Cantor-Dedekind, cit., p. 207.  
3 G. Cantor, Briefe, cit., p. 365.
4 G.  Cantor,  “Grundlagen  einer  allgemeinen  Mannigfaltigkeitslehre.  Ein  mathematisch-philosophischer
Versuch  in  der  Lehre  des  Unendlichen”,  in  Gesammelte  Abhandlungen  mathematischen  und
philosophischen Inhalts.  Mit  erläuternden Anmerkungen sowie mit  Ergänzungen aus dem Briefwechsel
Cantor-Dedekind, cit., p. 168.
5 Ibid., p. 204. Cfr. “Principien einer Theorie der Ordnungstypen”, cit., p. 84.  
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“concepts” and “ideas” interpreted as fundamental element of all knowledge: 
«only  be  obtained  through  concepts  and  ideas  which,  at  most  stimulated  by
external  experience,  are  on  the  whole  formed  through  inner  induction  and
deduction  as  something  which  in  a  way already lay  within  us  and  was  only
awakened and brought to consciousness»1.
Cantor  did  not  make  a  secret  of  his  idea  to  unite  a  metaphysical  interpretation  of
mathematical objects with its epistemological framework in order to base his insight on
numbers  with  philosophical  foundation2.  And  now,  is  also  not  a  secret  that  his
“awaking” process and the view on that «ideal realm» represented by the transfinite
numbers as arithmoi eidetikoi, are nothing but a interpretation of Plato's theories in the
Phaedo and  Philebus,  as  has  already  been  said  -  but  even  remembered  by Cantor
himself3:
«Under a “manifold” or “set” I understand in general every multiplicity indeed,
which  is  conceivable  as  One,  which  means,  every  collection  of  determinate
element,  which can be connected by law to a whole.  And I think with that to
define something closely related with the Platonic εἶδος or ἰδέα, and also with
what Plato calls in his dialog Philebos or the higher Good, μιϰτόν»4. 
In  this  sense  is  also  to  understand  his  attempt  to  harmonize  mathematics  and
metaphysics  in  his  «Platonic  thought»,  by  curiously  understanding  the  relationship
between both with a considerable insight on the founding relations among them:
«He [Cantor] has always interpreted the results of his investigations not only as
1 G.  Cantor,  “Grundlagen  einer  allgemeinen  Mannigfaltigkeitslehre.  Ein  mathematisch-philosophischer
Versuch  in  der  Lehre  des  Unendlichen”,  in  Gesammelte  Abhandlungen  mathematischen  und
philosophischen Inhalts.  Mit  erläuternden Anmerkungen sowie mit  Ergänzungen aus dem Briefwechsel
Cantor-Dedekind, cit., p. 207.
2 Cfr., Ibid., p. 100.
3 C. Ortiz Hill, “Abstraction and Idealization in Georg Cantor and Edmund Husserl Prior to 1895”, cit., p.
117f. Cfr. Phaedo, 75E – 76A.
4 G.  Cantor,  “Grundlagen  einer  allgemeinen  Mannigfaltigkeitslehre.  Ein  mathematisch-philosophischer
Versuch  in  der  Lehre  des  Unendlichen”,  in  Gesammelte  Abhandlungen  mathematischen  und
philosophischen Inhalts.  Mit  erläuternden Anmerkungen sowie mit  Ergänzungen aus dem Briefwechsel
Cantor-Dedekind, cit., p. 204.
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contributions  for  a  “science  of  the  formal  systems”;  he  was also  in  search  of
bigger  connections.  […]  He  considered  mathematics  as  a  primary  stage  for
metaphysics, and the progress in the realm of the set theory were for him also and
at the same time, important steps in the understanding of God and World»1.
Cantor notoriously recalls for his interpretation of Plato the exposition offered by the
professor for history of philosophy Eduard Zeller in his monumental  Die Philosophie
der Griechen2. His referring to Plato seems to serve the purpose of guarantee for the
ontological status of mathematical  objects.  In particular,  their  condition of existence
bounded to their non-contradiction, their free development and «ordered relationship»
ruled and started by «previously formed and already existing concepts»3. 
Whole numbers have, exactly as all other ideas, a form of immanent reality by their
position in our understand and their “definite” relation to all other components of our
understanding; an immanence which does not prevent anyway, to recognize a position
also  in  the  external  world  to  the  mathematical  objects:  they  are  in  fact,  as  such,
«representatives  of  powers  which  are  actually  present  in  corporeal  and  intellectual
nature»4. Then, not only Cantor stresses a parallelism between the two kind of reality
assigned to concepts, but he also tried to established a “Plato-inspired” interpretation of,
on the one side, the truthfulness and Being of the «object of knowledge» which are
concepts and ideas; on the other, the connection between the knowable nature of such
objects  and  their  Being5.  Mathematical  knowledge  can  anyway  concentrate  on  the
immanent nature of its objects and guarantee for their existence, as seen, by defining
their non-contradiction, definiteness and reciprocal relations.
2.2.2 Cantor's Definition of Number
Cantor defines each number as, by essence, a simple concept, in which a manifold of
Unities are combined into a whole and in which the relations among the Unities are
1 H. Meschkowski, Probleme des Unendlichen (Springer Fachmedien Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1967), p. III.
2 Cfr. G. Cantor, “Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre. Ein mathematisch-philosophischer
Versuch  in  der  Lehre  des  Unendlichen”,  in  Gesammelte  Abhandlungen  mathematischen  und
philosophischen Inhalts.  Mit  erläuternden Anmerkungen sowie mit  Ergänzungen aus dem Briefwechsel
Cantor-Dedekind, cit., p. 206.
3 Ibid., p. 182.
4 Ibid., p. 181.
5 «What  is  knowable,  is;  what  is  not  knowable,  is  not,  and  to  the  same extent  something is,  it  is  also
knowable», in ibid., p. 206.
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defined. In the Mitteilungen Cantor clarifies briefly that:
«every finite (and exactly in the same way, every transfinite) cardinal number has
for itself a totally independent ideal existence and position with respect to all other
cardinal numbers. For the formation of the universal concept “five” only one set is
needed […] and to this set corresponds the cardinal number; the abstraction act
directed  to  the  characteristic  and  the  order,  in  which  I  encounter  this  totally
different things, causes – or better – awakes in my spirit the concept “five”. The
five is therefore independent in and for itself from the “four” or “three” and from
every  other  number  whatsoever.  Every  number  is,  according  to  its  essence
[Wesen], a simple concept, in which a manifold of Ones is organically-uniformly
comprehended together in a  special manner, so that this way the different Ones
and the numbers  which  proceed from their  partial  comprehension as  well,  are
virtual composing parts»1.
Here we find Cantor substantially dealing with the problem of the One-Multiplicity, or
one over against the many. He stars stating: 5 = 2+3
This equality should not be interpreted, according to Cantor, as if the concept 5 does
really  comprehend the concept  2 and 3 as parts.  Certainly yet,  1,  2,  3,  4  are  to be
indicated as virtual composing parts of 5, which means only that, in every concrete sets
of the cardinal number 5 are to be found partial sets, to which correspond 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Every  equality  represents  therefore  a  determinate  ideal  relationship  of  the  three
independent  cardinal  number  2,  3  and 5,  and,  as  correlate,  to  every concrete  set  5,
correspond two partial set that can be really composed (2 and 3). Analogously, other
equalities base on cardinal numbers, represent «fixed ideal relations and laws among
number  concepts  which  have  their  correlate,  accordingly  to  our  human  form  of
knowledge, their fundament, in certain relations of concrete sets»2. Among the lawful
relations which connects and “organizes” the realm of finite cardinal number in an ideal
and organic whole, is the determining definition, according to which, given 2 cardinal
numbers a and b, one is bigger than the other, and therefore, with a third c, is verified
1 G. Cantor,  “Mitteilungen zur Lehre vom Transfiniten”, in Gesammelte Abhandlungen mathematischen und
philosophischen Inhalts.  Mit  erläuternden Anmerkungen sowie mit  Ergänzungen aus dem Briefwechsel
Cantor-Dedekind., p. 418.
2 Ibid., p. 419.
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that:
a < b, b < c => a < c.   
The totality of all finite cardinals constitute, with such order, a «simply ordinate set».
«Hence, we have here,  according to the rank, a lowest element, the the smallest
cardinal number 1 and, with respect to every finite cardinal number ν, according
to  the  rank,  i.e.,  here  according  to  dimension,  the  subsequent  finite  cardinal
number  ν + 1. Therefore, we obtain the totality of all finite cardinal numbers in
what is called natural infinite series:1, 2, 3, ...ν ,..., in such a series they represent
a completely ordinate set of the order-type ω»1.
This  infinite  totality of  finite  numbers,  as  taken as  a  thing for  itself,  is  an actually
infinite  set,  or  what  Cantor  calls  a  Transfinitum.  To conduct  the  theory of  cardinal
number in the realm of the transfinite, and there «to bring it to rigorous formation», we
are  instructed  to  the  «introduction  of  the  transfinite  ordinal  numbers,  which  are
themselves  only  the  special  forms  of  the  order-types  or  ideal  number  (arithmoi
eidetikoi)»2. The transfinite ordinal number are in fact nothing more than types of the
infinite and ordinate sets which are the completely ordered ones. 
We understand here,  even if  we are not  able  to  enter  in  the  complex mathematical
questions  involved,  how for  Cantor  «the  whole  real  numbers  are  related  to  Plato's
arithmoi  eidetikoi with  which  they  probably  even  fully  coincide»  and  how  the
transfinite  ones  are  only  special  forms  of  the  same3.  With  that  he  calls  Plato's
interpretation, which he borrowed from Zeller, of ideas as numbers, an interpretation
which  distinguishes  between  the  “empirical”  and  the  pure  and “ideal”  treatment  of
numbers. This latter, the arithmoi eideitikoi, are detached from the sensuous things and
stay in a ordered relationship among them, i.e., the before-after relationship. But in the
same interpretation we also find the Platonic principle according to which, in what is
real [das Wirkliche], the One and the multiplicity must be organically combined, i.e.,
«the principle on which every theory of number is based»4. Mathematics  first deals not
with the ideal numbers, but rather with the “mathematical” ones, which do not coincide
1 Ibidem.
2 Ibid., p. 420.
3 G. Cantor, “Principien einer Theorie der Ordnungstypen”, cit., p. 84.
4 E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, Zweiter Teil, Erste Abtheilung, 3rd (Fues's Verlag, Leipzig, 1875),
p. 574.
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with ideas and lay «between» them and the sensuous things. Zeller explains in fact how
in the Philebus Plato does actually 
«clarify  the  Pythagorean  theory  of  the  complete  connection  of  unity  and
multiplicity, of the limits and the infinity, as a pillar of dialectic. He clarifies also
the same definitions on the concepts which the Pythagorean demonstrated by the
numbers. Therefore, Plato does recognize by numbers and mathematical relations
the connecting elements between Idea and appearance,  numbers present us the
Ideas as the measure of the corporeal and spatial; primarily they unify themselves
hereby, into the schema of ideas (…)»1.
Now, for Cantor, «if the abstracting act» is bestowed on a given set which is ordered by
one or more relations (dimensions), «but only with respect of the characteristics of the
elements», such that the order is maintained also in the universal concept, a «primarily-
arising, unitary and organic formation» is obtained. By that we have, in other words,
«such an  universale» called by Cantor ideal number or order-type, and in the special
case of the ordered set, ordinal number2. If it abstracted from the «characteristics of the
elements» - we already know, in a set composed by elements whatever and seen as a
«unitary thing for itself» - «as well from the order of their [of such elements] being-
given, we obtain the cardinal number or power of the set», which is a universal concept
within which the elements as Ones are bond together as a «unitary whole» without any
rank-order3. To two sets correspond the same cardinal number when they are equivalent,
while to two ordered sets does correspond now one and the same order-type when they
are in a relationship of conformity.
Those are the «roots» from which Cantor developed then his transfinite theory of types,
because if «by finite sets the two moments, “power” and “ordinal number”, to a certain
extent coincide», for a finite set by every elements order as a “completely-ordered set”
posses the one and the same ordinal number, «by the infinite sets the difference between
“power” and “ordinal numbers” does evidently appear»4. Cardinal as well as the order-
1 Ibid., p. 568.
2 G. Cantor,  “Mitteilungen zur Lehre vom Transfiniten”, in Gesammelte Abhandlungen mathematischen und
philosophischen Inhalts.  Mit  erläuternden Anmerkungen sowie mit  Ergänzungen aus dem Briefwechsel
Cantor-Dedekind., p. 379.
3 Ibidem. Cantor's italics.
4 G.  Cantor,  “Die  Grundlagen  der  Arithmetik”,  in   Gesammelte  Abhandlungen  mathematischen  und
philosophischen Inhalts.  Mit  erläuternden Anmerkungen sowie mit  Ergänzungen aus dem Briefwechsel
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types are «simple concepts-formations», where hereafter, «every of them is a true unity
(μονάς), because in them a multiplicity and manifold of Ones are connected in a unitary
way». The elements of the set M in front of us are to be «separately presented», in the
«intellectual image» that is the order-type, the Ones are unified into an  Organismus,
which is a composite of matter and form: the conceptually distinguished Ones are the
matter, while to those correspond, where they are to be found under a order, the form1. 
Both concept of number are essential in order to understand his manifold theory and
even the true nature of them which appears in its full range when the two analysis are
confronted. Writes in fact Cantor in his Abhandlungen zur Mengenlehre:
«If I interpret the infinite this way, […] then it follows a great pleasure for me to
see, how the entire number concept, which by the finite only has the backdrop of
the ordinal number, when we proceed up to the infinite it splits into two concepts:
the one power, which is independent from the order possessed by a set, and in the
ordinal number, which is necessarily connected with an law-ruled order of the set,
by means of which this latter became a  completely-ordered set. And when I go
back down from the infinite to the finite I also see clearly and beautifully, how the
two concepts became Ones again and how they flow together into the concept of
whole finite number»2.
In the Philebus  we find in the same manner, Socrates' solution to the problem of the
relationship  between  the  unitary  concept  and  the  multiplicity  of  appearance  by the
Platonic principle of the unifying real and the being One of the many, where this holds
even for concepts3.
Without the need to go deeper in Cantor's account of number and especially his major
achievement,  i.e.,  the basis  of the set-theory,  we can briefly say and stress  that  the
similarity in Husserl's and Cantor's account of the first fundamental steps necessary in
order to gain clarity on the very basic phenomena called in question on the “lower” or
Cantor-Dedekind, cit., p. 440.
1 G. Cantor,  “Mitteilungen zur Lehre vom Transfiniten”, in Gesammelte Abhandlungen mathematischen und
philosophischen Inhalts.  Mit  erläuternden Anmerkungen sowie mit  Ergänzungen aus dem Briefwechsel
Cantor-Dedekind., p. 380.
2 G.  Cantor,  “Abhandlungen  zur  Mengenlehre”,  in  Gesammelte  Abhandlungen  mathematischen  und
philosophischen Inhalts.  Mit  erläuternden Anmerkungen sowie mit  Ergänzungen aus dem Briefwechsel
Cantor-Dedekind, cit., p. 181.
3 E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, cit., p. 565.
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“fundamental” analysis of the mathematical concepts, have been noticed and even with
respect of the topic here in question, already at the time of the encounter of the two men
in Halle1. It was in fact Frege that, in his famous but even too critical reviews of both,
Cantor's “Mitteilungen”2 and Husserl's “Philosophie der Arithmetik”, charged both men
with attempting to achieve magical effects by using abstraction to destroy and detaching
the properties things have in order to obtain the “something” whatsoever that represents
the One collected in a multiplicity or in a set. 
Frege writes in fact in his hilarious review of Cantor's  Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur
Lehre vom Transfiniten, but which also recalls some of the aspects Husserl claimed for
his basic formal function:
«If, for instance, you find that some property of a thing bothers you, you abstract
from it.  But  if  you  want  to  call  a  halt  to  this  process  of  destruction  so  that
properties you want to see retained should not be obliterated in the process, you
reflect  upon  these  properties.  If,  finally,  you  feel  sorely  the  lack  of  certain
properties in the thing, you bestow them on it by definition. (…) The significance
this would have is practically beyond measure»3.
And more specifically with respect of the process involved in the formation of number,
he writes in the same review:
«Faced with a cage of mice, mathematicians react differently when the number
[Anzahl] of them is in question. Some (…) include in the number the mice just as
they are, down to the last hair; others – and I may surely count Cantor among
them – find it  out  of place that  hairs  should form part  of the number and so
abstract from them. They find in mice a whole host of other things besides which
are out of place in number and are unworthy to be included in it. (…) 
Cantor  demand  even  more:  to  arrive  at  cardinal  numbers,  we  are  required  to
1 Cantor was in fact in Husserl's Habilitation commettee and a friendship relation developed after this first
encounter. Cfr. ed. H. Garlach, H.R. Sepp, Husserl in Halle, (Peter Lang, Bern, 1994) p. 146f. 
2 For what concern Frege's review of Cantor's work, see G. Frege “Review of Georg Cantor, Zur Lehre vom
Transfmiten. Gesammelte Abhandlungen aus der Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik”, in
Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, ed B. Mc Guinnes (Basil Blackwell, Oxford,
1984), p. 178f. 
3 G. Frege, “Draft towards a Review of Cantor's Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur Lehre vom Transfiniten”, in
Posthumous Writings, ed H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, F. Kaulbach (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1979), p. 69.
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abstract from the order in which they are given. What is to be understood by this?
Well, if at a certain moment we compare the positions of the mice, we see that of
any two one is  further  to  the  north  than  the  other,  or  that  both  are  the  same
distance to the north. (…) But this is not all: if we compare the mice in respect of
their ages, we find likewise that of any two one is older that the other or that both
have the same age. (…) All this relations generate an order. (…) So we are meant
to abstract from this order too»1.
Hence,  abstraction,  according  to  Frege,  would  endow  mathematicians  with  the
miraculous  and  even  supernatural  ability  to  change  things  in  “the  wash-tub  of  the
mind”. This ability assigned by Cantor, but much more by Husserl, to consciousness, is
what demonstrate for Frege the psychologistic approach to mathematical problems. It
was  in  fact  the   «psychological  and  hence  empirical  turn»  he  believed  Cantor  and
Husserl had given the matter that particularly irked him, a turn derived, in the case of
Husserl,  from Brentano's  approach to science and,  for Cantor,  from his necessity to
harmonize  his  metaphysical  perspective  with  the  straight  logical-mathematical2.
Summarizes in fact Frege in his Rezension von E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik:
«The most naive view is the one on which a number is something like a heap or
swarm in which things are contained with all their peculiarities. Then comes the
conception of a number as a property of a heap, aggregate, or whatever else it may
be called.  Here one feels  the need to cleanse things  of their  peculiarities.  The
present attempt belongs to those that carry out the cleansing operation in the wash-
tub of the mind. The advantage this offers is that the things in it assume a quite
peculiar pliancy; they no longer knock so hard against each other in space and
shed  many  of  their  bothersome  peculiarities  and  differences.  The  mixture  of
psychology and logic, which is so popular nowadays, yields a strong lye for this
purpose»3.
1 Ibid., p. 70.
2 G.  Frege  “Review of  Georg  Cantor,  Zur  Lehre  vom Transfmiten.  Gesammelte  Abhandlungen aus  der
Zeitschrift  für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik”, in  Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and
Philosophy, cit., p. 181.
3 G.  Frege,  “Rezension von E.  Husserl,  Philosophie der  Arithmetik”,  in  Zeitschrift  für  Philosophie  und
philosophische Kritik, p. 316.
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But now, Frege himself held, as we have briefly seen above, that the «properties which
serve to distinguish things from one another are, when we are considering their Number,
immaterial and beside the point»; therefore, something  «we want to keep them out of
it»1.  According  to  his  position,  one  is  following  “pure  logic”  by  disregarding  the
particular characteristics of objects, and he believed that the propositions of this same
pure logic could not reach consciousness in a “human mind” without any activity of the
senses,  since «without  sensory experience no mental  development  is  possible in the
beings  known to us».  Those are  words  from the  Begriffsschrift,  the work where he
mostly  tried  to  demarcate  the  distinctions  among  the  different  kind  of  scientific
propositions and their origin by trying «to prevent anything intuitive [Anschauliches]
from penetrating here unnoticed». He writes yet anyway:
«The most reliable way of carrying out a proof, obviously, is to follow pure logic,
a way that, disregarding the particular characteristics of objects, depends solely on
those laws upon which all knowledge rests. Accordingly, we divide all truths that
require justification into two kinds, those for which the proof can be carried out
purely by means of logic and those for which it must be supported by facts of
experience. But, the fact that a proposition is of the first kind is surely compatible
with the fact that it could nevertheless not have come to consciousness in a human
mind without any activity of the senses. Hence it is not the psychological genesis
but the best method of proof that is at the basis of the classification»2.
Frege's aim in his criticizing Cantor's and Husserl's recall for an abstraction process was
surely stressing the unclear nature of its function, which is, at least  taking Husserl's
account, justified even if not completely to the point. What animated Husserl and Cantor
as well in approaching mathematical and even logical problems starting with a sort of
abstraction-process supposed as its very basis, was certainly the need of guarantee for a
sort  of “intuitive” referring of such higher-level  functions of  consciousness;  but  the
search for a kind of intuition is surely not to be understand in the sense of the mere
sense  intuition.  «With  respect  to  the  starting  point  and  the  germinal  core  of  our
1 G. Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, cit., p. 45.
2 G. Frege, “Begriffsschrift, a Formula Language, Modeled upon that of Arithmetic, For Pure Thought”, in ed
P.  Geach,  M. Black,  Translations from the  Philosophical  Writings of  Gottlob Frege,  (Basil  Blackwell,
Oxford, 1960), p. 1.
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developments  toward  the  construction  of  a  general  arithmetic»,  writes  for  example
Husserl in 1890, «we are in agreement with mathematicians that are among the most
important and progressive ones of our times: above all with Weierstass, but not less with
Dedekind, Georg Cantor and many others»1. The “untold” part of this general affinity of
intent, refers basically to the already more developed need for metaphysical framework
in Cantor's approach, which is somehow alien to the Husserl of the On the Concept of
Number and The Philosophy of Arithmetic. If the Aristotelian assumption of abstraction
was in  fact  curiously directed to  a  more  Platonic statement  regarding the nature of
mathematical concepts in Cantor, as we have seen, Husserl was prevented by such a
direct statement by the Brentanian warn against the «traits of Platonism» belonging, «in
addition to [his] brand of formalism», to Cantor's approach2. 
2.2.3 The Search of The Ontological Status of Mathematical Objects in The Philosophy
of Arithmetic.  
Husserl is in fact still “on the way” for the «wholly unique kind of “platonism” about
mathematics»  which,  explicitly  developed starting  from around 1907,  represents,  as
recently formulated, «a Platonism embedded within transcendental idealism»3. In this
latter interpretation, we look in fact to the transcendental ego as the source of Platonism
about logic and mathematics.  Even in this  later development and even if  differently
interpreted,  still  logic  and  mathematics  are  built  up  non-arbitrarily  through  acts  of
abstraction, idealization, reflection, and so on. Those can be seen as the characteristics
which  Husserl  maintains  after  the  Philosophie  der  Arithmetik up  to  Formale  und
transzendentale Logik, but where now transcendental constitution play a pivotal role in
the sense constitution.  
What is to be stressed is in fact rather that, if some aspects of a “platonic” or “idealistic”
approach to mathematics, such as the one developed by Cantor and others, can have find
some reverberation in Husserl works also, some others prevent to assign to the objects
of mathematics as assumed in the Philosophie der Arithmetik such a clear and definite
1 E. Husserl. “Begriff der allgemeinen Arithmetik”, in Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana XII, cit., p. 
374.
2 I.  Grattan  –  Guinnes,  The  Search  for  Mathematical  Roots  1870 –  1940,  (Princeton  University  Press,
Princeton and Oxford, 2000), p. 119.
3 R. Tieszen, “Mathematical Realism and Transcendental Phenomenological Idealism”, in Phenomenology
and Mathematics, cit., p. 14.
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status.  Surely  in  this  sense  should  be  considered  the  not  always  clear  distinction
between the characteristics and properties of numbers and the ones belonging to the
presentations of the same, or the distinction not always clear or, even more radically
interpreted,  the  completely  absent  explicit  distinction  between  the  numbers  as,
supposedly, “ideal objects” from the “real” mental acts within which they are accessible.
Even the articulated process in which «we come to know about them», and that we have
already extensively exposed, somehow prevent to consider ideal objects already part of
his ontology1.
That we have to focus on the mathematical objects is to be justified not only because, as
already seen above, logic does actually develop largely after and starting from the works
on arithmetic,  but  also because Husserl's  constant  view on the relationship between
mathematics  and  logic,  even  among  the  methodological  changes  in  his  philosophy,
constantly tended to interpret both as «intimately related»2; therefore to shed light on the
one means to bring clarity also on part of the second realm. In fact, differently from, for
example Frege, mathematics is not an extension of logic but much more its ontological
correlate;  both  are  “analytical”  in  Husserl  sense  of  the  words3,  with  the  following
exclusion of geometry as synthetic a priori.  
«The idea of a formal ontology as an a priori discipline that investigates all truths
belonging  to  the  essence  of  objectivity  in  general  in  formal  universality  is,
however, more far-reaching, at any rate very much more far-reaching than might
be expected from the propositions of the area accorded priority in our examples,
therefore, more far-reaching than the sphere of traditional formal logic. Rather,
this most universal theory of objects of all,  this formal ontology, embraces the
whole of formal mathematics. To be noted in this regard, is that this term formal
mathematics  excludes  geometry.  It  embraces  the  pure  theory  of  cardinal  and
ordinal  numbers,  theory  of  combinations  and  all  disciplines  of  what  is  called
analysis,  number  theory,  function  theory,  algebra,  the  differential  and  integral
calculus, <the> theories of Euclidean and non-Euclidean manifolds and any theory
1 Ed. Dov M. Gabbay, J. Woods,  Handbook of The History of Logic, Voll. 3, The Rise of Modern Logic:
From Leibniz  to  Frege,  (Elsevier,  Amsterdam, Boston,  Heidelberg,  London,  New York,  Oxford,  Paris,
2004),  p. 209.
2 G. E. Rosado Haddock, “To be a Fregean or to be a Husserlian: that is the Question for Platonists”, in
Husserl or Frege? Meaning, Objectivity and Mathematics, cit., p. 202.  
3 To define a statement or a complex of statements as analytic, it must maintain its mandatory true-value also
after complete formalization. 
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of manifolds in general: the whole of “arithmetized” mathematics (…)»1.
We  have  seen  above  how  Husserl  describes  the  process  leading  to  the  concept  of
multiplicity arising, problematically as seen, through first abstraction and then reflection
on the collection of contents of a concrete whole, and where therefore a “psychical act
of  second  order”  gives  the  awareness  of  the  multiplicity.  Husserl's  account,  by
concentrating yet in fact on the proper presentation of numbers as still different from the
merely symbolic, applies well to small finite cardinals. We have already seen that no
concept can be thought without being founded on a concrete intuition, and in fact the
more general concept of multiplicity depends on the intuitive presentation of concrete
multiplicity from which it is abstracted. Abstraction comes therefore in question by the
abstraction,  i.e.,  the “not paying attention on” the peculiar nature of the multiplicity
contents and by retaining instead their collective connection. Multiplicity, as general and
formal  concept,  is  therefore  define  by  “something  and  something...”,  or,  which  is
basically equivalent, “one and one and one...”. This general concept presents therefore
the  peculiar  indeterminateness  represented  by  the  “content  whatever”  and  by  the
possible “und so weiter” of the process. It is when this indeterminateness is  removed
that  the  concept  of  multiplicity  breaks  up  into  a  variety  of  “distinct”  concepts  of
numbers. An original presentation of a concept such as “one and one”, or “one and one
and one” arises which are named, respectively, “two”, “three” etc. 
Number  concepts  can  however  arise  also  not  directly  from the  general  concept  of
multiplicity, but for the small cardinal, also directly from the concrete multiplicity. The
concept of multiplicity and of number have therefore the same essential content, but in
the case of the number concept a distinction of the abstract forms of multiplicity from
one another is eventually involved, which “refines” the number concept in respect to
multiplicity. The concept of number takes shape out of comparison of distinct forms of
multiplicities.        
This remarks and the expositions of the formal abstraction and reflection leads to the
question if the fact that the collective connection is mental does imply that multiplicity
or  numbers  are  also  therefore  mental  entities.  Somehow,  much  of  Frege's  raised
questions about Husserl's work in the Philosophie der Arithmetik were exactly directed
1  E. Husserl, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungem 1906/07, in Husserliana XXIV, 
cit., p. 55
127
to this point: arithmetic appears as concerned with formal properties of multiplicities
and, in the case of the concept “something”, of objects, formed by the mind. Husserl's
analysis  framework  would  eventually  lead  to  believe  that  numbers  themselves  are
purely  formal  and  objective:  the  fact  that  Husserl  aims  to  describe  the  subjective
experience in having awareness of such mathematical and logical objects does not imply
eo  ipso their  subjective  nature.  Even  the  sense  of  the  analysis  on  the  “origin”  of
concepts recalled guarantees that, what it is here in question is not much the existence in
a  subjective  experience  of  such  entities  and  not  even  a  “possible”  genealogical
explication of them all, but only of the way of their being given to consciousness. 
On the other hand, Husserl's recalling of a kind of acts and of a language inevitably
linked to the psychological-subjective realm does suggest that the formal properties of
multiplicities  are  “formed” by the  mind.  Moreover,  Husserl's  ontology at  this  point
seems to include only the physical and the psychical,  but not ideal object.  And this
appear even more clashing if related to the later account of mathematics and logic. But,
of course, the fact that their ideal objectivity is not stated in the same sense does not
mean they are not objective at all. Husserl, unlike Frege, did not find it objectionable for
mathematicians to describe the way in which one comes to awareness of a  concept
instead  of  starting  with  a  logical  definition,  which  offer  a  extensive  or  a  logical
definition, but does not arrive at what we mean or intend in thinking the number1. 
On the other side, it  could be argued that a descriptive analysis of the origin of the
concept  of  number  may  justify  to  see,  already  in  the  Philosophie  der  Arithmetik,
numbers  at  least  as  abstract  objects  in  the  sense  of  invariants  in  our  mathematical
experience, or more broadly, in mathematical phenomena. When we posses or display
the  concept  of  number,  we can  at  least  say,  under  the  perspective  of  a  descriptive
analysis, that numbers are identities through the different kind of acts and the complex
process we carry out in order to let them arise. And that, even in different times and
place. On the other hand, this same descriptive framework kept Husserl from stating the
nature of the number concept clearly, if confronted with later assumptions in his works
after the Logical Investigations. In part that is surely to be linked, as we have already
seen above,  to  Husserl's  descriptive  act  structure  and the  role  assigned within  it  to
reflection and abstraction,  this  latter  even still  not yet conceived as a proper formal
1 In his 1918 The Thought curiously enough, we find Frege trying to answer exactly the same questions about
«timeless and immutable “thoughts”».  G. Frege, “The Thought”, in  Mind, New Series, Vol. 65, No. 259.
(Jul., 1956), p. 297.
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abstraction. Moreover, Husserl is still influenced and under many points of views by
Brentano. In this sense, a more clear understanding on the one side, of the nature of the
relations  involved  in  the  psychical  and  physical  phenomena,  and  of  the  intentional
structure of acts with their objective correlate on the other, could have helped Husserl in
his  coming  in  clear  about  the  status  of  mathematical,  but  even  more  in  general,
cognitive entities. Surely it is also to be considered that it is also with respect to the later
more  explicit  assumption  of  the  ideal  nature  of  those  latter,  that  Husserl's  position
appears more veiled,  and that even if  one refuse their  definition in the sense of the
ideality. 
What  it  is  already  well  known is  in  fact  that  Husserl  only  later  on  will  label  his
phenomenology  within  a  peculiar  form  of  Platonism  for  mathematics  and  logic.
Notoriously,  he  even  reached the  point  to  define  himself  in  a  1918 letter  to  Julius
Stenzel a «phenomenological Platonist»1. He also claims that instead of Aristotle, Plato
is the one who establishes the ideal of rationality and logic. In the historical part of the
1923  Vorlesung Erste Philosophie it is in fact through the Platonic nature of Euclid's
«pure mathematics» that Husserl take the chance to resume part of the history of the
acquisition by the Greek philosophy and mathematics of its rational essence «through
the Platonic view on the ideal nature of objects of knowledge», especially mathematical
ones:
«the first deep insights on the subjective form of true knowledge led wit itself, as
the greatest and earliest achievement, the discovery of the ideal knowledge in the
form of a cognition of the apodictic true. There is an originally evident gaining –
even a complete – of pure ideal-concept, and within there lay now some ideal-
laws, which are laws of visible apodictic universality and necessity. This gaining
immediately  bore  on  the  clarification  and  accomplishment  in  principle  of  the
already existing mathematics, on its transformation in a pure mathematics as pure
ideal science.
It must be here stressed that the history of the rigorous sciences, and especially,
the history of the exact sciences, in its the narrowest comprehension, is brought
back much earlier than the Platonic era, and that's for good reasons, but now, to
the  pre-platonic  formations  of  such  sciences  only  the  character  of  scientific
1 E. Husserl, “Brief an Julius Stenzel”, in Breifwechsel, VI, cit., p. 427.
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preforms  is  to  be  allowed.  This  way,  mathematics  acquired  in  first  place  its
specifically scientific status only through the subjectively-methodological work
performed by the platonic dialectic. Only due to such dialectic could mathematics
firstly became a pure geometry and arithmetic that has to do with ideally possible
spatial  and numerical formation,  thought also in normative relation to limiting
ideas  to  grasp  intuitively  and  with  respect  which  the  possibilities,  as  such,
approximate. And to these pure ideals of approximation (“pure” Unities, “pure”
line etc.) are now referred the immediate ideal-concepts and ideal-laws, which, for
themselves, as “axioms”, sustain the entire construction of pure deduction»1.    
The fact that Husserl not only historically and interpretively assumes later on such a
platonic interpretation of mathematical objects and of part of the logical objects, could
already  be  showed  in  this  passage  from the  important  1910  lecture  on  Logik  und
allgemeine  Wissenschaftstheorie,  which  was  also  repeated  by  Husserl  years  later
basically unmodified. Recalling the problem of explaining not the genetic origin of the
phenomena connected with the mathematical entities, but much more  setting the topic
in  the  givennes  of  the  mathematical  phenomena,  and  assuming  therefore  what
“mathematicians  brought”  for  describe  then  how  such  objects  could  come  to
consciousness, he already makes clear statements indeed on how must be understood the
nature of such objects:
«one cannot describe the given phenomena like the natural number series or the
species of the tone series if one regards them as objectivities in any other words
than with which Plato described his ideas: as eternal, self-identical, untemporal,
unspatial, unchanging, immutable etc. But immediately swirls around in the head
of the acquainted with the traditional philosophy: Platonic ideas are nothing more
than hypostatizations of abstractions.  Platonic  realism would mean at the same
time mysticism»2. 
From both quotes is much to be derived, not only the assumption regarding the nature of
1 E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie, in Husserliana, VII, cit., p. 34.
2 E. Husserl, Logik und allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie. Vorlesungen 1917/18 mit ergänzenden Texten aus
der ersten Fassung von 1910, in Husserliana, XXX, ed U. Panzer (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht,
1996), p. 34 
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ideal objects, especially mathematical, interpreted indeed as possessing an ontological
status close to Plato's ideas, but also their “metaphysical neutrality” in a double sense. In
the first place, by their not supposing to build up a «topos ouranios» as Husserl refers in
the  Logical Investigations and,  by avoiding any kind of hypostatizations1. In second
place, it is metaphysically neutral by only describing (i.e., not postulate), in the same
sense which dominate this earlier production, how consciousness relate to such objects
and  to  the  structure  mathematics  reveals  as  “given  itself”  with  such  and  such
characteristics  in  a  definite  and  categorical  theory.  A theory  this  latter,  «in  which
mathematical objects have an objective existence independently from our activities of
judging» and indeed do exist «under the point of view of the theory»2. 
This latter observation also stresses what is only touched upon in the quote from the
1923 Lecture and where is to be found the scientific ethos Husserl claims to have owed
from his teacher Weirstrass: the aim to put single inquiry and what emerge from a single
research as acquiring its true sense in a encompassing theory3. This holds eventually
also for what concern the role played by the most original ideal realities within the
theory that gives and gains throughout its status. We find in fact the later results of such
a  conviction,  evaluated  and  grown through  Husserl's  philosophical  evolution  in  the
“Introduction” to Formale und transzendentale Logik, where the weight of the platonic
insight into logic does actually led to what can be call “science” without any kind of
naivete:
«Science in a new sense arises in the first instance from Plato's establishing of
logic, as a place for exploring the essential requirements of “genuine” knowledge
and “genuine” science and thus discovering norms, in conformity with which a
science consciously aiming at through justness, a science consciously justifying its
method and theory by norms, might be built. In intention this logical justification
is  a  justification deriving  entirely from pure principles.  (…) Thus the  original
sense here is that logical insight into principles, the insight drawn from the pure
idea of any possible cognition and method of cognition whatever, precedes the
method factually employed and the factual shaping of science, and guides them in
1 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 106.
2 J. Benoist, “Husserl “Platonismus”, originally a talk delivered at the University of Cologne, in 1.8.2003,
quoted in in Phenomenology and Mathematics, cit., p. 118.
3 K. Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik, cit., p. 7.
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practice»1.    
This theoretical and metaphysical framework was meant by Plato against the sophistic
skepticism regarding the denial of science, and in this way, «Plato was set on the path to
the pure idea»: «not gathered from the facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his
dialectic of pure ideas – as we say, his logic or his theory of science – was called on to
make  genuine  science  possible  now  for  the  first  time».  Precisely  by  fulfilling  this
“vocation”, according to Husserl, Plato's dialectic helped create sciences in the strict
sense, i.e., the ones sustained by the idea of logical science and of reflection on its own
foundation, which means, «the strict mathematics and the natural science, which both
develop at higher stage in our modern sciences»2.
All those new perspectives briefly sketched here start anyway taking shape soon after
the  Philosophie  der  Arithmetik,  where,  for  example,  in  its  “Part  II”  logic  is  still
conceived largely as a theory of calculation involving concrete and sensible signs, while
already before the Prolegomena  but extensively exposed in this latter, logic obtains a
much more articulated definition. As  Wissenschaftslehre, its task is  «to deal with the
sciences as systematic unities of this or that sort»3. As pure logic, theory of science deals
in  fact  with  relations  between  certain  abstract  entities,  intended  as  non-linguistic
formations, which are concepts and propositions that delineate an «internally closed and
basically independent field» of a priori truths. Logic recognizes hereafter the objectivity
of  the contents  of  thinking and their  properties  and logical  relationships4.  For  what
concern logical relationships, pure logic takes the shape of a theory of the deductive
mechanism.  That  means,  broadly speaking,  it  becomes a  theory concerned with  the
logical mechanism dominating all formal sciences. Pure logic deals therefore with  «a
sphere of laws that in formal universality span all possible meanings and objects, under
which every particular theory or science is ranged and must obey, if it has to be valid»,
and moreover, which every formal theory must comply. Through such laws, meanings
and object, «a theory can be validated by its form and can be ultimately justified»5. 
Surely, according to Husserl, the essential impulse on the path of this reinterpretation of
the  role  of  logic  and  of  the  objective  and  abstract  object  is  to  be  linked  to  his
1 E. Husserl, Formale und Transzendentale Logik, in Husserliana, XVII, cit., p. 5.
2 Ibid., p. 6.
3 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. 70.
4 Ibid., p. 76.
5 Ibid., p. 239.
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«encounter», among others, with Lotze's Logik, and especially Lotze's reading of Plato's
ideas and the following lecture of Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre «through» Lotze1. Years
later,  in 1933, Husserl  writes in fact retrospectively to a – at  the time - young Parl
Welch: 
«My entire development was determined by the departing from F. Brentano (my
academic teacher) – and from his psychology, which judged “intentionality” to be
the main character of what is psychic. But by better penetrating the correlation
between  the  logical  idealities  and  their  intentional  correlates  (2nd Logical
Investigation), the sense of an intentional psychology and its analytical method
changed entirely shape in me. (…)
The extent of the role played in my development by my “Platonism”, my resolute
arguing for a universal ontology and also for the development of essential insight
(for  the  true  Apriori)  in  all  sphere  of  knowledge,  and  what  kind  of  new
significance  that  Platonism  did  acquired  in  the  late  transcendental
phenomenology,  [it  is  clearly]  to  be  explicated  in  my  “Formale  und
transcendentale  Logik”  (esp.  II  part),  even  if  however  here  only  the  “formal
ontology” is in question. For that “Platonism” I am thank to the famous chapter in
Lotze's Logik, how much continuously his epistemology and metaphysics pushed
me off»2.
In Husserl's eyes, Lotze's interpretation of concepts must have represented, a hint with
his interpretation of ideas as selfsame, eternal, concepts, which are objective and valid
«within a web of logical theory», and where therefore,  «from this point  of view the
entire structure of our concepts rises like a mountain-chain, beginning in a broad base
and ending in several sharply defined peaks»3. 
For Lotze it was this image of a conceptual world building itself up without a break,
upon which the vision of Plato dwelt. Being this latter «the first to recognize the eternal
self-identity of every concept and its significance as against the variableness of the real
world», he might well feel the charm of tracing out all the simple elements of thought,
1 C.  Beyer,  Von  Bolzano  zu  Husserl.  Eine  Untersuchung  über  den  Ursprung  der  phänomenologischen
Bedeutungslehre, in Phaenomenologica, 139,  (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London,
1996), p. 6. See, ibid., p. 131f.
2 E. Husserl, “Briefe and Welch” (6.17/21.1933), in Breifwechsel, VI, cit., p. 460.
3 H. Lotze, Logik. Drei Bücher vom Denken, vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen, cit., p. 54.
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of combining all that could be combined, and of setting up in the organic whole of a
world of ideas, i.e., what Plato interpreted as the eternal pattern of which the created
world  is  an  imperfect  imitation.  Even  by the  admitted  impossibility  to  achieve  the
impossible task to reconnecting all real to all the real, according to Lotze,    
«the utmost that we could attain by such means, would be merely the image of a
fixed order,  in  which simple and composite  concepts stood side by side,  each
unchangeably  self-identical  and  each  bound  to  its  place  in  the  system  by
invariable relations to all the rest»1.
Accordingly Husserl explains his plan to have been to take Lotze’s view of the ideal
domain and place all the mathematical and a good part of the traditional logic into it,
trying to avoid anyway, on the one side, the most of its metaphysical engagement, and
on the other, Lotze’s occasional psychologism as well, trying this time to interpret this
way part of the new mathematical logic of the late eighteenth century, for example, for
what concern a possible categorical theory.  Husserl  writes in fact during the works of
the planned new edition of the Logical Investigations in 1912:
«That  little  Lotze  himself  could  go  beyond  contradictory  inconsequences
[Inkonsequenzen]  and  beyond  psychologism,  so  on  the  other,  [his]  ingenious
interpretation of the platonic theory of Ideas shed some first bright light for me
and defined all the following studies. Already Lotze spoke of truths in itself and
therefore, the thought seemed likely to place all the mathematical and a good part
of the traditional logic in the realm of ideality»2.
Surely  Lotze  represented  for  Husserl,  besides  the  differences  and  the  late  critical
evaluation of the true value of his work, the opportunity to look into a new series of
problem, starting from the relations between the sciences and the role and nature of
logic as realm of validity. This already find its roots in the 1896 Lecture on Logik, and
the appearing within this lecture of the in nuce concept of pure logic in the sense of pure
theory  of  science.  It  is  moreover  well  know  and  it  is  in  fact  already  been  deeply
1 Ibid., p. 55.
2 E. Husserl, “Entwurf einer Vorrede. Zweites Fragment”, in Logische Untersuchungen, Ergänzungsband,
erster Teil, in Husserliana, XX/1, cit., p. 297.
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investigated1, how Husserl may approached via Lotze certain fundamental distinctions
introduced by Bolzano in his Wissenschaftslehre, such as the concept of “proposition in
itself”, for interpreting later, after the Logical Investigations, such notions in the sense
of  its  theory  of  logical  objects  as  ideal  objects.  A  clear  statement  of  such  an
interpretation is to be found, for example, in the 1903 review of Melchior Palagyi's work
on the crisis among the psychological and the formalistic approach in logic. Husserl
writes in fact extensively there:
«I saw that under <Bolzano's> “proposition in itself” is to be understood what is
designated in  ordinary discourse -  which always  objectifies  the Ideal  -  as  the
“sense”[“Sinn”] of a statement. It is that which is explained as one and the same
where, for example, different persons are said to have asserted the same thing.
(...). And it further became clear to me that this identical sense could be nothing
other than the universal, the species, which belongs to a certain Moment present in
all  actual  assertions  with  the  same  sense,  and  which  makes  possible  the
identification just mentioned, even where the descriptive content of the individual
lived experiences [Erlebnisse] of asserting varies considerably in other respects.
The proposition thus relates to those acts of judgment to which it belongs as their
identical meaning [Meinung] in the same way, for example, as the species redness
relates to individuals of “the same” red color»2.
Now  with  this  view  of  things  as  a  basis,  Bolzano's  theory  according  to  which
propositions  are  objects  which  have,  according  to  him,  nonetheless  than  «no
“existence”», appears to Husserl to have a pretty clear and intelligible signification: they
have, importantly, an “Ideal” being [Sein] or they possess the form of being of the pure
validity  [Gelten] of  objects  which  are  universals,  or,  as  Husserl  says,  of  universal
objects [allgemeine Gegenstände]. This kind of being is of the same kind of the one,
«which  is   established,  for  example,  in  the  “existence  proofs”  of  mathematics»3.
Therefore, in this sense, to mathematical entities it is explicitly confer the ontological
status of ideality, and even more, of ideal objects. All this kind of idealities do not have
1 C. Beyer, Von Bolzano zu Husserl, cit., p. 153f. 
2E. Husserl, “Besprechung  von  M. Palagyi,  Der Streit der Psychologisten und Formalisten in der modernen
Logik, Leipzig 1902”, in Aufsätze und Rezensionen, in Husserliana, XXII, p. 157. 
3 Ibid., p. 158.
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in fact «the real being of things», or of dependent thinglike [sachlich] Moments which
is, for example, the form of being recognized to temporal particulars in general.
It  will  be  not  our  aim  in  the  following  section,  to  establish  how  exactly  is  to  be
understood the influence of Lotze's  interpretation of the validity of ideal  objects  on
Husserl, and at the same time, we will not deal with the role played by Bolzano in the
definition of the kind of Being possessed by such objects. We will try instead to trace
back  Husserl's  meditations  on  the  Universal  and  the  already  mentioned  universal
objects, later on indicated also as ideal objects, to their first taking shape in 1896. That
will offer us the opportunity to show the origin of Husserl's interpretation of universal
and ideal objects conceived in a still “old fashioned” way as “unity over against the
multiplicity”, and moreover, the effect of such an interpretation of one of the aspect of




The Universal and The Ideal.
3.0) Introduction
The  traditional  problem  of  the  universal  goes  way  through  the  entire  history  of
philosophy and it appears also in Husserl's work, representing in fact one of the latest
interpretation of the logical and epistemological question about universality. It is in fact
of  no  doubt  that  Husserl,  even  if  not  by  explicitly  recalling  himself  to  a  specific
tradition, on the one side does assume in his investigations some of the very problems
and issues in logic that has their roots in the Aristotelian and even Scholastic tradition,
on the other side, assumes and shows, as recently mentioned, some controversial and
interpretative traits of Platonism. Husserl conceives his doctrine of the universal and the
intuition  of  the  universal,  which  has  acquired  a  problematic  notoriousness  as  his
doctrine of essence, by basically assuming a deeply elaborated version of a «traditional
conception», ending up in consequence with the conception of the universal as an “ideal
entity in common”.    
Without  any claim of  drawing any kind of  exhaustive statement  about  the different
aspects of the issue, under the logical and predicative point of view the proper question
of the universal and of universality involves of course the role it plays within a certain
theory of conceptualization. Its role comprehends of course a large variety of aspects.
The relationship between classes of words and the class of universality to which they
refer is, for example, what Husserl will indicate in his late works  as the topic of a «pure
analytic» geared towards a general «theory of syntaxes»,  explicitly referring here to
«conceptual universalities» and to their kind of existence explained in terms of «ideal
“existence”»1.  This relationship comes in fact in question for what concern different
grammatical entities, such as nouns or verbs, but evidently not in the same token for all
classes (see, the case of proper names) and even for what concern propositions. Those
latter can be obviously universal - affirmative or negative universal sentences are in fact
objects of logical investigations and have been called “universal” since Aristotle's Prior
Analytics - but are universal in a different sense and in a different way in comparison
1 E. Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik, cit., p. 330.
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with the universality  per se belonging to concepts1. What it  is  in fact at  issue here,
summarily  represents  the  semantic  aspect  of  the  inquiries  into  universality  and
universal, which means, clarify the fundamental «predicable» character connected and
«corresponding to their nature». It is in fact according to their universal nature, opposed
to the one of the particulars, that an universal determination belonging to the essence
“triangle” can be extended, i.e., «predicate» of all triangle2.      
Moreover, the semantic aspect is deeply connected and strictly linked to the knowable
and the “accessibility” in experience, of such common nature. If we accept the thesis
affirming its existence, than we have to explain the fundamental aspect of experience or
perception  which  is  represented  by  the  apprehension  of  “objects”  provided  with  a
certain universal signification. This very question is, even beyond all the differences
among “realisms” or “idealisms”, determining for what belongs to the interpretation of a
theory  for  what  concern  its  ontological  framework.  Affirming  that  the  universal  is
“something”  which  is  «by  its  nature»  capable  «of  being  in  several  things»,  as
formulated by the Scholastic in one of its later yet deeply influential logical work, does
in fact already express a peculiar interpretation (to be found even in later traditions) of:
1) the ontological nature of the universal of “Aristotelian” or “Platonic” traits; 2) the
following explanation of the way human beings access to the «something common to
several things»3. 
Especially  the  first  aspect  of  the  “ontological”  nature  of  the  universal  problematic
actually does marks the following logical tradition, in at least three aspects that can be
summarized: under the partition and more precise definition of the universal into the
more basic forms of genus and species4; the thesis of the truthful assertability and the
1 «A proposition,  then,  is  a  statement  affirming or  denying  something  of  something;  and  this  is  either
universal or particular or indefinite. By universal I mean a statement that something belongs to all or none
of something; by particular that it belongs to some or not to some or not to all; by indefinite that it does or
does not belong, without any mark of being universal or particular, e.g. ‘contraries are subjects of the same
science’, or ‘pleasure is not good’», Aristotle,  Prior Analytics, Book I, 24a16 - 24b16, in  The Complete
Works of Aristotle, Vol. I, ed J. Barnes (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991)
2 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 73b25 – 31, in ibid., eg. «I call universal whatever belongs to something
both of every case and in itself and as such. It is evident, therefore, that whatever is universal belongs from
necessity to its objects».  See also,  De Interpretatione, where Aristotle explicitly affirm: «Now of actual
things some are universal, others particular (I call universal that which is by its nature predicated of a
number of things, and particular that which is not; man, for instance, is a universal, Callias a particular). So
it  must sometimes be of a universal  that  one states that  something holds or  does not,  sometimes of  a
particular», 17a 37 – 41. 
3 Petri  Hispani,  Summulae  Logicale  cum  Versorii  Parisiensis  Clarissima  Expositione (Petrum  Mariam
Bertanum, 1622), p. 22. 
4 See, Porphyry, “Of the Nature of Genus and Species”, in Introduction (or Isagoge) to the logical Categories
of  Aristotle,  The Organon,  or  logical  treatises  of  Aristotle,  with the introduction of  Porphyry,  Voll.  II
(Henry G. Bohn, London, 1853), p. 611.  With this chapter compare chapter 5 of Aristotle's  Categories,
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conditions of truthfully predication of the universal, e.g. in the form of a general term,
for each one of an indefinite number of objects1; the interpretation of the “conceptual
universal”  by means  of  “essence”,  “idea”,  etc.,  which  represents  several  objects  by
representing the common element belonging to the whole of such objects. 
For what concern the second point above,  different traditions have thought up different
strategies in order to secure and rationally explain the experiential access to the common
element.  In  this  sense,  the  use  or  recurs  of  a  more  or  less  sensible-  or  intellectual
intuition.  Concepts  appearing  identified  and  deeply  determined  in  their  nature  with
universality  are  therefore  contrasted  with  sensible  intuition  but  to  some extent  also
related  to  a  kind  of  intuition.  In  this  sense,  a  problematic  yet  fundamental  étape  is
certainly  Kant's  interpretation  of concept  as  «universal  representation  [allgemeine
Vorstellung]», i.e., a representation of the something in common in or to various objects,
insofar it also plays as possible predicate in judgment. Kant, for example, expressed
such  a  position  in  the  Erste  Abschnitt of  his  universal  theory  of  logical  elements
[Elementarlehre] in his Logic lecture: 
«All cognitions, that is, all representations related with consciousness to an object,
are  either  intuitions  or  concepts.  An  intuition  is  a  singular  representation
(repraesentatio  singularis),  a  concept  a  universal  (repraesentatio  per  notas
communes) or reflected representation (repraesentatio discursiva). 
Cognition through concepts is called thought (cognitio discursiva). 
Note 1. A concept is opposed to intuition, for it is a universal representation, or a
representation  of  what  is  common  to  several  objects,  hence  a  representation
insofar as it can be contained in various ones. 
2. It is a mere tautology to speak of universal or common concepts - a mistake
that is grounded in an incorrect division of concepts into universal, particular, and
singular. Concepts themselves cannot be so divided, but only their use»2.
where the discrepancies between the account of the predicables given by Aristotle and by Porphyry clearly
appear; See, Aristotle, Categories, 2a13 – 4b20.   
1 See, for example, Mill's  System of Logic. Racionative and Inductive, 8th (Harper & Brothers, New York,
1882), p. 34. 
2 I. Kant, AA IX, 91, 06 – 20. Eng. Trans., I. Kant, Lectures on Logic, ed J. Michael Young, in The 
Cambridge Edition of The Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, 1992), p. 
589.
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Obviously we don't need here to offer a detailed exposition of the universality issue, nor
an historical exposition of the different interpretations and traditions which take or have
taken a position regarding this complex yet fundamental question and its various form
and aspects. We will instead first try to (briefly) offer some interpretative “tools” for
certain aspects of the universal issue (3.1). A “traditional analysis” will therefore follow
as  sort  of  exemplum in  order  to  show how  an  important  part  of  the  philosophical
tradition has approached the issue. Moreover, we will expose Lotze's introduction in his
Logik of the concept of “first Universal” or “conceptual Universal”, whose exposition,
beyond  the  historical  or  biographical  interest,  presents  some  interesting  element  in
common with Husserl's one. The possibility of an influence must anyway be excluded,
due to the more refined (even if still problematic and obscure) nature of the Husserlian
analysis, which, moreover, already employes the instruments of his Elements of Logic.
In  (3.2.)  we  will  first  introduce  the  aspect  of  the  Universal  issue  generally  more
prominent in Husserl's works and which also will be the topic of the final chapter. Then,
we will deeply analyze some manuscripts from the time around 1896, which will offer
Husserl's  basic  or  formal  definition  of  the  Universal  previous  to  the  Logical
Investigations and  a  statement  regarding “universal  objects”.  Finally we will  follow
some of the fundamental directions taken by Husserl starting from such a definition,
even if necessarily in brief and schematic way.  
3.1) Some Short Insights Into The Question of the Universal.
The question of universal objects, which means, absolutely universal entities to count
among realities and which are to be thought as numerically identical even if instantiated
in  the  plurality  of  individual  objects,  if  it  represents,  on  the  one  side,  an  old
metaphysical problem, especially Aristotelian,  surely does not appear  solved, on the
other  side,  with  medieval  philosophy and  still  does  not  disappear  with  Russel,  but
assumes instead new forms. The very basic question paradoxically remains pretty much
close to the one formulated after Plotinus, if, in other words, it does make sense and, in
this case, how,  «to speak about genera and species, as to whether they subsist (in the
nature of things) or in mere conceptions only; whether also if subsistent, they are bodies
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or incorporeal, and whether they are separate from, or in, sensibles, and subsist about
these»1. Certainly,  the  question  about  nature  and  ontological  status  of  such  an
universality  like  the  “Redness”  among  red  things  does  assume  different
characterizations and actually open a number of questions related to different topic in
philosophy and logic.  To make an  example,  the  correlation between Universals  and
predicates of a language and the possible extension of such a correlation –  if, in other
words, it does actually correspond a “universal object” to every predicate, or only for
the  positive  ones  (wise  –  not  wise),  or  if  a  Universal  actually  corresponds  or  may
correspond to a proper noun or not. This complex epistemological and logical problem
did actually leaded to various and frequently antithetical positions2. 
Starting from the most  basic  predicative structure,  for  example,  as  in  the case  of  a
attributive predication with a noun, the exemplification of a predicate belonging to an
Individuum with its existential assumption can be interpreted by a realist in the sense of
a generalization of the attribution of P with respect of an S, to the existence assumption
of an object which is P. This would lead to recognize the fact that not only S is an entity,
but also what is predicated is  an entity.  This kind of interpretation can for itself  be
integrated in an ontological framework of different kind, which oft forces to leave the
metaphysical neutrality of a simple linguistic analysis. The relation between S and P can
be interpreted, for example, as the instantiation of a universal entity, but also,  as the
mere belonging of an (abstract) part to the “objects”, the belonging to a set composed by
other objects etc. 
Especially  the  first  these  regarding  the  existence  of  an  universal  entity  appears
supported by the predication of the identity of a particular characteristic among different
objects: the same color belongs to different objects etc. In this case, the, lets say, “realist
position”  does  assume  the  strict  identity  of  an  entity  which,  in  the  form  of  a
characteristic, belong to different objects and appears numerically identical in all those
latter, even if two or more of them have no concrete common parts3. This last argument
leads to the supposed referring of individual abstract noun, like “green”, to a universal
entity,  similarly  to  proper  nouns;  and  even  that  such  an  entity  is,  for  its  part,
1 Porphyry,  Introduction (or  Isagoge)  to  the  logical  Categories  of  Aristotle,  in  The Organon,  or  logical
treatises of Aristotle, with the introduction of Porphyry, cit., p. 610. 
2 See, P. F. Strawson, A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Universals, concepts and qualities: new essays on the meaning
of predicates, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 2006). 
3 The traditional formulation Ps takes therefore the shape of exemplification of “-ness” formulas, such like
«S exemplifies P-ness».
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instantiation of an higher universal entity, “color”. 
Consequently, the relation between universal entities of different order is also differently
understood,  especially  if  interpreted  as  the  instantiation  of  an  higher  universal  in
objects: a thing is green and is at the same time colored, so it is actually instantiation of
the “being-colored”, and many colors do actually exemplify in a different manner such
“being-colored”. Here it can be spoken of an “exemplification” of an higher universal,
where the universal “green” is interpreted as exemplification of the universal “color”; or
of “inclusion”,  where the universal “green” includes the universal  “color”1.  We find
even  example  of  this  different  interpretations  already  in  Aristotle  and  Plato,  with
obvious differences for what concern the interpretation of the Universal nature2.
With the introduction of intentionality in the philosophical interpretation of the problem
of the Universal, it has been also proven necessary to deduce from the mere existence of
the  mental  grasping  of  an  –  even  imaginative  –  object  to  the  existence  of  the
characteristic  expressed  by  “-ness”  formulation,  and  consequently  to  the  universal
characteristic, even if by non-existing objectualities3. In this case, the presence of the
universal entity is referred to its having been grasped within an intentional relationship.
This  presence  could  also  be  interpreted  in  a  form  of  Platonism  by  affirming  the
existence of the corresponding Universal for the predicate.  Hence,  to such universal
entity corresponds a single and abstract noun which can even be generated by suffixing
a predicable part of an utterance4. A realistic position, on the other hand, could anyway
refuse  the  existence  of  non-exemplified  Universal,  by  affirming  the  only  possible
existence of such entities in the individuals or in, at least, one example. Within such a
theoretical framework, one is forced to distinguish between instantiated Universalities
and the conceptual formations which would eventually (or not properly) comprehend
them; this position is obviously in need of a further  clarification regarding the proper
nature of concepts.
Traditionally, nominalism does refuse the existence of Universal entities in a even more
radical way. A common feature belonging to such a theoretical position is the refutation
of the existence of universal objects as the objective correlate of an entity numerically
identical  among  various  individuals.  Nominalism,  in  one  of  its  more  general
1 R. Chisholm, On Metaphysics (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1989), p. 143f.
2 See, Aristotle, Prior Analytics, and Plato, Phaedo. 
3 See  again  R,  Chisholm,  The  first  Person.  An  Essay  on  Reference  and  Intentionality (University  of
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1981).
4 Corresponding to the English “-ness” or German “-heit”, for example.
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formulation,  may affirm the possibility to consider in some way the existence of an
certain correlate for P, but would refuse to define it as an universal entity in order, for
instance, to guarantee for predication. 
Husserl himself, does actually criticizes in this sense plenty of forms and versions of
nominalism, and his criticism may be interpreted - within the general reaffirmation of
the nature of the logical inquiry in contrast with the psychological - also as a defense of
a more articulated interpretation of the Universal, especially with respect to its function
in his theory of meaning1. Against a kind of nominalism which «even for the logical and
arithmetical  axioms  pretends»,  «as  for  example  in  a  Mill»,  «an  inductive»  origin,
Husserl affirms exactly the lack of acknowledgment of the «general essential-insights»,
according to which such entities that are not psychologically inducted, but rather formed
from «pure general induction» as «originally self-given Universalities». With the same
aim, Husserl criticized even more in general the extreme version of nominalism:
«the extreme Nominalism, which found a new life in the Humean empiricism, is
completely blind with respect to the universal intuition, (…) moreover, by this
blindness,  it  tries  to  spin  into  elimination  [wegeskamotieren]  all  the  universal
thinking,  and  that,  by  distinguishing  of  the  natural  relations  from  singular
individuals – relations that appear obviously within universal utterances, but one
must forget about asking for the right of such utterances»2.
Even in recent time, under the common label of the tropus-theory3, we find a position
that  generally affirms that  in  predication we find,  corresponding to  the  very simple
elements  constituting  this  latter,  the  reference  to  two  entities,  and  even  accept  the
existence of a correlate for P. But on the other side, refuses to define such correlate in
terms of a universal object by, for example, opening to the postulation of a correlate
“whatsoever”. 
If we affirm that “S is p” we are for example also affirming that it exists in a certain
sense, for example in a mere psychological one, an entity owned by S; this entity cannot
yet  being  owned  by  two  disjuncted  individuals.  This  has  to  be  mereologically
1 See, for example, E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. 88f, and
especially E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 147f.
2 E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie, erster Teil, cit., p. 172.
3 Starting from the works of  Donald  Williams,  for  example,  “The Elements  of  Being  I”,  in Review of
Metaphysics, 7, 1953, p. 3 – 18.
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understood, in the sense according to which the two individuals do not have any parts in
common, otherwise two individuals could have an individually identical attribute by
owning the same part to which the characteristic belongs1. Between the two correlates it
never exists identity. Still, this position does not exclude the multiple exemplification of
p; an exclusion which is on the other side proposed by an even extremer interpretation
of the ontological connection between an individual S with its individual p, that directly
excludes the existence of p in case of non existence of the S to which it actually belongs.
This extreme position, which historically seems to recall the opposition between Plato
and  Antisthenes about the particular nature of the “mental images” and the following
«inconceivable nature» of the universal2, bases now its  natural cogency, paradoxically
enough, on the interpretation of abstraction as the process of «not-paying-attention» to
the characteristics of an individual:  from such an abstraction we would in fact only
obtain the revealing of a singular abstract moment or part belonging to a determinate
singular object3. 
If we consider such skeptical positions under the point of view of their mere aim, we
may  formulate it as follow: to see the characteristics belonging to the individuals as
individual entities in themselves and therefore “evaluate” how much such characteristics
do actually account for the nature and conceptual definition of the individual. Under this
point of view, they can even have a sense from an Husserlian perspective, as we will see
by speaking of the “object defining universal”. We can in fact assume the role played in
such theories by the abstraction as defined in the following sense: what we obtain in
letting by side aspects of the individual for the good of only one characteristic, is not the
universal or particular as objects, but instead the characteristic p in the whole structure
proper to the individual.  By means of such abstraction it  is revealed how this latter
process  was  already  oriented  to  the  revealing  of  the  characteristic  interpreted  as
essentially  belonging  to  the  ontological  status  of  the  individual,  and  as  possible
reference for a meaningful concept. Moreover, in the case of some version of the less
skeptical theory, which only affirms the individuality of the entity corresponding to the
characteristic, by means of the principle of identity of indiscernibles can be connected to
an Universal.             
1 Like in the example: a piece of paper and its surface have the individually identical white.
2 Plato, Sophist, 251b.
3 See, D. C. Williams, “The Elements of Being I”, cit., p.  9f. 
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3.1.1) Some Fundamental Traits of Aristotle's Conception of the Universal 
Notoriously,  Aristotle  defines  the  universal  (τὸ  χαθόλου)  as  something  which  is
common to every objects of a certain kind, as he stated for example in On the Parts of
Animals, where he affirms explicitly that 
«Since the ultimate species are substances and individuals which do not differ in
species are found in them (e.g. Socrates, Coriscus), we must either describe the
universal attributes first or else say the same thing many time over, as I said. (The
universal attributes are common; for we call universal those which belong to more
than one subject)»1. 
The universal plays a determinating role in Aristotle's philosophy by essentially define
his  concepts  of  «substance [οὐσία]»,  as it  emerges clearly from the Z book of  The
Metaphysics:
«the universal is common, since that is called universal which naturally belongs to
more than one thing. Of which individual then will this be the substance? Either of
all or of none. But it cannot be the substance of all; and if it is to be the substance
of one, this one will be the others also; for things whose substance is one and
whose essence is one are themselves also one. 
Further,  substance  means  that  which  is  not  predicable  of  a  subject,  but  the
universal is predicable of some subject always»2.  
Hence, Aristotle does interpret the universal as what is in common «in respect of the
whole»  -  a  universal  is  in  fact  said  in  respect  of  some  whole  -  and  defines  it  in
consequence as «one over many»: 
«Therefore the Forms will be substance; and the same terms indicate substance in
this and in the ideal world (or what will be the meaning of saying that there is
1 Aristotle, On The Parts of Animals, Book I, 644a 27, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, cit. 
2 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, Book Z, 1038b10 – 1038b16, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. II, ed J.
Barnes (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991).
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something apart from the particulars - the one over many?). And if the Ideas and
the  particulars  that  share  them have  the  same  Form,  there  will  be  something
common to these (...)»1.
For the limit of our interest, we can consider the theory of the τὸ χαθόλου as derived by
Aristotle from a later interpretation of the Socratic maieutics way of investigation, i.e.,
in the sense of an “induction” which, assuming the form of «perception»2,  develops
trough the abstraction of the something in common among things. This links already the
interpretation of  the universal as non-existing “outside” the things, as an universal in re,
as their essence to call in question an appealing word. Induction is a kind of abstraction,
typically moving from the perceived individuals to universals. In an interpretative way,
the universals are in fact already present “in” or are constituents “of” the individuals
being  perceived  but  in  a  “scattered  way”.  Noûs  is  the  moreover  the  ability  to  see
universal  patterns  in  what  is  being  perceived. From such a  kind  of  examination  of
things,  we acquire  the  knowledge  of  what  it  is  common in  them by the  following
judgment; as a consequence, for him there is no science if not of the universal3.     
Notoriously, Aristotle's recall for a theory of abstraction in order to explain the grasping
of  universal  were  probably conceived as  an  alternative  to  Platonism4.  This  sets  the
fundamental traits of an Aristotelian kind of theoretical enterprise distinguished from the
Platonic one, and that essentially by offering moreover a different interpretation of the
experiential  process  and  of  the  ontological  status  of  the  universal  or  singular
characteristics of things that are revealed in experience, in respect to the corresponding
substance: abstraction aim to explain the way to distinguish the properties of things
without yet granting any of these a substantial existence in re, such as Plato claimed the
forms to have. In these sense, an object is considered “with respect” to one (or more) of
its  attributes;  this  latter  is  than considered for itself,  a process that may lead to the
“constitution”  of  a  new abstract  object  consisting  in  the  original  object  in  only the
respect(s) considered which may now become subject in its own. We find here yet only
1 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, Book A, 991a8.
2 Aristotle, On the Soul, Book II, 424a18 – 24. Aristotle uses very rarely the term “abstraction” [ἀφαίρεσις],
and also nearly never in an explicit way.
3 See, for example, Aristotle, The Metaphysics, Book Γ, 1003a33 – 1003b18, or E. C. Halper, One and Many
in Aristotle's Metaphysics. The Central Books (Parmenides Publishing, USA, 2005), p. 8f. 
4 W. Wieland, Die Aristotelische Physik (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1962), p. 197, and recently A.
Bäck, Aristotle's Theory of Abstraction (Springer International, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London,
2014), p. 8.
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one  substance,  the  original  one,  with  its  “abstracted”  attribute,  a  situation  slightly
different from the Platonic affirmation of an object existing independently on the basis
of its being subject on its own right1.
Aristotle's account of abstraction in relation to the obtaining of the universal starts in his
inquiry into perception and from the consideration of how  «attributes» are abstracted
from «individual substances» and within his account of thought how universals derives
from particulars.  We start with the individual substances given in perception and then
isolate  aspects  of  them,  abstracta,  for  study  in  particular  sciences.  «The  so-called
special sciences» in fact, which differ from metaphysics for not dealing with «being as
being and with the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature», «they cut
off  a  part  of  being»,  so  Aristotle  expresses  a  peculiar  aspect  of  abstraction,  «and
investigate  the  attributes  of  this  part»  by  making  a  science  of  it2.  For  example,
mathematics  considers  objects  «qua immovable  and  qua separable  from  matter»3.
Therefore, he recognizes different  abstracta of “scientific” interest: the universals like
species and genera of substance (man, plant, animal) but even from other categories
(figure,  square,  redness) – such universal  are likely considered as existing and their
knowledge as abstracted from individuals4;  Aristotle might recognize yet also singular
abstracta,  like  mathematical  objects  for  example,  by speaking,  for  example,  of  the
particular instance of a number in a formula. We do not judge only on general redness,
but also in particular judgments. Those latter universals seems not to be object of sense
perception, but still objects and, according to their intelligible matter, we can find and
there can be several instance of the same species:      
«when we come to the concrete thing, e.g.  this  circle, i.e. one of the individual
circles,  whether  sensible  or  intelligible  (I  mean  by  intelligible  circles  the
mathematical, and by sensible circles those of bronze and of wood), of these there
is no definition, but they are known by the aid of thought or perception; and when
they go out of our actual consciousness it is not clear whether they exist or not; but
they are always stated and cognized by means of the universal formula. But matter
is unknowable in itself. And some matter is sensible and some intelligible, sensible
1 Ibidem.
2 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, Book Γ, 1003a22 – 1003a26.
3 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, Book E, 1026a10 – 1026a11.
4 Science investigates in fact things which are, for our understanding does seek after «the fact and the reason
why» of something, «if it is and what it is». Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 89b23 – 89b24.
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matter being for instance bronze and wood and all matter that is changeable, and
intelligible matter being that which is present in sensible things not qua sensible,
i.e, in the objects of mathematics»1.
The  instances  are  therefore  particulars  of  a  specie,  are  of  matter  and form and are
singulars,  while  even  the  intelligible  is  stated  to  be  somehow  individual,  yet  in  a
different manner than sensible individuals. This kind of Universal are the ones mostly
difficult to explain within a theory of abstraction, already by thinking to the difficulties
involved  in  the  explication  of  the  connection,  for  example,  between  mathematical
individuals and perceptible ones2. 
For our interest is here anyway not important to look for a solution in the Aristotelian
account. What it is for us of some interest moreover, is the fact that Aristotle thinks also
that  the  things  thus  abstracted  are  objects  existing  in  re  that  are  in  some  sense
independent  from  their  bases,  the  things  from  which  they  are abstracted.  Without
interpreting to far this complex question in Aristotelian philosophy, we can still see how,
even in the explicit affirmation in the  Categories regarding the existential connection
with the «primary substances»3, Aristotle does not deny that universal as abstract objects
exist  in re, only not independently from the individuals. Hence, the  noûs let arise in
thought  what  separates  off  from  the  whole  of  individuals  perception.  Moreover,
interesting  for  us  is  also  the  fact  that,  for  Aristotle,  the  abstracta  are  not
“mere”concepts, tools limited to human mental process with no correlates whatsoever4.
By  effecting  abstraction  we  presuppose  and  affirm  existing  common  features  of
individuals in re that we can observe and have a “theory”in proper sense. On the other
side however, by abstraction no new objects existing over the individuals in perception
are created. For Aristotle, abstract objects are not real and self-subsistent ones5, but still
real although not independently; while moreover, they seem to include the universal
1 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, Book Z, 1035b32 – 1036a13.
2 For example, in the case of great numbers or complex figures.
3 «All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. This is
clear from an examination of cases. For example, animal is predicated of man and therefore also of the
individual man; for were it predicated of none of the individual men it would not be predicated of man at
all. Again, colour is in body and therefore also in an individual body; for were it not in some individual
body it would not be in body at all. Thus all the other things are either said of the primary substances as
subjects or in them as subjects. So if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of
the other things to exist», Aristotle, Categories, 2a35 – 2b7.
4 As for instance in, J.  Klein,  Greek mathematical  Thought and the  Development of  Algebra  (The  M.I.T.
Press, Cambridge, 1968), p. 107f.
5 The species man does not exist in re over and above the individual human beings.
149
species and be at the same time objective. Hence, Aristotle would not accept substantial
forms as separate, universal objects, but by wanting them, as universal structures, to be
objective, “abstract” objects.  
Surely, for Aristotle we have acquaintance with singulars through preception, but this is
not  enough,  for  we  become  acquainted  with  universals  through  induction  on  the
singulars  acquired,  and knowledge of  them through demonstrations  on universal,  as
clearly expressed in the Posterior Analytics1.
3.1.2) Lotze on the Articulation, Origin and Fundamental Function of Universals for
Conceptual Universality.
Husserl does surely studied Lotze's 1874  Logik, as we have already noticed2. In this
influential work, Lotze assumes explicitly the aim to expose the «articulated nature of
the Universals» by integrating with such a take on a traditional problem in logic his
investigation into  the logical  elements»,  but,  according to  him,  «especially with  the
«theory of the concepts», which would lead moreover to a theory of the different «parts
of the speech» and up to judgments3. 
Universals do articulated by him into a first and a second “level”, but generally for the
generation of both, Lotze turn significally to the definition as the “common element” in
the several individuals, as briefly indicated in this  quote from the  First  Book  of his
Logik:  
«In the actual course of its  development,  therefore,  thought is  first  directed to
those universal concepts which really contain the law for the complete formation
of the individuals for which they are required; it is not until it has some special
motive in investigation that it frames universals in which things otherwise unlike
1 «It is evident too that if some perception is wanting, it is necessary for some understanding to be wanting
too—which it is impossible to get if we learn either by induction or by demonstration, and demonstration
depends  on universals  and induction on particulars,  and it  is  impossible to  consider  universals  except
through induction (since even in the case of what are called abstractions one will be able to make familiar
through induction that some things belong to each genus, even if they are not separable, in so far as each
thing is such and such), and it is impossible to get an induction without perception - for of particulars there
is perception; for it is not possible to get understanding of them; for it can be got neither from universals
without induction nor through induction without perception»,  Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 81a38 – 81b9.
2 See the previous section.
3 H. Lotze, Logik, cit. p. 14, 54.
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are grouped under a fraction of similar elements. Thus when we were speaking of
the  first  formation  of  concepts,  the  current  instances  of  subordination,  e.g.  of
Caius and Titus to the concept of man, or of the oak and beech to that of plant,
seemed to us quite natural and intelligible; it was as if the mere direction to grasp
the common element in the individuals was enough to put us upon the track of
these really authoritative concepts M»1.   
For the generation of what he calls «first universal», Lotze appeals therefore to a sort of
immediate kind of universalisation which is grounded and develop in an experiential
givenness. Lotze's starting point is common to the tradition and take shape within what
we have indicated above as the semantic framework of the logical investigation into
universal, but he immediately connects in a significant way the definition of the first
universal as something which is immediately experienced as the common element in
several impressions. 
Lotze's starting point is in fact the impossibility of connecting a «definite name» for all
the impressions we have of single shades of colors or a particular magnitude. Here we
find in fact the proper function of the process of universalisation and the assumption of
the references of what takes shape in language to the common element immediately
experienced: 
«Words  never  denote  impressions  as  they  can  be  experienced;  we  can  only
experience  or  actually  perceive  a  particular  shade  of  red,  a  specific  kind  of
sweetness, a definite degree of warmth, not the universal red, sweet, and warm, of
language. The universalisation [Verallgemeinerung] which in these and all similar
cases  the  matter  of  sensation  has  undergone,  is  commonly  regarded  as  an
unavoidable inexactness of language, perhaps even of the thought which language
serves to express. Unable or not accustomed to make a definite name for every
single impression,  language (it is supposed) blurs the slight differences between
them, and retains only what is immediately experienced in sensation as common
to them all: by this reduction of its means of expression to a moderate number it
certainly  makes  the  communication  of  ideas  possible,  but  diminishes
proportionately the exactness of that which has to be communicated»2.
1 Ibid., p. 150. Italics mine.
2 Ibid., p. 27. Italics mine.
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To stress the sort of «falsification» originated by the universalisation and to recall for a
originality belonging to impressions, according to Lotze,  simply means  «to pass too
lightly over the very remarkable circumstance, that in a number of different impressions
there is something common which can be thought apart from their differences»1.  
Lotze's first universal is in fact exposed in the First Book in the sense of the universal,
i.e.,  common  specie  belonging  to  different  colors,  and  the  “color  as  such”  as  the
common genus, i.e., the “something in common” among all colors. The first specie, for
example the classical example of the “Redness”, is defined therefore as the element in
common “in” or “of” all the different shades of red, and that, even if it may appear to
someone as originated through «logical work». According to Lotze, we have it rather in
«direct sensation», i.e., we have explicitly the «experience of the existing connection»
through out the different colors and single specie2. 
This very evidence is first of all granted by the “fact” that the «thinkable world itself is
so constituted» that every of our impressions cannot be «as incomparably different from
every other as sweet actually is from warm, yellow from soft»; that means, we find or,
as expressed by Lotze, «there is» this generality which actually grant for the universality
of our experience3. Moreover, this first universal acquired or «grasped» by such a way,
already guarantee also for a level of exactness which suffice for our handling with the
world and even grounds the following exactness of science. 
The first universal works now also as sort of “points of reference”, as intuitive basis, for
the higher functions of though and language, with respect of which other functions are
simple  «approximation».  To this  first  universal  is  in  fact  essentially  the  “entity”  to
which  «nouns  and  other  (…)  approximate  expressions  are  anchored»4.  The  first
universal  is  therefore,  the  presentative  correlate  of  the  fundamental  verbal  and
predicative  formations.  The  relationship  between  first  universal  and  concept,  in  the
sense of logic, is yet for its part  highly articulated,  but the starting point is still  the
immediate  universal  which  emerges,  according  to  Lotze,  «through  the  simple
representations  (ideas)  [Vorstellungen]», which  are  therefore  the  first  element  from
which and by which the grasping of the first universal does find its “origin”. Therefore
1 Ibid., p. 28.
2 Ibid., p. 31.
3 Ibid., p. 28. 
4 H. Lotze, Logik, cit. p. 29.
152
Lotze writes pretty extensively:  
«Such a common element is usually considered by logic only in the form of a
universal concept, and in this shape it is a product of more or less numerous acts
of thought. It is therefore important to point out that this first universal, which we
find  here  involved in  the  comparison [Vergleichung]  of  simple  representations
[Vorstellungen], is of an essentially different kind; that it is the expression of an
inner  experience which thought  has merely to  recognize,  and that  just  for this
reason it is (...) an indispensable presupposition of that other kind of universal
which we shall meet with, in the formation of concepts»1.
In  this  long quote,  Lotze  basically shows how the  first  universal  which  emerge  by
experiential  comparison  between  simple  representation,  is  of  a  different  kind  with
respect to the universal which is traditionally associated in logic with universal concept
tout  court,  which  are  already  products  of  explicit  conceptual  formation.  The  first
universal, on the other side, is surely the indispensable presupposition of presentative
nature for the universal involved in explicit logical concept-formation.
Methodologically speaking, also another aspect of Lotze's inquiry into the first universal
could  represent  for  us  a  point  of  interest.  According to  Lotze  in  fact,  we impart  a
universal  concept  such  as  of  a  geometrical  figure  to  another  person  by,  basically,
inducing  him to  «execute  a  precisely  definable  series  of  psychical  operations»  and
relating in this manner «simple representations» already given. By this operation we can
summon or, in a slightly dangerous way of speaking, «put before his mind» the same
«content» we have and want to impart. But this operation cannot explain in the same
manner wherein the universal concept consists; which means, it cannot clarify for itself
the logical content which is  «meant» or «intended» when it is deployed. Besides the
closeness to nearly all the methodological points we have seen deployed in the first
section by the concept analysis, we see here very clearly expressed what such a original
concept analysis is about:    
«We can indeed direct another person to think of all single colors or all shades of
blue, and by eliminating their differences bring out what is common to his ideas in
1 Ibidem.
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the two cases;  but  it  is  only in  appearance a  logical  work which we are here
prescribing; all that we really call upon him to do is to see for himself how he
executes the task»1.
It is in other words impossible to explain to another person the operations leading to the
«common element in red and yellow» or how he is supposed to «separate the common
element from the different one»; but we can only trust  in his  having the immediate
experience «of the connection which exists between red and yellow» and in a following
«recognition  [Anerkennung]»  of  the  inner  experience  leading  to  the  first  universal,
which is therefore «no product of thought, but something which thought finds already in
existence»2. 
We find anyway in our experience only a single definite shade of color, only a tone of
definite height, which is the object of sensation; and it is only these definite impressions
which present substantial  and «perceptible images» to consciousness. But obviously,
Lotze stresses the distinction between this latter singular from the objectivity, where in
fact «Universal ideas never posses this kind of intuitability [Anschaulichkeit]». We find
always in perception or in collecting memory a definite color, tone etc., only with the
«accessory notion [Nebengedanken]» that every other tone and color has an equal right
to serve as a perceptible instance of the ever imperceptible universal3. The question is of
course  to  rightly  understand  that  representations  [Vorstellungen]  are  not  simply  the
consciousness of the «something in common» standing «at rest before the mind». In this
sense, a universal may never claim to be indicated as a representation. Even when we
are  inducted,  for  example,  by words  to  present  in  consciousness  representations  of
individual  colors  for  comparing  them  and  grasping  this  way  the  common  element
«which, anyway, our sensation testifies them to contain», we do not detach it by thought
from their differences and made an equally perceptible idea.
Probably pushed by the experiential framework of his inquiry into the first universal,
Lotze even comes to determine the range reached by the the experiential element and
the logical ones proper to the investigation.  To determine in each particular case what
this common element consists in, to decide whether a number of representations are
separated  merely  by  differences  in  degree  of  one  simple  universal,  or  whether
1 Ibid., p. 30.
2 Ibid., p. 31.
3 Ibid., p. 31.
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accordingly those latter form a linear series or in still higher forms, these are not objects
or topics for logic.  For such a task, and here Lotze clearly marks the boundaries of
reflection on the logical work, «it is enough to know that some generally applicable and
primarily  quantitative  determination  is  the  indispensable  means  for  distinguishing
between the particular instances of a universal». While a judgment, some of the form A
> B, is indeed, as a judgment, a logical piece of work1. This logical work can anyway be
based only on something which cannot find its definition in the same logical work: what
a judgment expresses, i.e.,  the general fact that differences of degree do exist in the
same matter, as well as the particular fact that the degree of a exceeds that A of B, «can
only be experienced, felt, or recognized as part of our inner consciousness»2. 
Lotze calls here in question the role played by the proper logical work which differs
from the mere «shaping the impressions into representations»3.  The kind of “logical
work”  involved  in  this  first  stage  does  not  imply  a  regarding  of  the  forms  of
substantivity, adjectivity, and verbality as modes of apprehension which thought put in
practice  upon its  content  before  receiving any stimulus  from it.  But  in  those forms
reasons even does not simply respond to, or simply reproduce the «actual current of
representations  [Vorstellungslauf]»,  rather,  «gives  them the  shape  without  which  the
logical spirit could not accept them»4. For Lotze therefore, the independence expressed
by means of the substantival form with its article, for example, does not lay in itself on
the  fact  that  «this  was  a  permanent  element  [Glied]  among  changing  groups  of
representations»,  but  rather  the  first  act  by which  thought  expresses  its  law on the
consciousness  content.  “Logical  work”  is  in  consequence  the  «acknowledgment
[Anerkennung]»  operated  on  the  basis  of  the  first  universal  «only  experienced  in
immediate sensation», and «verbal expression» for fixing its character, which is to be
found originally in the «immediate consciousness of certain characteristics given in the
content»5. 
Logical work and logic in general, does hereafter assume for itself the task of discern
the compatibility of representations and the possibility of subordination to universals.
But  it  does  so,  mainly  without  directly  taking  in  consideration  the  fact  that  the
1 Ibid., p. 57.
2 Ibid., p. 32 – 3.
3 The work involved, for example, in giving affirmative position to the object-matter or in distinguishing it
negatively from all others etc. 
4 Ibid., p. 34.
5 Ibid., p. 35. 
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possibility and even the success  of  its  own procedure in  general,  depends upon the
«original  constitution  and  organization»  of  what  Lotze  calls  «the  whole  world  of
representables».  A constitution  which  is  all  the  more  necessary  to  make  thinking
possible. Moreover, it is necessary for the formation of the basic universal to trace it in
respect  to:  the  unity  of  consciousness  and  the  synthesis  of  apprehension,  which  is
basically  the  combination  of  manifold  elements  in  the  instant  unity without  spatio-
temporal order, the synthesis of perception which ad the representation of space and
time, and the synthesis of the value in the determination of the whole coalescence1. So
long as the logical work of holding the manifold together does not go or goes  further
the  faculty  of  establishing  connection  into  wholes,  it  can  be  already be  spoken  of
«concepts» in Lotze's sense of the word. We can therefore always posses perfect or
developed concepts, but  «until the vague suggestion of some sort of whole has grown
into the pervading thought that there is a definite ground for the co-existence of these
particular attributes, in this particular combination and to the exclusion of certain others,
and that this ground is an adequate one»2.
Lotze even suggest an interesting explanation of how to get to this «definite ground»,
which seems basically to represent a method in order to reach and to indicate (or let
emerge)  necessary  elements  of  a  conceptual  universal.  First  the  “comparation”  of
different forms of connected elements and parts (a,b,c,d) with other slightly different
(a,b,c,e), in order to let emerge the nuclear form (a,b,c); then we can “bring to us”, even
for «practical purpose», «what is the line which divides what is inwardly coherent from
casual  accessions»  by  «bring  the  whole  in  motion»,  i.e.,  by  performing  a  sort  of
“variation”, 
«in the  belief  that  the influence  of  change will  show which  parts  hold firmly
together while foreign admixtures fall  away,  and in what general and constant
modes those parts combine while changing their relative positions in particular
cases: in this sum of constant elements we find the inner and essential cohesion of
the whole, and we expect it to determine the possibility and the manner of variable
1 Lotze makes such an example: «if, like the figures of geometry, it was something which had no reality out
of our consciousness and no growth or development in time, we should here too attempt at any rate to
arrange  the  elements  of  the  whole  in  a  hierarchy in  which  those  that  conditioned  others  should  take
precedence of those that were conditioned, according to their stages of dependence».
2 Ibid., p. 38 - 9. 
156
accretions»1.
The first method would lead to the formation of the logical or conceptual universal, but
Lotze stresses the centrality of the second method that of determining the element which
maintains itself in the same instance under changed conditions, because it is not only the
«common element»,  I.e,  the  universal,  in  several  groups  of  representation  which  is
therefore exposed by, but it is also justified the regard of these elements as coherent and
admissible  withing  the  same  concept.  Both  does  not  actually  represent  abstraction,
which is admittedly «the name given to the method by which the universal is found»
and  is  defined  by  the  process  through  which  what  it  is  different  in  the  particular
instances of a universal is leaved out after comparison, and by which it is added what
they posses in common. According to Lotze in fact, we do not find in actual thinking
such  a  “procedure”.  When  we  try  to  trace  the  universal  we  find  rather  that  it is
produced, not by simply leaving out the different marks p' and p'', q' and q'' which occur
in the individuals compared, but by substituting for those left out the universal marks P
and Q, of which p' p''  and q' q'' are particular kinds. This interpretation of abstraction,
which is called by Lotze «compensation by corresponding universal» for omission of
the individual marks, is the fundamental rule of abstraction, which apply in nearly all
cases of universal formation and at every logical level2. Thus,  Lotze briefly resumes the
important points regarding this articulated formation of universals as follow, stressing
therefore  the  fundamental role  of  the  first  universal  with  respect  to  conceptual
universality: 
«We have seen that the universal  marks (...)  which we require  here,  the “first
universal” (...), come to us without logical effort as simple facts of observation in
our mental life; and just for this reason they can be applied in building up this
second universal, which we do produce by logical effort. That the yellow of gold,
the red of copper, and the white of silver are only variations of a common element
which we proceed to call color, this is a matter of immediate sensation; but to a
person who could not sense it, it could never be explained by logical work either
that these particular impressions are species of this universal, or what is meant by
1 Ibid., p. 40.
2 Ibid., p. 41.
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a universal as such and the relation, of its particular to it. It is just this point to
which I would again draw attention here, that the immediate perception of a first
universal and the application of some kind of quantitative ideas is the condition of
the formation of the second universal in all cases (…)»1.
Besides the suggestive argumentation, which surely also clarify also some traits of the
general approach to the problem of conceptual universality by Husserl, we must stress
before entering the following section, that we do not think, Lotze's Logik does actually
influenced Husserl's approach. Husserl was surely well acquainted with the Logik before
the  Logical  Investigations,  where  in  fact  Lotze's  work  is  even  criticized;  but  the
terminology and the  theoretical  instruments  used by Husserl  are  to  be  found in the
previous works, such as the distinction between part and piece, of dependent and non-
independent moments, etc.  
3.2) Husserl and The Conceptual Universal.
For Husserl now, the problem of conceptual universality, and strictly related with it, the
complicated  issue  of  Husserl's  articulated  referring  and  definition  of  the  Universal
stricto sensu, shows up in an explicit way early in its production, but clearly in 18962. It
can be shown, starting from the early analysis Husserl dedicated to formal concepts and
to  representation  in  narrow  sense,  that  some  insights  emerging  from  the  1896
explanation were already present. But we will try instead to show, how some peculiar
aspects emerging from this meditations will then develop in different forms and under
different names, like in the case of what Husserl will call, still generally and broadly,
“essence” and “eidos” in the Logical Investigations, but importantly, for what concern
his  referring to  “universal”  and “ideal  objects”,  which is showed or “firmly” stated
here3. 
This central issue of Husserl's early work it appears obviously connected to a plenty of
1 Ibid., p. 41 – 2.
2 E. Husserl, “Das Allgemeine. Eine Studie. Aporien über das Allgemeine”, in Zur Lehre vom Wesen und der
eidetische Variation, in Husserliana, XL, cit., p. 1f. 
3 See, among the studies Husserl conducted within the methodological framework of the eidetical variation,
the  very  late  ones  on  «the  ontological  universality»  and  on  the  «essential  universal»,  in  the  1935
Manuscript “Allgemeines über die Methode der Variation. Abgrenzung des individuell eigenschaftlichen
Wesens des Exempels vom allgemeinen Wesen”, in ibid., p. 385.
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different  problems,  like  the  early  (critical)  theory  of  abstraction,  of  meaning  and
judgment, but even closely linked to the methodological framework and definition of
phenomenology. One of the more recurring issue that actually challenged Husserl in
reaffirming  the  nature  and  role  of  the  Universal,  and  accordingly  the  conceptual
universal, is notoriously the empirical, and especially strictly “intuitionistic” explicative
strategy in logic and epistemology. Starting from the influential works of Hume and
Mill, in fact,     
«(...) Empiricism, in the form of a degenerated Intuitionism, recognizes as form of
giveness  of  something  in  itself  [Selbstgebung]  only  the  experience  of  the
individual or temporal Particulars [Einzelheiten], and results therefore totally blind
about the fact that something universal [Allgemeines],  conceptual universalities
and  universalities  of  states  of  affairs  [Sachverhaltsallgemeinheiten]  can  be
immediately intuited with evidence and even are constantly intuited, so to speak.
(…) And therefore ignores also the fact that consciousness is a realm of immediate
eidetic-insights of pure universality and necessity»1. 
This later statement briefly summarizes what Husserl basically develops within his time
in  Halle  and Göttingen.  «Contesting  the  validity»  and possibility of  «purely eidetic
thinking» in fact, as Husserl affirms in the First Book of Ideas by retaking what already
exposed in the  Prolegomena2, means a bankruptcy of thought and science, and even
«cancels  out»  in  return  the  original  Empiricism and Skepticism from which  such a
criticism  originates  «by  means  of  a  countersense»3.  Moreover,  by  recalling  for  an
“intuition” [Anschauung] that reaches beyond the limit of «the direct experience which
only presents  particular  singularities  and no universalities»,  we are even allowed to
consider  science  universally  and  we  do  not  simply  identify  it  with  «experiential
science»4. Induction and mediate inference can in fact surely offer to science tools for
obtain «general propositions». The problem arises yet for Husserl, whether we ask for
the  truth  and limit  of  mediate  inference  and the  principles  governing the  modes of
inference, «like in the case of the syllogistic principles», which cannot be considered
1 E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie, erster Teil, cit., p. 171 - 2.
2 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. 118f.
3 E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch, cit.,
p. 43.
4 Ibid., p. 44.
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mere «empirical universalizations»1. Therefore,  guarantee for “pure universal thinking”
means guarantee for the very form of logical thinking.
The  same  quote  above  says  us  yet  already  something  more,  at  least  two  more
fundamental points about universalities and their role in the phenomenological approach
on the «higher forms of objectification» in experience2: 
A) The first one is Husserl's complex and articulated use for referring to the Universal. 
It  comprehends  in  fact  in  a  “narrower”  sense  the  something  universal,  which  is
essentially what he calls  «the conceptual universal». This latter  is  the universal that
defines and determines the object of experience, i.e., the «object-defining universal», as
Husserl  expresses  himself  it  in  19063.  Basically,  it  represents  what  is  conceptually
graspable in the singular object of experience, i.e., the concept in a more specific and
refined sense then the one seen till now, and by means of that, it is actually a «different
expression»,  so  Husserl  goes  further,  for  what  he  calls  in  the  years  of  the  arising
phenomenology,  and  especially  around  the  time  of  the  Logical  Investigations,
“essence”.  It  also  refers  yet  even  in  broader  sense  to  the  «universality  of  states  of
affairs». 
B) The second one is Husserl referring to the intuitable nature of such a universal, and
the  mention  of  the consciousness  as  the  sphere  within  which  the  different  kinds  of
universal giveness are to be found, i.e., the role of to the modalities and kinds of acts
involved  by the  grasping  of  the  universal,  which,  for  their  part,  can  be  described.
Therefore,  the second point  more generally and broadly refers to  the fundamentally
phenomenological insight into the fact that,  universals, as essence or ideas,  «can be
intended [gemeint] and can be given in themselves, by directly showing as such in the
intuition of ideas [Ideenanschauung]»4. This latter expression, which is to be found in a
1913  manuscript,  is  only  a  later  version  of  the  «eidetic  intuition»,  which  also
methodologically  defines  early  phenomenology as  «eidetics»,  i.e.,  as  an  a  priori  or
eidetical science5.  
In his 1906 Lecture on Logic Husserl comes to express very briefly but at the same time
1 Ibidem, and especially Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. 88f.
2 E. Husserl, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungem 1906/07, in Husserliana XXIV, cit.,
274.
3 Ibid., p. 302.
4 E. Husserl, “Zur Gegebenheit von Ideen”, in  in  Zur Lehre vom Wesen und der eidetische Variation,  in
Husserliana, XL, cit., p. 89. 
5 R. Sowa, “Eidetics and its methodology”, in The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology, ed S. Luft and
S. Overgaard, (Routledge, New York, 2012), p. 254. 
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in a very weighty manner what already said now:       
«Authentic consciousness of universality of the kind that constitutes the givenness
of the universal is well-founded consciousness. It presupposes consciousness of
particularity, namely, when it is actually to be given, an intuitive consciousness.
Of special  interest  here is  that,  for  givenness,  it  does  not  matter  whether  the
individual or particular is for its part given <in> the form of perception or in the
form of fantasy and other figuration. If we place a red in fantasy and a red in
perception (and, if we compare several reds in fantasy, or in the imagination in
general, it is then the same thing) in the synthesis of comparison, then, despite the
different  mode  of  givenness  that  they  constitute,  they  ground  an  intuitive
consciousness of equality and possibly of universality. And, the latter gives the
universal red. We see it. We see it, whether it is a matter of identification on the
basis of perceptions or other intuitions. It is the same universal.
Our speaking of essence is just a different form of expression <for the universal>,
an expression having a primitive relationship to the particular object that “has”
the  essence.  Everything  conceptually  graspable  about  the  object,  namely
specifiable  by  internal  predicates,  is  its  essence  or  belongs  to  its  essence.
Furthermore, then, objectively considered, every universal is called an essence, an
essentiality  (ein  Wesen,  eine  Essenz).  The  expression  “universal  object”  is
shunned, because object is a word preferably used for individual objects, even for
things [Dinge]»1.
In this long quote we find resumed what it is substantially at issue by the conceptual
universal as it developed from the time in Halle and the first years in Göttingen, passing
through  an  already  more  deep  refinement  and  improvement  in  the  Logical
Investigations. 
Interesting for us is already Husserl's explicit assert on the misleading definition of the
universal as “object”, which recall in fact the image and the interpretation of such a
logical and epistemological entities in the sense of an erroneous reification, i.e., in the
sense  of  the  “thing”  which  may compromise  the  comprehension  of  the  essence  as
1 E. Husserl, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungem 1906/07, in Husserliana XXIV, cit.,
p. 298 – 9. Italics mine.
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interpreted by Husserl. But on the other side, surely Husserl makes abundant use and
freely indicates ideal and «universal objects» to refer, for example, to «meanings» in the
sense which appears exposed in the  First Logical Investigation1.  Therefore, there is a
sense in speaking of «objects» not in the sense of the «real objects as objects of nature»,
but instead in the sense «of the ideal, of the categorial», which we can «glance at» in a
judgmental  lived-experience,  and  which  «is  surely  something  like  the  essence»,
according  to  Husserl2.  He  writes  for  example  late  on,  in  the  Phänomenologische
Psychologie  lecture,  looking  back  to  the  essential  acquisitions  of  the  Logical
Investigations: 
«Same  unreal,  i.e.,  ideal  objects  are  in  their  numerical-identical  singularity
substrate of true or false judgments, exactly as real objects; on the contrary, object
in  the  most  logically  general  sense  means  nothing  else  than  “something
whatever”, about which it is possible to speak truthfully and meaningfully»3.
Equally important, Husserl does refer by the universal with a certain preference in the
long quote above to the “conceptual universal”, i.e., to the universal by means of which
the object is “defined” and at the same time “determined”, and which moreover may
function as significations for certain class of words, when verbally fixed, such as nouns
or adjectives. Moreover, these latter appear and are also comprehended, in the form of
non-independent  parts  of state of affairs,  as “essence”,  which are in fact defined as
«universalities  of  state  of  affairs». In  this  sense,  «objectively  considered»,  such  a
universal posits more or less explicitly something factical corresponding in its content.
This even emphasize and connect its peculiar role by the «signification of certain verbal
expressions»4 especially after the Logical Investigations, like in the case of the reference
of predication so briefly exposed in a 1914 manuscript:  
«Characteristic is equal to property [Eigenshaft] (…). The essence moment (in my
<Husserl's> sense)  corresponding  to  the  property,  to  the  characteristic,
1 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 106.
2 E.  Husserl,  “Das  Perzeptionale”,  in  E.  Husserl,  Wahrnehmung  und  Aufmerksamkeit,  in  Husserliana,
XXXVIII, cit., p. 244.
3 E. Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie, cit., p. 22. 
4 See,  R. Sowa, “The Universal as 'What is in Common': Comments on the  Proton-Pseudos  in Husserl’s
Doctrine of the Intuition of Essence”, cit., p. 536.
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corresponds now to the core of the predicate meanings. The whole essence of the
individual (and corresponding: the totality, the whole property of the constituting
own-peculiar-being  [Eigensein])  has  its  correlate  in  a  core  of  a  whole  and
exhaustive predicate»1.
The aspects of the conceptual universal saw, define in their interconnection the early
traits  of  the Husserlian «theory of essence» as substantially articulated into the two
connected aspect. 
First: the indication of the Universal, and especially the conceptual universal, as the
term which defines Husserl's  referring to “Essence” and (before the refinement in a
more specific connotation) eidos. That leads moreover, on the one side, to the need to
define what Husserl even before the introduction of the term Essence means with the
“universal”; on the other side, the reasons for ascribing the status of “objects”, and in
particular, “universal” objects to the universal so defined. These latter two points are
especially in question around 1896.  
Second:  and  the  indication  of  phenomenological  “method”  for  the  cognition  of  the
essence (broadly called Wesensschau). What it is basically at issue with that, is an initial
securing of access to non-particular meaning formations and access to an experiential
domain that transcends atomistic perception. In fact, the problem partially underlying
the theory of essence recalls to a certain extent what in modern empiricism was the
epistemological  problem  of  abstraction,  and  moreover,  the  meditations  on  the
separability of formal meaning from concrete particulars, a separability which normally
calls for process of generalization and formalization per se. For our aim, we will only
partially refer to the sphere of fundamental questions, which are already for themselves
an entire realm of phenomenological investigations.
3.2.1)  The  early  Analysis  of  the  Universal  and  Universal  Objects:  From  the  1896
Aporetic Analysis to the Definition as Unity in the Multiplicity
  
The  problem of  the  nature  of  the  universal  [das  Allgemeine]  is  token  as  object  of
1 E. Husserl, “Auseinandersetzung mit Jean Hering über das Gesamtwesen, das unwandelbare Wesen des
Naturdinges und andere Ideen als Einheiten gegenüber Exemplaren als ihren Vereinzelungen”  (1914),  in
Zur Lehre vom Wesen und der eidetische Variation, in Husserliana, XL, cit., p. 84. 
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conceptual  analysis  explicitly in  1896, as  we have said.  Husserl  tries in  a  series of
manuscripts to affirm by aporetic argumentation  «the strictly identity of the universal
and the existence of universal objects»1. By the aporetic argumentation, Husserl takes
different  insights  on  the  existence  and status  of  the  Universal  and try to  stress  the
contradiction of the one against the others in order to affirm (or eventually negate) such
an entity and its definition. We can therefore assume the aporetic meditations as a sort
of concept analysis. 
In the case of the universal, we can examine the basic theories even starting from the
most  simple  and classical  example,  which  will  become famous in  later  works:  two
objects  with  the  same  color.  The  following  basic  question  takes  such  a  shape:  the
common color of the two objects is something identical among all the objects with the
same color,  but without  constituting what Husserl  calls  «an object in  itself»? which
would consequently be distinguished from its «cases» or, generally speaking, from its
«instantiations»2? According to the possible answers, we affirm: 1) universal objects do
exist, to which correspond a multiplicity of single cases as non-independent moments in
the objects; the single case is actually not the specie of an universal, which is a unity; 2)
universal objects do exist, but only insofar they are given as «an identical element in the
multiplicity of the single elements», which means, the universal is a «part» in them: two
objects have an identical moment in common [gemeinsam]. The singularities are not
cases of the species, but only the «bearers» of the identical universal, which is a part
[Teil] in them and not a “piece” [Stück]; 3) there are no general or universal objects, and
to speak about something universal is a fiction connected to a linguistic use3. In the
different cases we will find therefore:
In 1) to the same concept presentation do actually corresponds «identical parts» in the
objects belonging to the extension of the concept; the Identical is the Universal. 
2) to the same concept presentation, on the contrary, do not correspond any identical
parts. Therefore, we find here like parts, i.e., they are equal [gleich] to each other.
In the traditional ontology, universals were conceived as “hypostatisations” of forms,
which are direct results of abstraction from the sensuous, from particulars, and seen
1 E. Husserl, “Das Allgemeine. Eine Studie. Aporien über das Allgemeine”, in Zur Lehre vom Wesen und der
eidetische Variation, in Husserliana, XL, cit., p. 21.
2 Speaking now with a later expression, E. Husserl,  Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana
XVIII, cit., p. 135f. 
3 E. Husserl, “Das Allgemeine. Eine Studie. Aporien über das Allgemeine”, in Zur Lehre vom Wesen und der
eidetische Variation, in Husserliana, XL, cit., p. 2.
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therefore  as specie.  As  eide,  for  example,  those  are  considered  universals  of  least
specific  differences  under  which  only  individual  substances  fall,  and  are  to  be
considered  object,  i.e.,  «individuals  of  higher  order»1.  The  first  Husserl  insights
proposed, seems to actually recalling such a theory with respect of the Universal. In this
case we have in fact:
a) what Husserl calls «universal presentation» of a property, to which correspond an
identical “part” in the manifold of objects.  
b) to the property corresponds a «universal object».
According  to  Husserl,  in  this  case  the  objects  which  fall  under  the  same «concept
determination [begriffliche Bestimmung]» do have the same common part as identical
part. They can surely have also a «piece» in common, than we have the case of two
objects with a common “concrete part”, like in the case of two shapes with the same
color that actually “share” or belong to the same and identical surface,  or the same
object  considered under  the same facet  in different  times.  We can consider  the two
different shapes as «something abstracted», but in this case Husserl seems to refer to
“abstracted”  in  the  sense  of  “extracted”:  the  common  fraction  is  «individually  the
same».  But  if  we consider  now,  for  instance,  the  «geometrical  element  of  different
objects», like their form, this «abstract» is not a fraction but the «like» or equal part
belonging to different objects.  If  they have an identical fraction,  the form would be
identical,  otherwise  likely  the  same.  Even  more  complex  is  the  case  of  the  same
identical object or even two different objects, in two different moments and under the
same respect: in this case, Husserl seems to stress the fact that we must importantly
consider the abstract part as «something different» in the sense of different individuals,
which are equal but «never truly identical in logical sense»2. 
When we focus now with Husserl on the different nature of the «abstract parts» we find
two different characterization of the,  we may say,  “factical” counterpart  «of what is
abstract» in the case of what it is for its part «something individual», and what it is
instead «something universal» in the sense of «something specific», both belonging as
part  to  a  not-independent  moments.  On  the  side  of  what  it  is  individual  we  find
«individualizing  moments»,  when,  on  the  side  of  the  something  universal,  we  find
1 Terminology borrowed from G. T. Null and R. A. Simons, “Manifolds, concepts and Moment Abstracta”, in
ed. B. Smith,  Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology (Philosophia Verlag, Münich,
Wien, 1981), p. 439f.
2 E. Husserl, “Das Allgemeine. Eine Studie. Aporien über das Allgemeine”, in Zur Lehre vom Wesen und der
eidetische Variation, in Husserliana, XL, cit., p. 3.
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rather  «not-individualizing  moments».  To  such  a  distinction  now,  Husserl  lets
correspond the traditional classification which have,  importantly for connecting such
complex exposition to the wider sense of the inquiry, also predicative significance of:
concrete              abstract
subject                predicate
individual           universal
In this  sense,  for example,  when we affirm “Socrates is  p”,  we not  merely refer to
Socrates  (or  to  the  S  in  general)  as  what  Husserl  calls  an  «immediate  presentation
[direkte Vorstellung]», but to a «multiplicity of presentations» which can even changes
in thought and content, but that, still and only by still «presenting the same object». This
distinction is, according to Husserl, the basis for the other fundamental one between the
«immediate  presentation»  which  is  linked  to  the  «concrete  individual»,  and  the
«attributive presentation» which is for its part correlate to the «unity of the metaphysical
individual».  Both guarantee in predication coherence and constancy of attribution in
spatial-temporal or attributive changes1. 
In the sense of the «aporetic analysis» Husserl  also try to  understand how and if  a
universal moment can achieve identity, which would directly link to the objectivity of
the  universal  moment,  and to  the  problem of  its  possible  intuitability.  This  kind  of
analysis  is  applied  to  the  identity  of  the  species  by  means  of  the  analysis  of  the
Universal identity2. Husserl's approach is close to the one already seen. 
According to a thesis, only the individualizing moment as characterized above can be
truly identical, therefore also the specific moment, i.e., the non-individualizing moment
is identified through the intuitions of the identical part holding also the specific moment.
Hence, this thesis is a version of the skeptical argument seen in the previous section3,
and it generates difficulties by the explication of the relationship between «moment of
1 Ibid.,  p.  4  –  5.  Husserl  tries  to  apply  this  type  of  distinction  of  individual  and  universal  to  the
comprehension of place and point in time as intuitive moment. The actual extension, like a surface, may be
in fact  an  intuitive moment,  but  if  we do not  apply the above distinction,  the fundamental  difference
between the same extension and the «absolute place» would not emerge. Moreover,  this latter is not a
simple  multiplicity,  but  we  find  order  and  relations  in  it,  i.e.,  it  represents  in  fact  an  «euclidean
multiplicity», according to Husserl.
2 Also in the 1913 manuscript “Zum Verhältnis des Begriffs zu seinen Gegenständen. Der Begriff als Spezies
ein  Identisches,  aber  kein  Individuelles”,  in Zur  Lehre  vom  Wesen  und  der  eidetische  Variation,  in
Husserliana, XL, cit., p. 27 – 8.  
3 See, 3.1.
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the part and moment of the whole». In the case of color for instance, if we suppose a
general and “fixed” connection between its non-independent moment and the extensive
fraction as its  basis,  we deny the evidence of the color  shades  of the whole in  the
apprehension of the whole-moment color (white, for example). The whole color is in
fact much more the «complexion of the color species which do belong to the particulars
(…) to the parts», and in this sense is defined as a «unitary gestalt-quality» and, by
means of that, it depends on extension and position of the single colors1. The way by
which non-independent moments of the fractions belongs to the whole as determining
moments,  differs  from  the  way  by  which  fractions  belong.  Moreover,  the  abstract
moments  of  the  whole are  “grasped” also independently from certain  fraction2.  The
abstract moments of the fractions are grasped by the fractions and as such they belongs
to the whole as its parts.         
«So, if I call an object white, the abstract moment white is properly a gestalt-
quality, formed by the fusion [Versmelzung] of all moments “white” that belongs
to every single part of the extension. The fusion offers an “uniform” unity because
of the lack of delimitation. Delimitation is gained through coloration distinction,
and in this case the fusion offers the unity of the multiplicity of what is different,
while  <in  the  first  case>  we  have  the  unity  in  the  multiplicity  of  what  is
qualitatively uniform and only local continuously changing»3.
After the exclusion of this aporia, which would, in other words, deny the whole quality
and mistaking the way fractions belongs to the whole with the way abstract parts do4,
the inquiry continues, importantly for us, into the identity and the kind of identity of the
Specie. 
Husserl  delineates an analysis  which already takes in question an higher  conceptual
formation, but the very question remains similarly formulated: all color parts have an
identical moment in common, the Specie “color”; two triangles have the same [dieselb]
1 E. Husserl, “Das Allgemeine. Eine Studie. Aporien über das Allgemeine”, in Zur Lehre vom Wesen und der
eidetische Variation, in Husserliana, XL, cit., p. 5.
2 Like in the case of fractions too small to be perceived, which are quality-determining anyway. See also, E.
Husserl, Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit, in Husserliana, XXXVIII, p. 53f. This part belongs to the text
of the 1904 lecture on perception. 
3 E. Husserl, “Das Allgemeine. Eine Studie. Aporien über das Allgemeine”, in Zur Lehre vom Wesen und der
eidetische Variation, in Husserliana, XL, cit., p. 7.
4 This same argument is taken by Husserl nearly 10 years later in his 1906 Logik Lecture. See, E. Husserl,
Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungem 1906/07, in Husserliana XXIV, cit., 295f. 
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moment “form”. The question is now about the nature of such a possible “common
identical”.  By affirming this  latter  as  a  «constituting part» in  different  cases,  a  part
which is identical between, on the one side, the different abstract parts of a whole, and,
on  the  other  side,  between  different  individuals  which  posses  an  identical  moment
(different shapes with the same moment “form”), may generate another aporetic inquiry.
This analysis importantly aims to elucidate how experientially follows the identity of
the specie, i.e., its connection to an intuitive real of experience. 
According  to  Husserl,  we  face  here  two  possibilities:  Or  (α),  we  «immediately
recognize», which means, we somehow directly grasp the Identical intuitively, or (β),
we are put in front of a whole or different wholes, whose parts are equal, than we refer
to the «class» belonging to  the Specie.  Both positions must  undergo for Husserl  an
examination. 
A critical  point which strikes both points is the impossibility to start  the process of
recognition of the «common over against the multiplicity» of parts without a previous
recognition of the Identical in the Individual. The previous recognition seems in fact to
already assume the possibility to  identify the «delimitations» among the parts or, more
in general, among the unities, which are mandatory for intuitively develops the «points
of  view  [Hinsichten]»  in  the  comparative  passing  through  the  elements  of  the
multiplicity1. In order to “gain” the one common element over against the multiplicity
delimitations among the unities are in fact necessary; otherwise, we would already have
a unity.
A possible solution for α and even more for β calls in question experience in the sense
of a repeated encounter with objects, which is yet important for Husserl under two point
of views:
1) the fact that we find similarities among the element of a set which may establish
«class of likeness [Ähnlichkeitsklasse]» but  also the equally fundamental differences
which are also mandatory in order to distinguish and define the common element2;
2) this process establishes the «unitary thread of likeness» which would help, even in
mere experience, to shape the «appearing in likeness of all <the components> which
1 E. Husserl, “Das Allgemeine. Eine Studie. Aporien über das Allgemeine”, in Zur Lehre vom Wesen und der
eidetische Variation, in Husserliana, XL, cit., p. 9f.
2 Two shapes can be like under the respect of the form, but different under another respect. This kind of
experiential-oriented  fundation  of  relationships  among  individuals  may  also  work  among  species  and
genera themselves, like in the case of different forms.    
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stay in such a unity»1. Hence, according to this theory, likeness taken for itself would
represent and refer to the  Genus, the different “forms” of likeness the  Specie and the
individual likeness given the cases or instantiations of this latter.          
In spite of the fact that this thesis about the identity of the Specie may appear consistent,
it lacks in explaining exactly the objectivity of the Specie. This objectivity in fact cannot
involve a «regress in infinitum»2. But if we operate with class or groups of likeness and
we define a Specie or a Genus on the basis of a last difference between them, it results
impossible to intuitively explain how we reach the last difference which distinguish a
Specie for itself. If we have objects which all likely have the moment “form”, we should
find the difference among them which defines a Specie “triangle”, and moreover, which
distinguishes it from “square”. This distinction may be possible only following back to
the moment “form” in order to establishing the defining difference among the objects,
which  supposes  for  its  part  exactly  the  moment  form from which  it  generates  the
distinction. Also to call in an even higher genera (for example, angles) in order to obtain
the specific difference would be of no help, for such moments do belong to a even more
larger class. 
Briefly,  the general problem indicated by Husserl  in such a description is  about the
difficulty of intuitively grasp likeness and difference, and that in two peculiar sense: the
general issue regarding the intuitable nature of those latter, and, more in general, the
difficult starting point of the process by which we become aware of such concepts3.
Under  this  point  of  view,  the  aporia  seems  to  hit  the  mark;  at  least,  we  can  here
recognize the problems involved in the early formulation of the intuition issue, i.e., the
exclusive lean on mere contents.
In others pages yet, Husserl takes again the identity issue, in particular, the «identity of
the Universal». Among the thesis presented and partially criticized by Husserl, we want
here  briefly  expose  only  the  more  significant  ones.  The  starting  point  of  the
argumentation in this 1896 pages is again the well know example of the «two objects
with like parts or moments, for example, two horses likely colored». Now, if affirm that
the two objects are likely colored, means that the two objects have their own color-
moments and that among both lays «likeness», therefore we may affirm «in both objects
1 Ibidem.
2 Ibid., p. 11.
3 Hence, we recall here the function of description.
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inhere [einwohnen]  an identical Being, the Genus, or more specifically, the Specie»1.
Here the Specie identity is linked to the likeness. Therefore, we may here speak about,
and distinguish between, the Specie and the «single cases».
But: 
- in this case, we cannot speak about a relationship between Specie and cases of the
specie. At least,  not in the sense of a specie  in re, which would inhere every single
pieces. It is in fact surely an identical part among the different cases and all fractions
have the same identical non-independent moment. Important is only to understand that,
in this case, «we are not speaking of the same   identity which is in question when we
say that two objects do share a common fraction, like in the case of two houses which
share a wall»2.            
- the Specie is the «identical something which inherent in [innewohnen] all the cases».
Therefore, the specie divided whether we have more objects with the same specie. An
identical moment would this way belong to the «respective moments» of all objects and,
paradoxically, the objects would not be truly distinguished and divided.   
-  not  the moments  are  identical,  but  rather  what  Husserl  defines  «the significations
[Bedeutungen]», and now, in the «subjective acts» the significations are «the same thing
that the moments».
- moreover, we must distinguish the sense by which we call two or more objects “like”
or identical, and when the same formal relationship is applied to moments of objects.
«We speak of likeness and identity in different sense»: in the first case, the likeness is
established under a respect, in the other case, it is spoken «absolutely»3. When we call 2
or more objects, or in general individuals, “equal”, we do so under «a respect», and
therefore we establish such a respect4. But, «two equal moments, if taken for themselves,
are indiscernible  [ununterscheidbar]»5. That also means, discernible and indiscernible
moments belong to objects, where the former «are called non-identical moments», while
the latter «identical». Where we do not find differences among the moments, therefore
«all become one». When we find likeness between objects as wholes we find therefore
1 E. Husserl, “Das Allgemeine. Eine Studie. Aporien über das Allgemeine”, in Zur Lehre vom Wesen und der
eidetische Variation, in Husserliana, XL, cit., p. 12. For example,  E. Husserl,  Logische Untersuchungen,
zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 106, 115, 118.
2 E. Husserl, “Das Allgemeine. Eine Studie. Aporien über das Allgemeine”, in Zur Lehre vom Wesen und der
eidetische Variation, in Husserliana, XL, cit., p. 12.
3 Ibid., p. 13.
4 Ibid., p. 26.
5 Ibid., p. 14. Husserl's italics.
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identical parts among differences, where the differences are qualitative or based in their
different way to be connected to the objects (like distances). While among parts, their
likeness or equality means identity, they have «internal moments» which are identical
with the exclusion of the external moments:
«The White here and the White there are, considered for themselves, identical,
they coincide. But they have also external determinations, they belong to different
objects, they have different moments connected together. (…) Even if I must yet
pay attention to the white per se, so it is also something per se. When I consider
the things this way, equality emerges and the equality connects in fact White and
White»1.
Only when I  consider the connection of the parts  then differences emerges,  but this
latter «concern only the connection, and only indirectly the Whites». Whit this latter is
guaranteed for the distinction between the White of the Dog and the White of the piece
of paper. But as “law”, Husserl affirms: if a plurality of contents must stay in a likeness
relationship, among them at least a difference must be given; otherwise, equality ends
up as long as «plurality merge into unity»2.
Of course, the question became soon, how is to be conceived the relationships between
the identity in the sense of the likeness among the moments and the strictly identity of
the one, i.e., «the identity of the one with itself» says Husserl. According to him, this
question is «close», or to be related to the one about how is to be distinguished the
identity in the sense of the equality among the abstract moments with respect to the
identity of a “piece”, like in the case of two different surfaces which share an identical
common piece. 
1 Ibid. p. 15.
2 Ibidem
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This unclear comparison can be, in our opinion, differently understood. But what seems
to generally emerge could be resumed as follow. The piece is an “object” and it is a part
in two different “objects”, which means, it is the same element which is shared within a
relation, for example, in the case of likeness between two parts which are likely colored.
A ≈ B and ϑ will be the common element between both by being the bearer – Husserl
speaks about being the “subject” -  of two different characteristics.  Now, in order to
identify  this  proper  “piece”,  the  distinctions  between  the  two  parts  sharing  are
fundamental, in the sense that, the much the distinction is marked the easier results to
identify the common piece, ϑ. The problem arises when we take in consideration the
shapes of colors on a surface, which for itself compose in fact a «multiplicity»1. This
latter is due to the smaller «distance» between the different nuances of the same color,
while it results easier by two color of different kind, like in the case of red and blue.
Different shapes of green instead do form such a multiplicity because of the «fusion
between the  shades».  In  the  case  of  two different  kind  of  color,  would  be  easy to
identify the  common piece,  which is  the  genus color.  Here  is  in  fact  important  the
difference and the distinction between the parts. 
But now, Husserl stresses, even by the shapes of green, due to the fusion among them,
we reach identity and the kind identity is based in fact on such an identity. Therefore,
explaining the identity on the base of equality and likeness  with the existence of a
difference among the parts, and then apply the same explication for both, the arising
identity of kind and genus, seems to generate difficulties due to the role assigned to the
difference by the distinction of, exactly, the “piece” identity.        
1 Ibid., p. 17.
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This peculiar difficulty leads Husserl to recognize first that «by the concept formation, it
is  not  in  question,  whether  it  exists  real  [wirklich]  equality,  but  instead,  that  we
distinguish, that something is taken for equality or difference»1. And second, that the
difficulty falls back to the impossibility to form a class on which a kind could be based
on: in the case of two, suppose, identical Reds, we find everything indistinct; by two
shapes  of  red  instead,  equality  increases  continuously,  generating  the  same
indistinctness. We have to assume therefore, «equality in narrow sense as “identity” of
the infima specie», for instance, this determinate shade of red; and likeness, where we
find different shades of red continuously changing and with certain «distances» among
them,  that  constitute  a  class  of  order.  But  the  kind  of  relations,  for  example,  the
difference in intensity among the shades, do not allow to form the kind or even the
genus with which we could establish such a class, as we have seen. Are we forced to say
that the contents in itself do contain now specie and genus? But this way we will still
face the difficulty already seen, concerning how to find the last difference among them
which could lead to the distinction that defines and distinguish a specie for itself in
identity.    
A solution  could  be:  the  different  abstract  moments  of  an  object  are  different  and
distinguished  only  «within  the  connection»;  which  means,  assuming  that  the  same
moment does enter in different connections,  in this way it  assumes within them the
«external determinations» which distinguish it, but, for itself, remains everywhere the
same: «The same moment appears in a variety of connections, and acquires in them
different  external  determinations,  for  itself  remains  yet  everywhere  the  same».  But
Husserl continues, «can I this way still speak about a plurality of cases of White? Is the
moment White here and there twofold? It is identically the same Specie, but in another
relationship?» But actually, the connection does not mean here in fact to “decompose”
[Zerfallung]? By means of which also intuitively we can say, the White here and the
White there, are distinct things but are identical as white. By the fall of connection, it
results merely a multiplication [Vervielfältigung] of the presentations, while by the latter
fall also the identical multiplies, distinguishes itself in different cases, but the mean of
the  identity  among  the  two  relations  is  the  same:  the  lived-experience  of  the
identification does not  differ  and it  is  indistinguishable in  both case,  as  long as we
recognize a certain determination as the same, which means, as long as the first White
1 Ibid., p. 18.
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and  the  second  one  are  indistinguishable  due  our  having  abstracted  from  the
connections. Here, abstraction is a form of attention bestowed on the identity, while this
identity  is  called  by  Husserl  «the  Universal»  by  representing  the  «unity  in  the
multiplicity of the connections»1. 
The connections only confers to the identical its external determinations, but they do not
divide it, it preserves its own identity and unity, and when I bestow attention on the
White, I am not actually grasping the identity of the single case, but of the specie. The
specie in fact is not a part in the whole, but the whole object owns now the White in the
form of a case of the specie.  Moreover,  the different cases have all  this element as
common in  themselves,  and that  means,  in  return,  every Species  belong  a  class  of
abstract parts and objects. Husserl comes to state, he will keep to the «strictly identity of
the Universal and to the existence of universal objects»2.
The existence of this  “universal  objects” is  derived by Husserl  by starting from the
definition of the universal objects as «abstract object». These latter are basically defined
as «objects which have the same identical content as other objects»3. They are therefore,
it could be argued, unities which share the content with other objects, where the content
of the abstract object is the one identical among the latter ones. In this sense in fact
Husserl  seems  to  arguing  for  the  existence  of  abstract  objects  with  the  same
argumentation taken for the existence of a unity in the connection. Abstract objects are
in fact define as «cases» of a class of universality, as non-independent entities, whose
individuality is granted by its not corresponding to any other object whatsoever. And
now,  also  their  difference  with  respect  to  «concrete  objects»  is  defined in  terms  of
connection: an object which, as taken for itself, «can exists in only one connection», is a
concrete object; on the other hand, «an object which exists and can exist in more then
one connection is an abstract object»4.
By such a long and complex argumentation that aims to exclude possible hypothesis in
order to gain a stable insights on the question about the nature of the Universal, some
basics point emerge more clearly than others but are all of some basic importance. The
specie  is  substantially  defined  as  a  unity  in  the  multiplicity,  where  this  latter  is
1 Ibid., p. 21.
2 Ibidem.
3 E. Husserl, “Innere und äußere Gleichheit bzw. Identität. Inwiefern individuelle und abstrakte Gegenstände
sich darin unterscheiden, ob es ein ihnen innerlich Identisches geben kann. Gegenstände als Exemplare
einer Allgemeinheit und singuläre Gegenstände”, in in Zur Lehre vom Wesen und der eidetische Variation,
in Husserliana, XL, cit., p. 25.
4 Ibid., p. 26.
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conceived  in  a  large  sense;  it  can  be  the  multiplicity  of  objects  or  a  variety.  The
Universal (Specie) is the identical moment which is to be found among the parts and
find its actual instantiation due to the connections; but when abstracted, it emerge also
in identity and unity. The Specie for itself maintains in fact its identity and unity, even
when it is actually grasped as a part. Abstraction is for its part, now differently defined,
which means,  in the sense of an attention close to a “meaning” the unity.  The part
corresponding to the Universal, defines the whole. In this sense in fact, the moment or
the parts are also predicatively relevant. Not only because to them do correspond in the
act a possible signification, but also because, when conceived as the identical, are also
the reference established for a relation. Under the same respect are equally important
Husserl's meditations on the concept determination, under which objects with defining
parts (as the universal) fall, but also due to the basic predicative structure which Husserl
recognizes in his analysis,  as we have seen by speaking of individualizing and not-
individualizing moment. To these Husserl links also peculiar form of presentations and
the  distinctions  among subject  and predicate,  with  the  corresponding elements,  saw
within the sphere of attribution. With this latter reflections are in fact already present,
besides the sense of Universal as Specie, the very fundamental traits of the conceptual
universal which we have see at the beginning of the section and which we will find
again later on.  
3.2.2) The Logical Investigations.
Later on, i.e., starting from the first edition of the Logical Investigations, Husserl takes
and  explicitly  apply  this  peculiar  conception  of  the  Universal  as  Specie  and  as
“universal objects”, using the term Specie for example, connected to the term Eidos,
which for its part still does not hold the more specif sense used in the first Book of
Ideas  for  «distinguishing the absolutely important Kantian concept of Idea from the
universal concept of (formal or material Essence)»1. In this sense, Husserl uses here the
term Specie and universal objects in the sense emerged, which means, with a meaning
1 E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch, cit.,
p. 8.
175
so  wide  that  comprehends  basically  all  kind  of  idealities.  Species  are  for  example
conceptual universalities in the form of the traditional  Universalia  (“White”, “Man”)
under which objects fall, but also every kind of abstract objects and meanings of every
kinds, among them, also meanings of entire propositions. The specie or universal object
takes here in fact the sense already seen: every unity which individualizes itself as the
same identical one in a multiplicity (of individuals) and which is grasped or can be
grasped as the identical element or moment in common among objects.
This kind of conception lays the very basis for Husserl's general or “formal” definition
of ideality, which also conducts him in a slightly mistaking way, later on modified, to
identify the form of ideality which belongs to the conceptual universal and to essence
which can have an extension, like in the case of the concepts in the earlier works, to the
one belonging to meanings. Those latter are in fact also conceived as ideal unities that
individually singularize in real objects (like characters) and in  real  [reell] moments of
intentional lived-experiences, but not in the same way of universals. Meanings ideality
is a «special case» of the ideality in general, but it is not a special case of the ideality of
the specie absolutely. Husserl writes in fact in the 1908 Lecture on Bedeutungslehre:
«Meanings as such can be an identical of many positing acts, they are an ideal, as
long as they are not real [reell] pieces of such acts, which means, as long as they
do not come and go with them, for new and new acts can identically comprehend
the same meaning. (…) Now, this ideality is yet not ideality in my original sense
<Logical Investigations> (which I have mistaken with), the ideality of the Eidos,
of the Essence as a “Universality”. Universal objects in the sense of meanings and
universal objects in the sense of Specie are clearly to be distinguished»1.    
Anyway,  the  Spezie  conception  of  ideality  and  meanings  is  surely  defining  in  the
Logical Investigations. In fact, along the pages of the 1900 influential work, we find
different statements and even within different contexts leading to the comprehension of
the role played here by this interpretation of the Universal in the sense of “the unity in a
multiplicity”. 
The first articulated reference is for example to be found already in the Prolegomena,
1 E. Husserl, Vorlesung über Bedeutungslehre. Sommersemester 1908, in Husserliana XXVI, ed . U. Panzer,
(Martinus Nijhof, Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster, 1987), p. 217.
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and  more  precisely  in  the  part  dedicated  to  the  critic  against  Sigwart's  alleged
anthropologism in the explanation of logical validity.  In this context, Husserl speaks
explicitly «of the Universal, i.e., the idea», in this case the idea of truth, in the sense of a
identical unity arising from a multiplicity of «concrete individual cases»1. It could be of
some interest to briefly expose the main points of Husserl's argument in this pages; we
find here in fact some of the main traits of his conception clearly exposed.   
Husserl's  starting  points  is  in  fact  already the  description  of  the  «lived-experience»
which  defines  the  experience,  the  consciousness  of  the  Universal,  i.e.,  the  kind  of
«lived-experience in that totally different sense in which a Universal, an Idea, is a lived-
experience». Already by speaking of «experiencing and “coming to consciousness”»,
we refer to such expressions, as Husserl remarks, «in quite a different sense in relation
to  ideal  being,  from what  they  have  when  in  relation  to  empirical,  individualized
being»2. We do not «”grasp” [erfassen]» in fact the Universal, from now on called by
Husserl  «idea»  or  «ideal  being»,  in  experience  in  the  same  manner  we  have  «an
empirical content», which for its ontological status «comes up for vanishes again in the
stream of the psychical experience»3. Already we are in fact in what he will call in the
following years also the «disposition» or «attitude in essential-intuition»4. Obviously,
the starting point could and may be still «a red object which stands before us», but the
particular red object in our actual perception «is not the Species “Red”» nor the object
does contains this latter in the form of a “psychological” or “metaphysical” part. In this
context  we  find  Husserl  speaking  about  the  difference  between  the  particular  and
individual moment belonging to the Specie and which we found equal or “like” in all
the  objects  where  it  find  «instantiation»,  where  the  Specie  is  for  its  part  defined
notoriously now, as the identical unity «over against» the multiplicity of concrete cases:
«The part, the non-independent moment of red, is, like the concrete whole object,
something  individual,  something  here  and  now,  something  which  arises  and
vanishes with the concrete whole object, and which is  like, but not identical, in
different objects.  Redness,  however,  is  an ideal unity,  in regard to which it  is
1 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. 135.
2 Ibid., p. 134.
3 Ibid., p. 134 - 5.
4 E. Husserl, “Der Wesensunterschied in den Wesensbegriffen und ihrer Bildung. Anschauungsbegriffe als
Typenbegriffe gegenüber exakten Begriffen als Ideen” (1912), in Zur Lehre vom Wesen und der eidetische
Variation, in Husserliana, XL, cit., p. 65.
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absurd to speak of coming into being or passing away. The part (moment) red is
not Redness, but an instance of Redness»1.
Hence, as such a unity the Specie is defined by Husserl again, and now in a significant
way, «a universal object», which differs from singular ones even if undergoes to the
same «objective consideration»2. 
The same distinction is now to be found and has in fact its counterpart in the kind and
form of acts  that «grasp» or «apprehend the two kind of objects»,  according to the
general framework of intentional description of the acts of consciousness; in fact, 
«we do something completely different if, by looking at a concretum intuitively
given, we refer to its sensed redness [empfundene Röte], i.e., the individual feature
it has here and now, and if, on the other hand, we refer to the Species Redness, as
when we say that “Redness is a Colour”»3. 
Therefore, by regarding to the concrete case, especially more concrete cases, we refer
not to the concrete, but to «its universal, its Idea», and in the same manner, by regarding
several acts of such a “process” which Husserl calls now «Ideation», we may rise to the
inwardly  recognition  «of  the  identity  of  these  ideal  unities»  which  are,  continues
Husserl, «meant [gemeint] in our single acts»4. To these meant “ideal unities” belongs
identity in  the  strictest  sense,  which  means,  the  identity  granted  by being  identical
species, or species of the same genus. Any Idea is consequently given in such an act of
Ideation «based upon», according to Husserl, «an intuition» in the form of an act of
«insight [Einsicht]» and they maintain, more important now, «unity and identity over
against the dispersed multitude of concrete», like in the case of compared cases of an
evident judgment, act of meaning etc5. 
We  find  therefore  this  theory  very  concisely  newly  exposed  within  the  Logical
Investigations, i.e., in the notorious quote from the First  of the Logical Investigations.
Husserl writes in fact extensively but also with a certain clearness now:
1 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. 135.
2 E. Husserl, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungem 1906/07, in Husserliana XXIV, cit.,
p. 299.




«The genuine identity that we here assert is non other than the  identity of the
species. As a species and only as a species, can it embrace in unity (ξυμβάλλειν
εὶς ἕν), and as an ideal unity, the dispersed multiplicity of individual singulars.
The  manifold  singulars  for  the  ideal  unity  Meaning  are  naturally  the
corresponding  act-moment  of  meaning,  the  meaning-intentions.  Meaning  is
related  to  varied  acts  of  meaning –  Logical  Presentation  to  presentative  acts,
Logical Judgment to acts of judging, Logical Syllogism to acts of syllogism – just
as Redness in specie is to the slips of papers which lie here, and which all “have”
the  same  redness.  Each  slip  has,  in  addition  to  other  constitutive  aspects
(extension, form etc.), its own individual redness, i.e., its instance of this color-
species,  though this  neither  exists  in  the  slip  nor  anywhere else  in  the  whole
world, and particularly not “in our thought”, in so far as this latter is part of the
domain of real being, the sphere of temporality»1.
The fact of being or holding of something general amounts already now for Husserl to
an  «ideal  possibility»,  which  would guarantee for  the  extensive  falling of  empirical
cases under the Idea or the equivalency of statements, for instance. As such possibilities,
their  meaning  intentions  could  even  remain  without  actual  fulfillment,  the
«apprehension or bringing to consciousness» could not even be realized, but the ideal
being  retains  its  peculiar  existence  and  validity  «in  the  timeless»,  and  of  Lotzean
memory, «realm of Ideas»2.
Obviously, the definition of the universal within the first pages of the 1900 work, like
for example the one in the first of the six logical inquiries, refers directly to Husserl's
interpretation of the Specie in the sense of the Universal we have seen, which is now
«the class of “universal objects”» constituted by «meanings», and where the specie is
one of the first expressions of Husserl's conception for the Eidos3. By defining now the
ideality  proper  to  this  species  which  are  meanings,  Husserl  refers  from  now  on
explicitly to the necessity of conceive it in the sense of the ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, and interprets
them,  indeed,  as  universal  objects.  This  has  at  lest  partially its  reason in  the  sense
assigned by Husserl to the inquiry into meaning in the Logical Investigations.         
1 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 105 – 6.
2 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. 136.
3 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 108.
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The Logical Investigation were in fact notoriously thought by Husserl as his attempt to
«establish  a  theory  of  the  formal  deductive  systems»1,  which  is  the  task  of  a  not
psychologically interpreted and not merely normative logic, i.e., a logic as theory of
science  in  its  try  to  comprehend  what  makes  science,  science2.  This  kind  of  logic
investigates therefore into the unity of a theory, which exists on the basis of «certain
relation  of  founding»3.  These  is,  at  least,  partially  composed  by  the  «deductive
connection  of  given  propositions»4,  where  an  example  of  such  a  connection  is
represented  by  the  logical  relationship  between  premise  and  consequence  of
syllogisms5. Even if judgments «can barely being realized without verbal expression»,
the objects which pure logic seeks to examine are only «in the first instance, given to it
in grammatical clothing». Pure logic is in fact in Husserl understanding not science of
language. Thus, logical objects «come before us embedded in concrete mental states
which further function either as the meaning-intention or meaning-fulfillment or certain
verbal expressions (…) and form a phenomenological unity with such expressions»6.
Object  of  investigation  is  yet  not  the  «psychological  judgment,  i.e.,  the  concrete
psychical phenomenon» either, but rather the logical judgment, the «identical assertion-
meaning,  which  is  one  over  against  the  manifold  of  (…)  judgmental  lived-
experiences»7. 
The identical meaning of assertions is therefore a logical object. The meaning can be
maybe comprehended or grasped, but not stricto sensu perceived. A subject matter for
discussion was in fact, for example in Brentano, such kind of intuitions, in order to limit
the appeal to the existence of such meanings- and logical-entities. Obviously, on the
other side, «who advocates for ideal objects» can normally barely escape the accusation
of  metaphysically hypostatise  such entities.  But  such an interpretation would fail  in
understand the  proper  «meaning of  [Husserl's]  theory of  ideal  essentialities»,  which
represents  his  Platonismus  as  the  «direct  reference  to  a  kind  of  original  (…)
givennesses», whit respect of which we in everyday life and science judge and which
«show  in  knowledge  and,  thus,  as  something  truthfully  being»,  i.e.,  as  something
1 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. 5.
2 Ibid., p. 230.
3 Ibid., p. 232.
4 Ibid., p. 244.
5 Ibid., p. 243.
6 Ibid., p. 7 - 8.
7 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 8.
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“objective” even if not “real”1. In this sense, “object” is to be understood as equivalent
to  «predicable  subject»,  which  means,  in  a  so  «wide  sense»  granted  on  such  an
equivalence, which allows «”Ideas” to be valid as objects»2.  
To identify logical objects and predicative subjects is evidently not enough. Not to every
predication, can be in fact said, does correspond an object (“a square round”), but even
to  such  objects,  does  correspond  predications.  There  are  therefore  objectless
expressions3. But something is an object if it is, according to Husserl, the logical subject
of, at least, one true and primitive predication, even if the latter is not really realized. In
this  sense  Husserl  talks  therefore  about  “universal  objects”  in  the  First  Logical
Investigation:
 
«Meanings constitute (…) a class of concepts in the sense of “universal objects”.
They are not for that reason objects which, thought existing nowhere in the world,
have  being  in  a  τόπος  οὐράνιος  or  in  a  divine  mind,  for  such  metaphysical
hypostatization would be absurd. If one has accustomed oneself to understand by
“being” only real being, and by “object” only real objects, then talk of universal
objects  and  of  their  being,  may  well  seem basically  wrong;  no  offence  will,
however, be given to one who has first used such talk merely to assert the validity
of certain judgments, such in fact as concern numbers, propositions, geometrical
forms etc., and now who asks whether he is not evidently obliged (…) to affix the
label  “genuinely existent  object”  to  the correlate  of  his  judgment's  validity,  to
what it judges about. (…) The principle of the parallelogram of forces is as much
a single object as the city of Paris»4.
Notoriously,  the  labelling  under  the  expression  “ideal  objects”  for  the  meaning  as
“universal  objects”  and  even  in  general  the  impulse  for  such  an  inquiry  my  have
generated, according to Husserl, from the «decisive impulse of Bolzano, and especially
of Lotze» and their relevant work, the Wissenschaftslehre from 1837, and and Logik5. In
1903, looking back to his recent works in a review published in the famous Zeitschrift
für  Psychologie der  Sinnesorgane,  he  describes  in  fact  this  such  fundamental  step
1 Ibid., p. 282.
2 Ibid., p. 283.
3 E. Husserl, Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890 – 1910), in Husserliana XXII, p. 303f.
4 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, in Husserliana XIX/1, cit., p. 106.
5 Hua XVIII, p. 229.
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forward in his philosophy from the earlier psychological studies in mathematics:
«For what concern my concepts of the “ideal” meanings, the ideal presentative and
judgmental  contents,  they  arise  originally  not  from Bolzano,  but  from Lotze's
Logik. Especially, his series of insights around the interpretation of Plato's theory
of Idea had a deep impact on me. A personal rework on such insights from Lotze
gave me the key to (...) Bolzano's conceptions and to the treasury of his theory of
science»1. 
What Husserl was able to find in the first two Volumes of Bolzano's work was, «under
the  names  of  a  theory  of  representations  and propositions  in  itself»,  a  perfect  first
project for a pure logic, in the form of a «first try for a complete account of the field of
the purely ideal disciplines», applying yet his «Platonic interpretation»2. But besides this
occurrence,  Husserl's  interpretation  of  universal  objects  originated  from  his
understanding of  the  Universal  may have  first  offer  the necessary condition  for  his
Specie conception of meanings. 
As we have seen above now, the Specie conception for meanings will undergo in the
years after the Logical Investigations some changes, especially for what concerned the
kind of ideality belonging to the meanings which derived from Husserl's interpretation
of the Universal. What instead will develop further and constantly from the 1900 Work,
is the conception of the Universal in the sense of Essence or Eidos, which starts more
explicitly from the traditional conception of the Universal, i.e., the universal interpreted
as the something predicatively ascribable to different objects and which can have  «an
extension» to which refer,  while  represents  the object  defining moment.  That  is  the
concept of «every essence which has in a specific sense an universality, to which does
correspond an extension as long as to this same Essence belongs the possibility to be
comparable to an undefined multiplicity of individuals that correspond to the essence
itself»3. 
1  Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890 – 1910), in Husserliana XXII, cit., p. 156.
2 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, erster Band, in Husserliana XVIII, cit., p. 298.
3 E. Husserl, Logik und Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie. Vorlesungen 1917, in Husserliana, XXX, ed. U.
Panzer (Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, 1996), p. 373. This quote is from the original 1910 Lecture. 
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3.2.3) Essence as Defining Universal. Some brief Remarks from the Works after 1900. 
The universal or general determinations, properties and attributes which we  «ascribe
[zuschreiben]»  predicatively through categorically  articulated  experiences  to  objects,
but which basically already structures experience before such predicative turn, as it will
explicitly became a point of interest in the Husserlian works of the '20s and with the
investigations in the ante-predicative realm, define the broad sense of “essence” which
dominates much of Husserl's works till  Ideas. In this latter work we find in fact this
encompassing sense of essence along with a more specific one, which is linked to the
pure  eidos.  This  sense of  essence  results  is  in  fact  first  neutral  with respect  to  the
distinction pure/impure, and basically embraces the sense of a “conceptual universal”
we have introduced. Husserl writes in fact in the first part of the 1913 work:
«An individual object is not merely an individual object as such, a “This here”, an
object never repeatable; as qualified “in itself” thus and so, it has its own specific
character,  its  stock  of  essential predicables  which  must  belong  to  it  (as  “an
existent such as it is in itself”), if other, secundary, relative determinations can
belong to it.  Thus,  for example,  any tone in  and of itself  has an essence and,
highest of all, the universal essence tone as such, or rather sound as such - taken
purely as the moment that can be singled out intuitively in the individual tone
(alone or else by comparing one tone with others as “something common”). In
like manner any material thing has its own essential species and, highest of all, the
universal  species  “any  material  thing  whatever”,  with  any  temporal
determinations whatever,  any duration,  figure,  materiality whatever. Everything
belonging to the essence of the individuum another individuum can have too; and
hightest  eidetic universalities of the sort just indicated in our examples delimit
“regions” or “categories” of individua. (…) At first “essence” designated what it is
to  be  found  in  the  very  own  being  of  an  individuum  as  the  What  of  an
individuum»1.
 
As such therefore, it articulates in different levels of universality, but more importantly,
1 E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch, cit.,
p. 12 – 3.
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this  kind  of  essence  as  conceptual  universal  is  still  the  one  which  determines  the
possible subject S of a simple judgment of peculiar forms, for example, “This S is p”.
«If I say “this is green”, so the subject is 'determined'  by [bestimmt durch] the concept,
by the essence Green, it is something of the essence Green», as Husserl affirms in a
manuscript linked to the works for  Ideas1. In this sense, an object which appears in a
fulfilled judgment, does so as an object belonging, in the form of a non-independent
moment, within a state of affairs; that means, generally, as the “object about which”
[Gegenstand-worüber] of the former. But this object appears or it is posed in this form
yet only in the sense of a This which is «placed in relationship with a certain essence»2,
i.e., «a higher or lower universal», through which, on the basis of the same individual
intuition,  «the  object  constantly  undergoes  its  essential  determination
[Wesensbestimmung]»3.  This  complex  description  briefly  presents  what  Husserl
understood  after  the  Logical  Investigations with  the  «defining  Universal»  which
represents one fundamental aspect of his theory of essence and of his interpretation of
the conceptual universal4. 
First, Husserl affirms the fundamental function of such universal again and explicitly in
predication. With this kind of universal, so Husserl, «the concept of property [Merkmal]
first  develops»,  by  representing  this  kind  of  consciousness,  the  «consciousness  of
universality» as an object consciousness constituted “vis-à-vis” as consciousness of the
particular (at lowest level: individual consciousness), a «synthetically relating act» that
can place object and object in relation, and also the universal and the corresponding
particular5. The Universal is therefore an objectivity whose «constituting relationship»
with the individual is, so Husserl, akin to that of part and whole, but somehow different:
«The  universale  is  not  in  re  (is  not  ante  and  post  rem),  provided  that  we
understand the in in the same sense as in whole and part. The thing does not have
the conceptual universal within itself, but the concept belongs to the thing as its
1 E. Husserl,  “Substrat  und Wesen”, in Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen
Philosophie,  2  Halbband,  Ergänzende  Texte  (1912  –  1929),  in  Husserliana  III/2, ed  K.  Schuhmann
(Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag, 1976), p. 580.
2 E. Husserl, Vorlesungen über Bedeutungslehre. Sommersemester 1908, in Husserliana XXVI, ed U. Panzer
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, Bostin, London, 1987), p. 210.
3 E. Husserl, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungem 1906/07, in Husserliana XXIV, cit.,
p. 302.
4 Ibidem.
5 Ibid., p. 300. 
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“essence”; the thing has its determination, its properties, in the concept»1.
The relationship between the individual object and the property, like in “the ball is red”,
is according to Husserl different from the one between the Specie and the Genus (red –
color). We can in fact see the ball as divided into pieces, to which a moment “red”
corresponds. Corresponding to the dividing into pieces of the spatial form, each piece of
the ball has in fact its red moment and, on the other hand, its form moment, according to
a law. Belonging to each moment of form is the corresponding universal form, to the
whole ball, the ball form that belongs to the ball as property. Likewise, the coloration
which, though, as qualitative covering over of the ball, has and presupposes the property
ball  as  substratum.  To  each  of  this  moment  corresponds  therefore  a  Universal,  a
universal of «least difference»; the universal of the whole object is as Specie, the unity
over against this parts2.
Second,  to  this  concept  of  Essence  as  a  universal  object-determination
[Gegenstandsbestimmung]  can  now  also  be  linked  the  so  called  “empirical
Universalities” or empirical essences, which actually are co-pose explicitly or implicitly
Individuals belonging to reality. Such universalities have therefore a bounded extension,
which means, an «extension of actual and real possible individuals»3. This individuals
are the objects through which such universalities do find their «exemplification»4. 
It is for example by starting from this last characteristic remembered that it results more
easy to distinguish now this concept of essence, from the specific one which is Eidos. At
the time of the fundamental introduction to phenomenology which is Ideas, Husserl in
fact eventually reach “clarity” and consistency in the use and distinction of the concept
Eidos and Essence. The former assumes now a more peculiar meaning in respect to the
concept of essence. Husserl states critically  in the introduction of the first Book: 
«With the expressions Idee [idea] and Ideal [ideal], it is perhaps not quite so bad
with respect to disconcerting varieties of significations, though, on the whole, still
bad  enough,  a  fact  to  which  the  frequent  misinterpretation  of  my  Logische
Untersuchungen  have made me  sufficiently sensitive.  In  addition,  the  need to
1 Ibidem. Husserl recalls here also Plato's μέυεξις as a possible interpretation of such a relationship.
2 Ibid., p. 301f.
3 E. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, cit., p. 409.
4 Ibid., p. 398.
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keep the supremely important Kantian concept of idea cleanly separated from the
universal concept of (either formal or material) essence  decided me to make a
terminological change»1. 
That this is not only a more precise terminological use but defines also a distinction
which  was  somehow  absent  around  the  time  of  the  Logical  Investigation  and  that
exactly due to the definition given by Husserl of Ideality which, so broad and slightly
undistinguished, could hold for the use of the term eidos in the same sense also for the
kind of ideality we have investigated till now, i.e., the Specie or every kind of universal
object.  We  have  seen  the  fundamental  connection  Husserl  established  between  the
Specie and the Universal: the former when «objectively considered» is a unity based on
a peculiar identity which can be grasped as the «common» in the multiplicity of the
objectivities, i.e.,  as the identical which individualizes in them, and under which, as
conceptual  universal,  these  themselves  fall.  We  have  found  here  a  version  of  the
traditional definition of the Universal as «ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν». Both find expression, at least
till  the  1907,  in  the  concept  of  ”essence”,  which  is  therefore  still  not  itself  further
specified as eidos. We can therefore say, the more specific concept of Idea which is to
be  reconstruct  around  this  time,  is  somehow  not  understood  in  the  same  sense  of
Universal exposed.    
This  different conception of the Universal  which basically define a equally peculiar
sense of «essence», must therefore not be confused or «equivocated» with the broad
sense  of  essence  operating,  for  example,  in  the  Logical  Investigation2.  Already
terminologically, to this essence is linked a «pure universal» and moreover, it it actually
the sense of essence which also defines a «science of essence» and according to which
«essential laws» can be also defined3. Husserl refers to this sense of essence with “pure
essence” and moreover, it used by Husserl in conjunction with the term “pure Eidos”.
The characteristic feature of essence as Eidos seems to be found in its pureness indeed,
which emphasize for us a difference in respect of the essence in less specific sense
already seen above, by means of its less strong or mandatory bond with the experiential
giveness:        
1 E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch, cit.,
p. 8.
2 Ibidem.
3 E. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, cit., p. 409.
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«The Eidos, the pure essence, can be exemplified for intuition in experiential data
[Erfahrungsgegebenheiten] - in data of perception, memory, and so forth;  but it
can equally well  be  exemplified in data of mere phantasy.  Accordingly, to seize
upon  an  essence  itself,  and  to  seize  upon  it  originarily, we  can  start  from
corresponding experiencing intuitions, but equally well from intuitions which are
non-experiencing, which do not seize upon factual existence but which are instead
“merely imaginative”»1.
Therefore,  the  pureness  of  the  pure  essence  is  to  be  stress  by the  equally possible
exemplification  by  «experience  giveness»  as  well  as  «by  formation  [Gebilde]  of
phantasy»,  as  Husserl  points  out  already  in  his  1909   Einführung  in  die
Phänomenologie  der  Erkenntnis  lecture2. The  givenness  could  be  conceived  as  a
givenness of experience, but now a «mere imagining», or rather, «what is intuitively and
objectively present in it», can serve our purpose just as well. This kind of  «Universal
reachs here giveness in a certain sense on the basis of individuality, but absolutely not
by means that the being-position of the universal may somehow depend from the being
of the individual»3. This latter, which only in «misleading way may be called the basis
of  abstraction  [Abstractionsgrund]  of  the  universal»,  can  be  given  in  recollection,
«fictional  phantasy  just  as  well  in  phenomenological  perception».  In  this  case,  we
«differently comprehend» the individual, «differently from the particular, single this-
here»;  we  “intuitively  single  out”  [Herausschauen]  from  perception  data,  memory,
phantasy «the essence», we do it «generally» and we do not even need to «bring it to
giveness»4.  Individual  is  here  also  understood  broadly:  we  can  in  fact,  as  in
phenomenology, obtain the essence «memory, perception, judgment, (...) Or even “what
we understand by...”»5. Within this new kind of intuition, «of ideation as I may say», we
find a new kind of absolute giveness, free form the character of individual giveness.
Even if there would be «no humanity», «no existence in the sense of nature», as long as
1 E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch, cit.,
p. 16.  
2 E. Husserl, Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis. Vorlesung 1909, in Husserliana, Materialien
VII,  ed E. Schuhmann (Springer,  Dordrecht,  Berlin, Heidelberg, New Zork, 2005).  Also in  E. Husserl,
Erfahrung und Urteil, cit., p. 411.
3 E. Husserl, Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis. Vorlesung 1909, in Husserliana, Materialien
VII, cit., p. 84.
4 Ibid., p. 85.
5 Ibid., p. 86.
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such words as “perception”, “judgment” and so on are somehow understood, it is always
possible  «to  bring  to  clarity  and  giveness»  such  concepts  without  recurring  to  any
position of transcendence whatsoever.  
This pure essence or pure concepts are close as “exact concept” of such a science like
pure  geometry,  for  they do not  necessarily  co-positing  anything  real  to  which  they
unidirectionaly refer, «no factual existence»; otherwise, that would in a certain manner
define their extension [Umfang] and even their sphere of application only to a certain
portion of actual giveness. But pure concept of phenomenology are somehow far more
numerous  and  variable  than  the  «exact  concept»  that  we  find,  for  example,  in  the
«explicative science»1. The pure concept of phenomenology are in fact «type-concepts
[Typenbegriffe]»,  while  on  the  other  hand,  we find  the  «exact  concept»  which  are,
basically, «ideal limit-forms», under which do not properly fall any experience or even
phantasy giveness2. 
With the  introduction of  pure  Eidos  and,  more importantly,  Typical  concept  we are
already entering the realm of Husserl's eidetics. Both are in fact terms and concepts
which  will  undergo  in  the  transcendental  Phenomenology  a  deep  and  influential
investigations. Especially the concept of Typus will in fact develop in a direction very
close and somehow already delineated by the defining concept. But we are already here
also leaving the field and the limit of our work.  
1 E. Husserl, “Der Wesensunterschied in den Wesensbegriffen und ihrer Bildung. Anschauungsbegriffe als
Typenbegriffe gegenüber exakten Begriffen als Ideen” (1912), in Zur Lehre vom Wesen und der eidetische
Variation, in Husserliana, XL, cit., p. 57.





In a later manuscript from 1918, only recently published, Husserl explicitly defines the
essence  in  its  «individual  singularization»  as  in  the  form  of  a  «concrete  essence
[konkret]» as the ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν. Writes in fact Husserl in a articulated manner that 
«The concrete essence is the ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, which means, the complete Eidetical-
Identical  of  the  multiplicity  of  individual  particulars  [Einzelheiten],  which  for
their part do not “comprehend” anything further specific. If we distinguish the
“Quale”  in  this  ἓν,  in  this  concrete  essence,  in  the  same  manner  it  results
absolutely identical  for all  the individual  particulars.  It  is  an essence-moment,
which does not absolutely include in itself any further difference»1.
This essence-moment, the concrete essence, does not yet results «connected» with the
«extension in  which  it  rather  extents»  and which “qualifies” it  by the  essence  own
stretching out over it; while the extension itself results not «absolutely identical, when
we pass through the πολλοί», but rather it is punctually a different one2. 
We  see  here,  nearly  22  years  later  the  1896  manuscripts,  how  Husserl  certainly
continues his inquiry into Essence and Eidos with a perspective very close to the one we
have tried to emphasize and to analyze in this very last section. Even after the radical
changes  his  views  on Specie,  Essence  and  Eidos  that  we  have,  unfortunately,  only
briefly schematize, his struggle for understand the fundamental connection between our
power to recognize trough experience the common One among different elements, still
deeply penetrate his meditations. In the dense quote above, we also recognize again a
late trace of  the conceptual universal as interpreted, in our understanding, by Husserl:
the  ἓν as  the  eidetical  and  identical  Quale  which  constantly  emerges  from  the
1 E.  Husserl,  “Individuelle  Vereinzelung des  konkreten  Wesens  als  hèn  epì  pollôn,  das  in  ein  sich  nur
spezifisch  differenzierendes  Quale  und eine  sich  individuell  differenzierende  Extension  zerfällt.  Die
spezifische Differenz gegenüber der letzten, echten, individuellen Differenz”, in Zur Lehre vom Wesen und
der eidetische Variation, in Husserliana, XL, cit., p. 148.
2 Ibidem.
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multeplicity, assumes now one of Husserl's late name of the his refined definition of
Essence, the concrete Essence. Still, this essence is a form of a Specie, and even more,
appears  in  the  following  pages  of  the  manuscript,  as  the  defining  essence  we  find
passing through the πολλοί. As such, continues to maintain its status, its peculiar unity
and identity, which means, its objectual ideality. But certainly, the late Husserlian works
on  Essence  do  also  acquire  a  peculiar  connection  with  our  cognitive  experience,
introducing  in  fact  important  aspects  of  his  Wesenslehre not  yet  present,  even  if
considered somehow already present in nuce in some of his meditations from 1908, in
the early works we have taken under consideration.   
Around the time of the first  Book of  Ideas,  for example,  Husserl  tries to eventually
connect his analysis of essence to the question of  «concept formation» in science and
scientific though in broad sense. The true aim of the investigations seems to lay, above
the  surely  not  extemporaneous  inquiry  into  the  nature  and  origin  of  the  scientific
conceptuality, in the elucidation of another aspect of the relationship between Husserl's
articulation of ideality spreading in those years, and corresponding kind of conceptual
experience1. In order to present scientific conceptuality, Husserl turns in first instance to
the important distinction between “explication” and “description”, a distinction which
he develops in the central years of our works. Natural science is articulated in this sense
in two “levels”: the descriptive one, on which the objects are classified and coordinated
in Genus and Species; the explicative one, whose aim is to link those Species to their
constitutive elements and abstract principles. Husserl affirms to find such a stratification
in  «scientific  psychology»,  while a  corresponding application to  phenomenology,  by
recalling  a  mistaking  theoretical  connection  between  description/concrete  and
explication/abstract token from biology, would be erroneous2. Besides this distinction,
Husserl goes through the distinction of the kind of concepts belonging to the descriptive
sciences, to the explicative sciences and to phenomenology. Also the concept belonging
1 E. Husserl, “Der Wesensunterschied in den Wesensbegriffen und ihrer Bildung. Anschauungsbegriffe als
Typenbegriffe gegenüber exakten Begriffen als Ideen” (1912), in Zur Lehre vom Wesen und der eidetische
Variation, in Husserliana, XL, cit., p. 56.
2 Husserl  probably refers to the kind of psychological  investigations conducted, for example,  by Wundt.
During the time of the intense work on the development of his first phenomenology (1904-1912), Husserl
was in fact  deeply studing the psychological  approaches on different topics by Alexander Pfänder and
Thomas Lipps, but also by the structuralist Oswald Külpe and earlier from Wundt and James. Especially
Wundt  in  his  largely  reworked  Grundriss  der  Psychologie  (Wilhelm  Engelmann,  Leipzig,  5th  1902,)
conducted an inquiry into the  «psychical  elements» (ibid.,  p.  35)  and the higher and lower «psychical
formations» (ibid., p. 109f), for linking this descriptive and experimental analysis, even if «partially», to the
exposition of the «principles and laws of psychical causality» (ibid., p. 382).
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to  the  normal  cognitive  experience  are  taken  in  consideration.  In  this  sense,  he
systematically exposes here the distinction within «the formation of concepts» between
intuitive concepts and concepts as Ideas. The former are therefore defined in the sense
of the Typic, which is, with the introduction of the “concept” of Typus, an important step
further in the genetic approach to cognition. Typus are in fact previously introduced in a
similar way to the empirical universalities we have seen, and therefore, in the late works
on the genetic theory of experience and judgment, are explicitly exposed as such and
developed extensively in the realm of genetic phenomenology. Ideas on the other side,
do assume even more explicitly the “narrower” sense we have see emerge in the last
pages  of  this  works,  assuming  therefore  even  more  their  relevance  for  the  future
Husserlian  inquiries  into  the  Ideas  of  World  and  Ego,  which  will  become  pivotal
arguments in Husserl meditation of the late '30s. 
Also  if  we  briefly  look  to  one  of  the  main  work  of  the  genetic  phenomenology,
Erfahrung und Urteil, we find some interesting insights in order to trace back to the
early inquiries some of Husserl's certainly impressive detailed-studies belonging to the
late period. 
He writes in fact extensively in Erfahrung und Urteil:
«it is clear that when we pass from like moment to like moment a unity emerge in
the coincidence, a unity in the duality of elements which are both separated and
linked together,  and that this  unity emerges over and over again as totally and
identically the same when we pass to a new member (…), then again to <another
one> in which we have a moment p which is always like. The unity first emerges
on the basis of the passive coincidence of likeness of the individual moments; and
if one comes back to it, it can then be apprehended for itself»1.
We must, therefore, according to Husserl,  distinguish the  first series  of  judgments  in
which there is predicated of each substrate its own individual moment, such as S' is p',
S" is p'', etc., and in contrast to this the judgments in which the same p, as everywhere
like, is predicated as the universal as the identicallv one in all, that which emerges in p',
p'', and so on2. But he has also already introduced the passive coincidence, from which it
1 E. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, cit., p. 389.
2 Ibidem.
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follows now  
«that  the  unity is  preconstituted  in  the  passive  coincidence  of  likeness  of  the
moments p' p", and so on as the unity of the species p: on the strength of this, an
act of judgment oriented in a new direction is possible, in which, if we return to S'
and re-effect the identification, we no longer determine S' by p'  as its individual
moment but by p as identically the same in S, S', and so on»1.
And a few sentences after he states again:
«There result  the judgments S'  is  p,  S''  is  p,  and so on, in which p no longer
designates an individual predicative core but a general [generell] one, namely, the
universal as that which is common to two or more S's successively apprehended.
Instead  of  being  determined  by  the  fleeting  and  variable  moment,  this  is
determined, therefore, by an  element ideally and absolutely identical, which, in
the mode of repetition or assimilation, goes through all the individual objects and
their multiform moments as an ideal unity. As we will see later on, this is a unity
which is not at all a function of the actuality of the moments; it does not come
into being and disappear with them, and, though it is individualized in them, it is
not in them as apart»2.
«Speaking genetically and as a matter of principle», the general core of an universal
judgment, «is a  ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν» which can be present to consciousness in the form of
«the unity of an a priori generality», and moreover is now and under this form ready for
a possible «thematic apprehension», which for its part can only be the after result of a
previous and active accomplishment of the multiplicity of the individual and «separate
apprehension of like objects in a synthetic transition»3.  The one which comes to light
here is not in the objects as their part, as a partial-identical; otherwise, it would indeed
be only a like [Gleiches] which is present everywhere and the like elements would be in
a relation of intersection.
1 Ibidem.
2 Ibid., p. 390. Italics mine.
3 Ibid., p. 391.
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«Hence, the  one  does not repeat itself in the like; it  is given only once, but in
many.  It  confronts  us  as  an  objectivity  of  a  new  kind,  as  an  objectivity  of
understanding, arising from original sources of activity, although obviously on the
foundation of sensibility;  for the activity of apprehending and running through
particulars and bringing them into coincidence is necessary if the universal is to be
preconstituted at all and then become a thematic object»1.
We  see  here,  even  if  only  so  briefly  exposed,  how  Husserl's  meditations  on  the
Universals assume their new forms in the genetic phenomenology, which for itself is a
completely new realm of investigations, unfortunately too far from the aim of our work.
But to a certain extent, the core of Husserl exposition explicitly regain the shape and the
spirit of the early analysis. 
For us it suffices here to have at least partially shared some light on the origin of what
we see developing from the early years till these late works. 
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